Sino-American relations
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| People's Republic of China | United States |
U.S.-China relations refers to international relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China. Most analysts have characterized present Sino-American relations as complex and multi-faceted, with the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) being neither allies nor enemies. At the same time, it is generally acknowledged that the nature of Sino-American relations will be a major factor in determining the state of the world in the 21st century.
Relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States have generally been volatile, especially after the fall of the Soviet Union, which removed a common enemy and ushered in a world characterized by American dominance. Some in the United States remain suspicious of the Communist Party of China and believe that its goal is to establish hegemony in East Asia and even worldwide, and threaten U.S. interests[citation needed]. There are also grievances which relate to human rights in the People's Republic of China and the PRC's claims on Republic of China's territory. For its part, there are suspicions in the PRC that the United States wishes to make China weak and divided and that criticisms pertaining to its human rights record are unwarranted in light of the economic and living standard improvements that have occurred in the country.[citation needed]
While there are many irritants in Sino-American relations, there are also many stabilizing factors. The People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States are major trade partners and have common interests in the prevention and suppression of terrorism and in preventing nuclear proliferation. While the end of the Cold War removed a common enemy, the War on Terror has produced a new common enemy, which has stabilized relations to some degree.
In addition, while there is still a great deal of Chinese mistrust at American intentions, there is also the grudging realization that the United States will likely remain a sole superpower for a great deal of time, and any direct challenge to the United States' position is likely beyond PRC's capability for several decades. There is also a realization that most of PRC's challenges and difficulties are internal, and therefore there is a desire on the part of the PRC to maintain stable relations with the United States. There is some strain due to US support for Tibetan and East Turkestan independence movements, which the PRC views as terrorism.
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[edit] Images and conceptions
Much of the complexity of Sino-American relations comes from the images that the two have of themselves and of the other.
Within China, there is a love-hate relationship with the United States. On the one hand, American consumerism and culture are seen as stylish. At the same time, there is resentment of American intervention into other nations' affairs, combined with a fear of American power. The Chinese are often perplexed at the stated motives of American foreign policy and tend to conclude that these goals, (such as promoting freedom and democracy) are an insincere cover for darker motives, namely to make China weak and divided. The leadership of the PRC often expresses confusion as to how others could interpret PRC's foreign and domestic policies as threatening.
Americans tend to see China as a far off and distant land. Since the 19th century, there has been a missionary impulse in American dealings with China, and the United States often believes that as part of its mission to advance freedom and democracy, it has the duty to advance the cause of human rights in China. Over the past 150 years, Americans have also tended to see the Chinese people as oppressed and abused by either the Japanese in World War II and more recently by the Communist Party of China. Americans do not generally accept the notion that many Chinese support the PRC government, because of its authoritarian nature, and are critical of the non-democratic government's ability to make decisions to benefit the Chinese people. As a result, Americans tend to be confused by the notion that most Chinese people find American criticism of human rights to be hypocritical and meddlesome.
Many in the United States, such as adherents of neoconservatism and the Blue Team, view the PRC as having the potential to threaten American global dominance and unipolarity. This attitude has been reflected by the Americans' suspicion of trade with the People's Republic of China.
[edit] History
[edit] From American Independence to the Treaty of Wangxia
First contact between the post-revolutionary Americans and the Chinese occurred during the voyage of the trader ship Empress of China, which arrived at Canton in 1784. Given the Chinese demand for raw goods as well as the American demand for anything remotely exotic, the voyage of the Empress was a financial windfall for its owners and thus began the lucrative Sino-American relationship known as the Old China Trade.
The result was the considerable exportation of specie, ginseng, and furs to China, not to mention the much larger influx of teas, cottons, silks, lacquerware, porcelains, and furniture to the United States. The merchants, who served as middlemen between the Chinese and American consumers, became fabulously wealthy from this trade, eventually giving rise to America's first generation of millionaires. In addition, many Chinese artisans began to notice the American desire for exotic wares and adjusted their practice accordingly, manufacturing goods made specifically for export. These export wares often sported American or European motifs in order to fully capitalize on the consumer demographic.
The end of the First Opium War in 1842 led to the Anglo-Chinese Treaty of Nanking, which forced open many Chinese ports to foreign trade. To this point, Sino-American relations had been conducted solely through trade; however, this new pact between the British and Chinese severely threatened further American business in the region. The John Tyler administration would thus secure the 1844 Treaty of Wangxia, which not only put American trade on par with the British but also secured Americans the right of extraterritoriality. This treaty effectively ended the era of the Old China Trade, giving the United States as many trading privileges as other foreign powers.
[edit] Open Door Policy
In the late 19th century the major world powers, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia, began carving out spheres of influence amongst themselves in China, then under the Qing Dynasty. The United States wanted this to stop. Therefore, in 1899, U.S. Secretary of State John Hay sent diplomatic notes to all of these powers, asking them to guarantee the territorial and administrative integrity of China, as well as to not interfere with the free use of treaty ports within their respective spheres of influence. The major powers evaded responding, saying they could not commit to anything until all the other powers had assented first, but Hay took this as acceptance of his proposal, which came to be known as the Open Door Policy.
The Open Door Policy, while generally respected internationally, did suffer serious setbacks. The first one occurred with Russian encroachment in Manchuria in the late 1890s. Protested by the U.S., it would lead to a Russian war with Japan in 1904. Japan then presented a further challenge to the Policy with its Twenty-One Demands in 1915 (then Republic of China (ROC)). Japan would conclude secret treaties with the Allies which promised them the German territories in China. However, the biggest setback to the Open Door Policy came in 1931, when Japan invaded and occupied Manchuria, setting up the puppet state of Manchukuo. The Americans, along with other countries, strongly condemned the action but did little at the time to stop it.
[edit] World War II
The outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 saw aid flow into the Republic of China (ROC, which was led by Chiang Kai-shek) from the United States (under President Franklin D. Roosevelt). A series of Neutrality Acts had been passed in the U.S. with the support of isolationists that forbade American aid to countries at war. However, since the Second Sino-Japanese War was undeclared, Roosevelt denied that a state of war existed in China and proceeded to send aid to Chiang.
American public sympathy for the Chinese was aroused by reports from Protestant missionaries, novelists such as Pearl Buck, and Time Magazine of Japanese brutality in China, including those surrounding the "Nanking Massacre." Japanese-American relations were further soured by the USS Panay Incident during the bombing of Nanjing. Roosevelt demanded an apology from the Japanese, which was received, but relations between the two countries would continue to deteriorate.
China formally declared war on Japan in 1941 following the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor, which brought the Americans into World War II. Massive amounts of aid were given by the Roosevelt administration to Chiang's beleaguered government, now headquartered in Chongqing. However, a perception grew that Chiang's government was unable or incapable to effectively resist the Japanese, or that he preferred to focus more on defeating the Chinese Communist Party under Mao Zedong; the two factions had been in conflict for years, and the same has been argued of the CCP. After World War II ended in 1945, the obvious hostility between the ROC and the CCP exploded into open civil war. General Douglas MacArthur directed the military forces under Chiang Kai-shek to go to the island of Taiwan to accept the surrender of Japanese troops, thus beginning the military occupation of Taiwan. American general George C. Marshall tried to broker a truce between the ROC and the CCP in 1946, but it quickly came undone, and the Nationalist cause went steadily downhill until 1949, when the Communists emerged victorious and drove the Nationalists from the Chinese mainland onto Taiwan and other islands. Mao established the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland, while the ROC has remained on Taiwan and other islands until the present day.
[edit] People's Republic of China
For 30 years after its founding, the United States did not formally recognize the People's Republic of China (PRC). Instead, it maintained diplomatic relations with the Republic of China government on Taiwan, and recognized the ROC as the sole legitimate government of all China.
As the People's Liberation Army moved south to complete the communist conquest of mainland China in 1949, the American embassy followed the Republic of China government headed by Chiang Kai-shek to Taipei later that year. U.S. consular officials remained in mainland China. However, the new PRC Government was hostile to this official American presence, and all U.S. personnel were withdrawn from the mainland in early 1950.
[edit] Korean War
Any remaining hope of normalizing relations ended when the U.S. and PRC's forces fought directly against each other in the Korean War. The Soviet Union was more of a factor than the People's Republic of China in instigating the 1950 North Korean invasion of South Korea.[citation needed] In response, the United Nations Security Council undertook to assist by military means the Republic of Korea. This was only possible due to the Soviet boycott of the Security Council due to the fact that the ROC continued to occupy China's seat, otherwise it would certainly have exercised its veto power. Once the American-led UN forces' counter-attack crossed the pre-war dividing line into the north and began to approach dangerously to the Yalu river on the Sino-Korea border, the PRC undertook a massive intervention into the conflict on the side of the communists. The subsequent PRC counterattack caused the longest retreat in American military history and heavy casualties on both sides, before the UN forces were able to repel the PRC back, near the original division. Two years of continued and often locally bitter fighting ended in an overall stalemate that ensued while negotiations dragged on, until a cease-fire was agreed to on the 27 July 1953. The war officially has not ended, and the Korean issue has had an important role in Sino-American relations ever since.
[edit] Relations frozen
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The United States continued to work to prevent the PRC from taking China's seat in the United Nations and encouraged its allies not to deal with the PRC. The United States placed an embargo on trading with the PRC, and encouraged allies to follow it. The PRC developed nuclear weapons in 1964 and, as later declassified documents revealed, President Johnson considered preemptive attacks to halt its nuclear program. Ultimately he decided the measure was too risky and it was abandoned.
Despite this official non-recognition, beginning in 1954 and continuing until 1970, the United States and the People's Republic of China held 136 meetings at the ambassadorial level, first in Geneva and later in Warsaw.
[edit] Rapprochement
Both the PRC and the U.S. had issued feelers to try to improve relations between the two major powers. This became an especially important concern for the People's Republic of China after the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969. The PRC was diplomatically isolated and the leadership came to believe that improved relations with the United States would be a useful counterbalance to the Soviet threat. Zhou Enlai, the PRC premier foreign minister, was at the forefront of this effort, but he had the committed backing of Mao.
In the United States, some were of the opinion that excluding Communist China from the world stage had primarily a harmful effect. Some Americans hoped that improved relations with the PRC could help them in Southeast Asia to deal with Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos and that if the PRC would align with the U.S. it would mean a major redistribution of global power against the Soviets. It was also postulated that mainland China's market of over a billion consumers could be a boom to American business.
One of the American political figures most interested in the PRC was Mike Mansfield, the Democratic Senate Majority Leader. He was contacted by the PRC and they proposed a meeting. Mansfield passed the note on to the State Department and President Richard Nixon.
Nixon had long been interested in Asia as well and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger believed approaching the PRC would be valuable. Domestic political concerns also entered into Nixon's thinking; the boost from a successful courting of the PRC could help him greatly in the 1972 American presidential election. He also worried immensely that one of the Democrats would preempt him and go to the PRC before he had the opportunity.
Communications were ongoing between the PRC and American leadership through the intermediaries of Pakistan and Romania.
In 1969, the United States thus initiated measures to relax trade restrictions and other impediments to bilateral contact, to which China responded. However, the rapprochement process was stalled by U.S. actions in Indochina until on April 6, 1971 the young American ping pong player, Glenn Cowan, missed his U.S. team bus and was waved by a Chinese table tennis player onto the bus of the Chinese team at the 31st World Table Tennis Championship in Nagoya, Japan. Cowan spoke with the Chinese players in a friendly fashion, and the Chinese player, Zhuang Zedong, a three-time World Men's Singles Champion, presented him with a silk-screen portrait of the famous Huangshan Mountains. While this had been a purely spontaneous gesture of friendship between two athletes, the PRC chose to treat it as an officially sanctioned outreach. Zhuang Zedong spoke about the incident in a 2007 talk at the USC U.S.-China Institute (video).According to sources of information from the PRC, the friendly contact between Zhuang Zedong and Glenn Cowan, as well as the photograph of the two players in Dacankao, had an impact on Mao's decision making. He had earlier decided not to invite the U.S. team along with teams of other western countries that had been invited. Later known as Ping Pong Diplomacy, the PRC responded by inviting the American ping pong team to tour mainland China. The Americans agreed and on April 10, 1971 the athletes became the first Americans to officially visit China since the communist takeover in 1949.[1]
In July of 1971 Henry Kissinger, while on a trip to Pakistan, feigned illness and did not appear in public for a day. He was actually on a top-secret mission to Beijing to open relations with the government of the PRC. On July 15, 1971, President Richard Nixon revealed the mission to the world and that he had been invited to visit the PRC and that he had accepted.
This announcement caused immediate shock around the world. In the United States, some of the most hardline anti-communists spoke against the decision, but public opinion supported the move and Nixon saw the jump in the polls he had been hoping for. Since Nixon had sterling anti-communist credentials he was all but immune to being called "soft on communism."
Within the PRC there was also opposition from left-wing elements. This effort was allegedly led by Lin Biao, head of the military. Lin Biao, however, died in a mysterious plane crash over Mongolia while trying to defect to the Soviet Union, silencing most internal dissent over the move.
Internationally, the reactions varied. The Soviets were immensely concerned that two major enemies seemed to have resolved their differences, and the new world alignment contributed significantly to the policy of détente.
America's European allies and Canada were pleased by the initiative, especially since many of them had already recognized the PRC. In Asia, the reaction was far more mixed. Japan was extremely annoyed that it had not been told of the announcement until fifteen minutes before it had been made, and feared that the Americans were abandoning them in favor of the PRC. A short time later, Japan also recognized the PRC and would commit to substantial trade with the continental power. South Korea and South Vietnam were both concerned that peace between the United States and the PRC could mean an end to support for them against their communist enemies. Throughout the period of rapprochement both these states had to be regularly assured that they would not be abandoned.
From February 21 to February 28, 1972, President Nixon traveled to Beijing, Hangzhou, and Shanghai. At the conclusion of his trip, the U.S. and the PRC issued the Shanghai Communiqué, a statement of their respective foreign policy views. In the Communiqué, both nations pledged to work toward the full normalization of diplomatic relations. The U.S. acknowledged the PRC position that all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The statement enabled the U.S. and PRC to temporarily set aside the "crucial question [Taiwan] obstructing the normalization of relations" and to open trade and other contacts.
The rapprochement with the United States benefited the PRC immensely and greatly increased its security for the rest of the Cold War. It has been argued that the United States, on the other hand, saw fewer benefits than it had hoped for. The PRC continued to heavily support North Vietnam in the Vietnam War and also backed the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. Eventually, however, PRC's suspicion of Vietnam's motives would lead to a break in Sino-Vietnamese cooperation and, upon the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1979, the Sino-Vietnamese War. Both China and the United States would back combatants in Africa against Soviet and Cuban supported movements. The economic benefits of normalization were slow as it would take decades for American products to penetrate the vast Chinese market. While Nixon's China policy is regarded by many as the highlight of his presidency, others such as William Bundy, have argued that it provided very little benefit to the United States.
[edit] Liaison Office, 1973-1978
In May 1973, in an effort to build toward the establishment of formal diplomatic relations, the U.S. and the PRC established the United States Liaison Office (USLO) in Beijing and a counterpart PRC office in Washington, DC. In the years between 1973 and 1978, such distinguished Americans as David K. E. Bruce, George H. W. Bush, Thomas S. Gates, and Leonard Woodcock served as chiefs of the USLO with the personal rank of Ambassador.
President Gerald Ford visited the PRC in 1975 and reaffirmed the U.S.'s interest in normalizing relations with Beijing. Shortly after taking office in 1977, President Jimmy Carter again reaffirmed the goals of the Shanghai Communiqué. The United States and the People's Republic of China announced on December 15, 1978 that the two governments would establish diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979.
[edit] U.S.-China relations since normalization
In the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations dated January 1, 1979, the United States transferred diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. The U.S. reiterated the Shanghai Communiqué's acknowledgment of the Chinese position that there is only one China and that Taiwan is a part of China; Beijing acknowledged that the American people would continue to carry on commercial, cultural, and other unofficial contacts with the people of Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act (text)made the necessary changes in U.S. domestic law to permit such unofficial relations with Taiwan to flourish.
Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping's January 1979 visit to Washington, DC initiated a series of important, high-level exchanges, which continued until the spring of 1989. This resulted in many bilateral agreements - especially in the fields of scientific, technological, and cultural interchange as well as trade relations. Since early 1979, the United States and the PRC have initiated hundreds of joint research projects and cooperative programs under the Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology, the largest bilateral program.
On March 1, 1979 the United States and the People's Republic of China formally established embassies in Beijing and Washington, DC. In 1979 outstanding private claims were resolved and a bilateral trade agreement was concluded. Vice President Walter Mondale reciprocated Vice Premier Deng's visit with an August 1979 trip to China. This visit led to agreements in September 1980 on maritime affairs, civil aviation links, and textile matters, as well as a bilateral consular convention.
As a consequence of high-level and working-level contacts initiated in 1980, U.S. dialogue with the PRC broadened to cover a wide range of issues, including global and regional strategic problems, political-military questions, including arms control, UN and other multilateral organization affairs, and international narcotics matters.
The expanding relationship that followed normalization was threatened in 1981 by PRC objections to the level of U.S. arms sales to the Republic of China on Taiwan. Secretary of State Alexander Haig visited China in June 1981 in an effort to resolve Chinese questions about America's unofficial relations with Taiwan. Eight months of negotiations produced the U.S.-PRC joint communiqué of August 17, 1982. In this third communiqué, the U.S. stated its intention to gradually reduce the level of arms sales to the Republic of China, and the PRC described as a fundamental policy their effort to strive for a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan question. Meanwhile, Vice President Bush visited the PRC in May of 1982.
High-level exchanges continued to be a significant means for developing U.S.-PRC relations in the 1980s. President Ronald Reagan and Premier Zhao Ziyang made reciprocal visits in 1984. In July 1985, President Li Xiannian traveled to the United States, the first such visit by a PRC head of state. Vice President Bush visited the PRC in October 1985 and opened the U.S. Consulate General in Chengdu, the U.S.'s fourth consular post in the PRC. Further exchanges of cabinet-level officials occurred between 1985–1989, capped by President Bush's visit to Beijing in February 1989.
In the period before the June 3–4, 1989 crackdown, a large and growing number of cultural exchange activities undertaken at all levels gave the American and Chinese peoples broad exposure to each other's cultural, artistic, and educational achievements. Numerous mainland Chinese professional and official delegations visited the United States each month. Many of these exchanges continued after the suppression of the Tiananmen protests.
[edit] Bilateral relations after Tian'anmen
Following the Chinese authorities' suppression of demonstrators in June 1989, the U.S. and other governments enacted a number of measures to express their condemnation of the PRC's violation of human rights. The U.S. suspended high-level official exchanges with the PRC and weapons exports from the U.S. to the PRC. The U.S. also imposed a number of economic sanctions. In the summer of 1990, at the G-7 Houston summit, Western nations called for renewed political and economic reforms in mainland China, particularly in the field of human rights.
Tian'anmen disrupted the U.S.-PRC trade relationship, and U.S. investors' interest in mainland China dropped dramatically. The U.S. government also responded to the political repression by suspending certain trade and investment programs on June 5 and 20, 1989. Some sanctions were legislated; others were executive actions. Examples include:
- The U.S. Trade and Development Agency (TDA) - new activities in mainland China were suspended from June 1989 until January 2001, when then-President Bill Clinton lifted this suspension.
- Overseas Private Insurance Corporation (OPIC) - new activities suspended since June 1989.
- Development Bank Lending/International Monetary Fund (IMF) Credits - the United States does not support development bank lending and will not support IMF credits to the PRC except for projects that address basic human needs.
- Munitions List Exports - subject to certain exceptions, no licenses may be issued for the export of any defense article on the U.S. Munitions List. This restriction may be waived upon a presidential national interest determination.
- Arms Imports - import of defense articles from the PRC was banned after the imposition of the ban on arms exports to the PRC. The import ban was subsequently waived by the Administration and reimposed on May 26, 1994. It covers all items on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms' Munitions Import List.
In 1996, the PRC conducted military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in an apparent effort to intimidate the Republic of China (ROC) electorate before the pending presidential elections, triggering the Third Taiwan Straits Crisis. The United States dispatched two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region. Subsequently, tensions in the Taiwan Strait diminished, and relations between the U.S. and the PRC improved, with increased high-level exchanges and progress on numerous bilateral issues, including human rights, nonproliferation, and trade. President Jiang Zemin visited the United States in the fall of 1997, the first state visit to the U.S. by a PRC president since 1985. In connection with that visit, the two sides came to a consensus on implementation of their 1985 agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation, as well as a number of other issues (U.Hawaii, 1997). President Clinton visited the PRC in June 1998. He traveled extensively in mainland China, and had direct interaction with the Chinese people included live speeches and a radio show, allowing the President to convey first hand to the Chinese people a sense of American ideals and values. President Clinton was criticized by some, however, for failing to pay adequate attention to human rights abuses in mainland China (Eckholm).
Relations between the U.S. and the PRC were severely strained for a time by the NATO Bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999, accredited to an intelligence error but which some Chinese believed to be deliberate. By the end of 1999, relations began to gradually improve. In October 1999, the two sides reached agreement on humanitarian payments for families of those who died and those who were injured as well as payments for damages to respective diplomatic properties in Belgrade and China.
In April 2001, a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft collided with a PRC J-8 fighter jet flying illegally in Chinese waters south of the PRC. The EP-3 was able to make an emergency landing on PRC's Hainan Island despite extensive damage; the PRC aircraft crashed with the loss of its pilot, Wang Wei. It was widely believed that the EP-3 recon aircraft was conducting a spying mission on the Chinese Armed Forces before the collision. Following extensive negotiations resulting in the Letter of the two sorries, the crew of the EP-3 was allowed to leave the PRC 11 days later, but the U.S. aircraft was not permitted to depart for another three months. Subsequently, the relationship, which had cooled following the incident, gradually improved.
[edit] Sino-American relations after September 11th, 2001
Sino-American relations changed radically following the September 11, 2001 attacks. The PRC offered strong public support for the war on terrorism. The PRC voted in favor of UNSCR 1373, publicly supported the coalition campaign in Afghanistan, and contributed $150 million of bilateral assistance to Afghan reconstruction following the defeat of the Taliban. Shortly after 9-11, the U.S. and PRC also commenced a counterterrorism dialogue. The third round of that dialogue was held in Beijing in February 2003.
In the United States, the terrorist attacks greatly changed the nature of discourse. It was no longer plausible to argue, as the blue team had earlier asserted, that the PRC was the primary security threat to the United States, and the need to focus on the Middle East and the War on Terror made it a priority for the United States to avoid potential distractions in East Asia.
Initially, there were fears among the PRC leadership that the war on terrorism would lead to an anti-PRC effort by the U.S., especially as the U.S. began establishing bases in Central Asian countries like Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and renewed efforts against Iraq. Because of the setbacks the U.S. has faced in its Iraq campaign, these fears have largely subsided. Many PRC citizens died in the World Trade Center rubble, and mainland Chinese companies and individuals sent expressions of condolences to their U.S. counterparts. The application of American power in Iraq and continuing efforts by the United States to cooperate with the PRC has significantly reduced the popular anti-Americanism that had been fostered in the mid-1990s.
The PRC and the U.S. have also been working closely on regional issues, such as those pertaining to North Korea (the DPRK ) and its nuclear weapons program. The People's Republic of China has stressed its opposition to the DPRK's decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, its concerns over North Korea's nuclear capabilities, and its desire for a non-nuclear Korean peninsula. It also voted to refer the DPRK's noncompliance with its International Atomic Energy Agency obligations to the UN Security Council. However, many Americans have accused the PRC of dragging its feet on this issue and even secretly propping up North Korea, as a cudgel against the U.S. and particularly Japan.
Taiwan remains a volatile issue, but one that remains under control. The United States policy toward Taiwan has involved emphasizing the Four Noes and One Without. On occasion the United States has rebuked ROC President Chen Shui-bian for provocative pro-independence rhetoric. However, in 2005, the PRC passed an anti-secession law which stated that the PRC would be prepared to resort to "non-peaceful means" if Taiwan declared formal independence. Many critics of the PRC, such as the Blue team, argue that the PRC was trying to take advantage of the U.S. war in Iraq to assert its claims on ROC's territory.
China's president Hu Jintao visited the United States in April 2006 (text of Pres. Bush's welcome). Clark Randt, U.S. Ambassador to China from 2001 to 2008 examined "The State of U.S.-China Relations in a 2008 lecture at the USC U.S.-China Institute. Click here for a streaming video version of the lecture.
[edit] Important issues in Sino-American relations
[edit] Chinese military spending
PRC's military budget is often mentioned as a threat by many, such as the blue team, in the United States. The PRC's investment in its military is growing at a fast rate. The United States, along with independent analysts, remain convinced that PRC conceals the real extent of its military spending.[2][3] These concerns may be caused by concerns by the United States that the PRC is attempting to challenge the United States or threaten their neighbors. However, even using the U.S. Defense Department's "high" estimate of total Chinese defense spending, China's military spending is only a fourth of U.S. spending.[4]
[edit] Republic of China (Taiwan)
The Republic of China remains a focus of difficulties in the relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China. The United States exports large amounts of weaponry to the ROC and there is a great deal of sympathy for Taiwan partly because it, unlike the PRC, has transformed into a pluralistic, liberal democracy and because of residual sympathy over the ROC's anti-communism during the Cold War. Any accession of the ROC to the PRC may also change the balance of power in that region in both political and military terms; this potentiality has been of increasing concern to Japan, a traditional ally of the ROC since its relocation to Taipei, as well.
On Taiwan, there is a general public consensus in favor of the status quo. However, some supporters of Taiwan independence, such as Lee Teng-hui, have expressed the idea that Taiwan must act quickly to declare independence because the long term trends are against it. In several cases in which the administration of Chen Shui-bian appeared to be moving away from the status-quo and toward independence, the United States has asked for and received assurances that the ROC remains committed to the "Four Noes and One Without" policy.
Officially, U.S. policy is governed by the Taiwan Relations Act (text), by the Six Assurances, and by the Three Communiques; it has stated a commitment to a one China policy. The strength of that commitment and the relationship between these policies, which are contradictory, changes from administration to administration.
U.S. diplomatic representation in the ROC is achieved through the American Institute in Taiwan and ROC diplomatic representation in the U.S. is achieved through the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Offices. These institutions act as embassies and consulates all but in name. (Personnels of the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Offices may not have diplomatic immunity and other privilege, though.)
- See also: Political status of Taiwan
[edit] U.S.-China economic relations
The PRC and the U.S. resumed trade relations in 1972 and 1973. U.S. direct investment in mainland China covers a wide range of manufacturing sectors, several large hotel projects, restaurant chains, and petrochemicals. U.S. companies have entered agreements establishing more than 20,000 equity joint ventures, contractual joint ventures, and wholly foreign-owned enterprises in mainland China. More than 100 U.S.-based multinationals have projects in mainland China, some with multiple investments. Cumulative U.S. investment in mainland China is valued at $48 billion. The U.S. trade deficit with mainland China exceeded $350 billion in 2006 and was the United States' largest bilateral trade deficit. Total two-way trade between mainland China and the U.S. has grown from $33 billion in 1992 to over $230 billion in 2004 (Bunton). Some of the factors that influence the U.S. trade deficit with mainland China include:
- The strength of the U.S. economy: a shift of low-end assembly industries to mainland China from the newly industrialized economies (NIEs) in Asia. Mainland China has increasingly become the last link in a long chain of value-added production. Because U.S. trade data attributes the full value of a product to the final assembler, mainland Chinese value added is overcounted.
- U.S. demand for labor-intensive goods exceeds domestic output. The PRC has restrictive trade practices in mainland China, which include a wide array of barriers to foreign goods and services, often aimed at protecting state-owned enterprises. These practices include high tariffs, lack of transparency, requiring firms to obtain special permission to import goods, inconsistent application of laws and regulations, and leveraging technology from foreign firms in return for market access. Mainland China's accession to World Trade Organization is meant to help address these barriers.
- The undervaluation of the Renminbi relative to the United States Dollar.[1]
At the September 2002 Joint Economic Committee meeting in Washington, the United States and People's Republic of China discussed strengthening cooperation in fighting terrorist finance and money laundering, prospects for foreign direct investment in mainland China's financial services, and the regional reliance on U.S. macroeconomic developments. Mainland China's continued strong growth has made it an important regional engine of growth, and the PRC reiterated its commitment to a strategy of market reforms and global economic openness.
Beginning in 2006, the U.S. and China agreed to hold regular high level talks about economic issues. Three rounds of talks have been held, the most recent in December 2007. Economic nationalism seems to be rising in both countries, a point the leaders of the two delegations noted in their opening presentations (Wu Yi, PRC Vice Premier, Henry Paulson, Jr., U.S. Treasury Secretary).
[edit] Human rights
In 2003 the United States declared that despite some positive momentum that year and greater signs that the People's Republic of China was willing to engage with the U.S. and others on human rights there was still serious backsliding. The PRC government has acknowledged in principle the importance of protection of human rights in mainland China and has purported to take steps to bring its human rights practices into conformity with international norms. Among these steps are signature of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in October 1997 (ratified in March 2001) and signing of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in October 1998 (not yet ratified). In 2002, the PRC released a significant number of political and religious prisoners, and agreed to interact with United Nations experts on torture, arbitrary detention and religion. However, international human rights groups assert that there has been virtually no movement on these promises, with more people being arrested for similar offences subsequently. Such groups maintain that the PRC still has a long way to go in instituting the kind of fundamental systemic change that will protect the rights and liberties of all its citizens in mainland China.
To counter this, the PRC has published a White Paper annually since 1998 detailing the human rights abuses by the United States, as well as its own progress in this area. The 2001 report criticizing U.S. human rights can be seen here.
Since October 19, 2005 the PRC government has also published its White Paper on its own democratic progress.[5]In November 2007, the Chinese government published a White Paper on the role of the Communist and other parties in China. [6]
[edit] Further reading
- Encyclopedia of Chinese-American Relations (2006), McFarland. Yuwu Song (Editor).
- Federation of American Scientists et al. (2006). Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning
- China and Ballistic Missile Defense: 1955 to 2002 and beyond - analysis by Brad Roberts, IFRI Proliferation Papers n°10, 2004
[edit] See also
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[edit] Sino-American relations
- Nixon in China (opera)
- China lobby
- Cox Report
- Hainan Island incident
- Hu Na Incident
- 1996 United States campaign finance controversy
[edit] Other Chinese relations
- Foreign relations of the People's Republic of China
- Foreign relations of the Republic of China
- Sino-Soviet split
- People's Republic of China-Japan relations
- Sino-Indian relations
[edit] Other American relations
- Foreign relations of the United States
- Transatlantic relations
- Indo-American relations
- Anglo-American relations
- Franco-American relations
- Taiwan-United States relations
- Special relationship
[edit] External links
- PRC embassy in the U.S.
- U.S. embassy in the PRC.
- U.S. Dept. of State: THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA.
- American Institute in Taiwan.
- USC U.S.-China Institute -- see Resources section for extensive documents collection and book reviews
- "Nixon's Fully Declassified Trip to China in 1972" - Provided by the National Security Archive.
- "Ping Pong Diplomacy".
- America and Taiwan, 1943-2004.
- "China-U.S. Joint Statement October 29, 1997." University of Hawaii. 10 Apr. 2006.<http://www.shaps.hawaii.edu/fp/us/us-china-jc4.html>
- Eckholm, Erik. "Clinton Urged to Meet Top China Dissident." New York Times 20 June 1998: A3. Historical New York Times. Proquest. DuBois Library, UMASS Amherst. 10 Apr. 2006.
- Bunton, T. S., and Kathleen J. Michels. "2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS OF THE U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION." USCC 2005 Annual Report Page. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.<http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/05_annual_report.php>
- Five Years of China’s WTO Membership. EU and US Perspectives on China’s Compliance with Transparency Commitments and the Transitional Review Mechanism, Legal Issues of Economic Integration, Kluwer Law International, Volume 33, Number 3, pp. 263-304, 2006, by Farah Paolo
- "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2005." 8 Mar. 2006. U.S. Department of State. 11 Apr. 2006.<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61550.htm>
- Original text based from the State Department Background Note: China.
- Rumsfeld questions China spending; October 18, 2005 - BBC News article about China's military spending.
- Rand Cooperation - China - RAND Cooperation study concerning China's military spending, which argues that China's spending is higher than official figures.
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