Consociativismo

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Il Consociativismo (in inglese Consociationalism) è una forma di governo che garantisce una rappresentanza garantita ai diversi gruppi che compongono un paese. Viene spesso adottato per gestire i conflitti che sorgono in comunità nazionali profondamente divise per ragioni storiche, etniche o religiose. I suoi obiettivi sono la stabilità del governo, la sopravvivenza degli accordi di divisione del potere e della democrazia ed evitare la violenza politica. Quando il consociativismo si instaura tra le diverse confessioni religiose che convivono in un determinato paese, è noto anche come Confessionalismo. Esempio di governo in cui si è applicato il confessionalismo è quello offerto dal Libano.

Il consociativismo è stato trattato in termini accademici dallo politologo olandese Arend Lijphart. Peraltro, Lijphart affermava di aver "unicamente scoperto che tale pratica era stata – indipendentemente dall'opera di esperti accademici o di altro tipo – inventata diverse volte negli anni precedenti".^[1]

John McGarry e Brendan O'Leary fanno risalire il consociativismo al 1917, quando venne per la prima volta utilizzato nei Paesi Bassi. ^[2] Nei fatti, Lijphart fa profondi riferimenti all'esperienza del suo paese d'origine per sviluppare la sua tesi in favore odell'approccio consociativo per regolare i conflitti etnici. I Paesi Bassi, paese consociativo, furono divisi - nel periodo tra il 1857 e il 1967 in quattro pilastri: i calvinisti, i cattolici, i socialisti e i liberali (anche se, fino al 1917 era in vigore un sistema elettorale di tipo maggioritario). Nel tempo in cui vigeva la "pilastrizzazione" ogni pilastro comprendeva gruppi strettamente organizzati, società ricreative e sportive, scuole, università, ospedali e giornali, frequentati e letti solo dai membri del "pilastro". La teoria, secondo Lijphart, ha il suo centro sul ruolo delle élites sociali, sui loro accordi e la loro cooperazione, come chiave per raggiungere una democrazia stabile.

[modifica] Caratteristiche

Lijphart identifica quattro caratteristiche chiave delle democrazie consociative:^[3]

• Grande coalizione - I gruppi dirigenti di ogni "pilastro" si uniscono per governare insieme negli interessi della società, in quanto riconoscono i pericoli della non cooperazione.
• Veto reciproco - Il consenso tra i vari gruppi è necessario per confermare le scelte della maggioranza. La reciprocità (Mutuality) comporta che la minoranza non ha interesse a bloccare la maggioranza. Infatti, se un gruppo riuscisse a bloccare un altro in una certa materia, quest'ultimo potrebbe come rappresaglia bloccare il primo in qualche altra materia di suo interesse. Si cercheranno, quindi, soluzioni condivise.
• Proporzionalità - La rappresentanza politica si basa sulla popolazione. Se un "pilastro" rappresenta il 30% della società civile, i suoi rappresentanti devono occupare non solo il 30% dei seggi parlamentari, ma anche un'identica porzione delle forze di polizia, del pubblico impiego e di tutti gli altri segmenti in cui è divisa la società.
• Autonomia tra i pilastri - Ciascun pilastro è autonomo dagli altri. Questo crea un senso di appartenenza tra i suoi membri e consente che, di fronte ad una medesima situazione, possano essere adottate norme giuridiche diverse, basate sulle consuetudini comunitarie dei soggetti coinvolti. Ad esempio, in Libano e Israele il matrimonio è regolato esclusivamente dalle norme della religione a cui aderiscono i nubendi (Islam, Ebraismo, varie confessioni cristiane ecc.) e non esistono norme regolatrici dei matrimoni interreligiosi, che quindi, di fatto, non sono consentiti.

[modifica] Favourable conditions

Lijphart also identifies a number of 'favourable conditions' under which consociationalism is likely to be successful:^[3]

• Multi-axis balance of power - The presence of 3 or more disparate groups, all constituting minorities, yields equilibrium.
• Multi-party system - One party cannot impose its will to the exclusion of the others. Thus, it becomes necessary to build coalitions.
• Small size - The elite members of society are more likely to be familiar with each other within the context of a smaller society.
• Overarching loyalty - The disparate groups share a feeling of belonging to the same political environment.
• Segmental isolation - Close contact would mean a higher likelihood of conflict.
• Tradition of elite accommodation - Good environment created
• Leader-follower relationship - The elites are firmly in control and have the support of followers.

[modifica] Advantages of consociationalism

In a consociational state, all groups, including minorities, are represented on the political and economic stage. Supporters of consociationalism argue that it is a more realistic option in deeply divided societies than integrationist approaches to conflict resolution.^[4] It has been credited with supporting successful and non-violent transitions to democracy in countries such as South Africa.^{[citazione necessaria]}

[modifica] Criticisms

[modifica] Brian Barry

Brian Barry has questioned the nature of the divisions that exist in the countries that Lijphart considers to be 'classic cases' of consociational democracies. For example, he makes the case that in the Swiss example, "political parties cross-cut cleavages in the society and provide a picture of remarkable consensus rather than highly structured conflict of goals".^[5] In the case of the Netherlands, he argues that "the whole cause of the disagreement was the feeling of some Dutchman...that it mattered what all the inhabitants of the country believed. Demands for policies aimed at producing religious or secular uniformity presuppose a concern...for the state of grace of one’s fellow citizens". He contrasts this to the case of a society marked by conflict, in this case Northern Ireland, where he argues that "the inhabitants…have never shown much worry about the prospects of the adherents of the other religion going to hell".^[6] Barry concludes that in the Dutch case, consociationalism is tautological and argues that "the relevance of the 'consociational' model for other divided societies is much more doubtful than is commonly supposed".^[7]

[modifica] Rinus van Schendelen

Van Schendelen has argued that Lijphart uses evidence selectively. Pillarisation was "seriously weakening," even in the 1950s, cross-denominational co-operation was increasing, and formerly coherent political sub-cultures were dissolving. He argued that elites in the Netherlands were not motivated by preferences derived from the general interest, but rather by self-interest. They formed coalitions not to forge consociational negotiation between segments but to improve their parties' respective power. He argued that the Netherlands was "stable" in that it had few protests or riots, but that it was so before consociationalism, and that it was not stable from the standpoint of government turnover. He questioned the extent to which the Netherlands, or indeed any country labelled a consociational system, could be called a democracy, and whether calling a consociational country a democracy isn’t somehow ruled out by definition. He believed that Lijphart suffered severe problems of rigor when identifying whether particular divisions were cleavages, whether particular cleavages were segmental, and whether particular cleavages were cross-cutting.^[8]

[modifica] Lustick on hegemonic control

Ian Lustick has argued that academics lack an alternative 'control' approach for explaining stability in deeply divided societies and that this has resulted in the empirical overextension of consociational models.^[9] Lustick argues that Lijphart has "an impressionistic methodological posture, flexible rules for coding data, and an indefatigable, rhetorically seductive commitment to promoting consociationalism as a widely applicable principle of political engineering"^[10], that results in him applying consociational theory to case studies that it does not fit. Furthermore, Lustick states that "Lijphart's definition of 'accommodation'...includes the elaborately specified claim that issues dividing polarized blocs are settled by leaders convinced of the need for settlement".^[11]

[modifica] Other criticisms

Critics point out that consociationalism is dangerous in a system of differing antagonistic ideologies, generally conservatism and communism. They state that specific conditions must exist for three or more groups to develop a multi-party system with strong leaders. This philosophy is dominated by elites, with those masses that are sidelined with the elites having less to lose if war breaks out. Consociationalism cannot be imperially applied. For example, it does not effectively apply to Austria. Critics also point to the failure of this line of reasoning in Lebanon, a country that reverted back to civil war. It only truly applies in Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands, and not in more deeply divided societies. If one of three groups gets half plus one of the vote, then the other groups are in perpetual opposition, which is largely incompatible with consociationalism.

Consociationalism focuses on diverging identities such as ethnicity instead of integrating identities such as class, institutionalizing and entrenching the former. Furthermore, it relies on rival co-operation, which is inherently unstable. It focuses on intra-state relations and neglects relations with other states. Donald Horowitz argues that consociationalism can lead to the reification of ethnic divisions, since "grand coalitions are unlikely, because of the dynamics of intraethnic competition. The very act of forming a multiethnic coalition generates intraethnic competition – flanking – if it does not already exist".^[12]

Consociationalism assumes that each group is cohesive and has strong leadership. Although the minority can block decisions, this requires 100 per cent agreement. Rights are given to communities rather than individuals, leading to over-representation of some individuals in society and under-representation of others. Grand coalitions are unlikely to happen due to the dynamics of ethnic competition. Each group seeks more power for itself. Consociationalists are criticized for focusing too much on the set up of institutions and not enough on transitional issues which go beyond such institutions. Finally, it is claimed that consociational institutions promote sectarianism and entrench existing identities.

[modifica] Examples of consociational arrangements

The political systems of a number of countries operate on a consociational basis, including:

• Belgium
• Lebanon
• The Netherlands from 1917 until 1967
• Switzerland
• Nigeria

Additionally, a number of peace agreements are consociational, including:

• The Dayton Agreement that ended the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is described as a "classic example of consociational settlement" by Sumantra Bose^[13] and "an ideal-typical consociational democracy" by Roberto Belloni.^[14]
• The Belfast Agreement of 1998 in Northern Ireland (and its subsequent reinforcement with 2006's St Andrews Agreement), which Brendan O'Leary describes as "power-sharing plus".^[15]

[modifica] References

1. ^ Arend Lijphart (2004) 'Constitutional design for divided societies', Journal of Democracy 15(2), pp. 96-109, p. 97
2. ^ John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary (1993) ‘Introduction: The macro-political regulation of ethnic conflict’, in John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary (eds.) The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts, London: Routledge, pp. 1-40
3. ^ ^{a b} Arend Lijphart (1977) Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press
4. ^ John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary (2006) 'Consociational theory, Northern Ireland's conflict, and its agreement 2: What critics of consociation can learn from Northern Ireland', Government and Opposition 41(2), pp. 249-277
5. ^ Brian Barry (1979a) 'Political accommodation and consociational democracy', British Journal of Political Science 5(4), pp. 477-505, p. 501
6. ^ Brian Barry (1979b) 'The consociational model and its dangers', European Journal of Political Research 3(4), pp. 393-412, p. 407
7. ^ Brian Barry (1979a), p. 481
8. ^ M.C.P.M. van Schendelen (1984) 'The Views of Arend Lijphart and Collected Criticisms', Acta Politica 19(1), pp. 19-49
9. ^ Ian Lustick (1979) 'Stability in deeply divided societies: Consociationalism versus control', World Politics 31(3), pp. 325-344
10. ^ Ian Lustick (1997) 'Lijphart, Lakatos, and consociationalism', World Politics 50(1), pp. 88-117, p. 117
11. ^ Ian Lustick (1997), p. 100
12. ^ Donald Horowitz (1985) Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, p. 575
13. ^ Sumantra Bose (2002) Bosnia After Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 216
14. ^ Roberto Belloni (2004) 'Peacebuilding and consociational electoral engineering in Bosnia and Herzegovina', International Peacekeeping 11(2), pp. 334-353, p. 336
15. ^ Brendan O’Leary (1999) 'The 1998 British-Irish Agreement: Power-sharing plus', Scottish Affairs 26, pp. 14-35

[modifica] Bibliografia

• Maurizio Stefanini. "Grandi coalizioni. Quando funzionano, quando no". Boroli Editore, 2008.