国家导弹防御系统

维基百科，自由的百科全书

国家导弹防御（NMD）是一个军事战略和联合的系统用于在整个国家范围抵挡外来的洲际弹道导弹。这些入侵的导弹可以被其他的导弹，或者激光所拦截。它们可以被拦截于发射点附近（爬升阶段），飞行过程之中，或者是再入大气层阶段。

“国家导弹防御”这一概念有多种解释：

目录 1 近期專案 1.1 美國概況 1.2 日本概況 1.3 研發方向 1.4 技術批評 2 參考資料 3 外部連結 4 参考文献

[编辑] 近期專案

[编辑] 美國概況

在90年代和21世紀初期, the stated mission of NMD has changed to the more modest goal of preventing the United States from being subject to nuclear blackmail or nuclear terrorism by a so-called rogue state. The feasibility of this more limited goal remains somewhat controversial. Under President Clinton some testing continued but the project was not given much funding. Some have considered this surprising, in light of Clinton's supportive remarks on 5 September 2000. He said that "such a system, if it worked properly, could give us an extra dimension of insurance in a world where proliferation has complicated the task of preserving peace."

The current NMD system consists primarily of ground based interceptor missiles and radar in Alaska which would intercept incoming warheads in space. A limited number of interceptor missiles (about 10) are operational as of 2006. These would possibly be later augmented by mid-course SM-4 interceptors fired from Navy ships and by boost-phase interception by the Boeing YAL-1.

NMD deployment is planned in three phases. The first phase is called Capability 1 (C1), and was originally designed to counter a limited threat from up to about five warheads with either simple or no countermeasures. More recently this phase has been upgraded to include the deployment of up to 100 interceptors and would be aimed at countering tens of warheads. This would require radar upgrades. Since North Korea is perceived to be the earliest missile threat, the interceptors and radar would be deployed in Alaska.

The second phase is called C2 and designed to counter an attack by warheads with more complex countermeasures. It would deploy additional radars and more interceptors, plus a missile-tracking satellite system. The C3 phase is supposed to counter threats consisting of many complex warheads. It would deploy additional radars as well as additional interceptors, including some at a second site, bringing the total to 200 or more. Although the C3 system is the current final deployment goal, the system design permits further expansion and upgrades beyond the C3 level. A Pentagon study concluded that the NMD system could be upgraded by integrating the hundreds of interceptors to be deployed as part of the ship-based Navy Theater Wide missile defense system. These interceptors would be integrated into the sensor infrastructure of the NMD system.

[编辑] 日本概況

2007年3月30日，日本航空自卫队防空导弹部队开始在埼玉县狭山市的入间基地部署爱国者3型导弹，意味着日本开始正式部署本国导弹防御系统。 ^[1]

[编辑] 研發方向

On 14 October 2002, a ground based interceptor launched from the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Site 太平洋上空225 km摧毀一枚練習彈頭. The test included three decoy balloons.^[2]

2002/12/16 布希總統簽署National Security Presidential Directive 23^[3] which outlined a plan to begin deployment of operational ballistic missile defense systems by 2004. The following day the U.S. formally requested from the UK and Denmark use of facilities in Fylingdales, 英國, and Thule, 格陵蘭, respectively, as a part of the NMD program. The projected cost of the program for the years 2004 to 2009 will be $53 billion, making it the largest single line in The Pentagon's budget.

Since 2002, the US has been in talks with 波蘭 and other 歐洲國家 over the possibility of setting up a European base to intercept long-range missiles. A site similar to the US base in Alaska would help protect the US and Europe from missiles fired from the Middle East or North Africa. Poland's prime minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz said in November 2005 he wanted to open up the public debate on whether Poland should host such a base.^[4]

In 2002, NMD改組為陸基中途防禦系統 (GMD), to differentiate it from other missile defense programs, such as space-based, sea-based, and defense targeting the boost phase and the reentry phase (see flight phases).

2004/7/22, 第一具陸基攔截系統部署於Ft. Greely, 阿拉斯加 (北纬63.954度，西经145.735度表达错误: 未预料的 / 运算符;-表达错误: 未预料的 / 运算符). By the end of 2004, a total of six had been deployed at Ft. Greely and another two at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Two additional were installed at Ft. Greely in 2005. The system will provide "rudimentary" protection.

On 15 December 2004, 馬紹爾群島舉行的攔截測試失敗 failed when the launch was aborted due to an "unknown anomaly" in the interceptor, 16 minutes after launch of the target from Kodiak Island, 阿拉斯加.

"I don't think that the goal was ever that we would declare it was operational. I think the goal was that there would be an 運作能力 by the end of 2004," Pentagon representative Larry DiRita said on 2005-01-13 at a Pentagon press conference. However, the problem is and was funding "There has been some expectation that there will be some point at which it is operational and not something else these expectations are not unknown, if Congress pours more attention and funding to this system, it can be operational relatively quick."

2005/1/18, 美國戰略指揮部指揮官 issued direction to establish the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense. JFCC IMD, once activated, will develop desired characteristics and capabilities for global missile defense operations and support for missile defense.

2005/2/14, another interceptor test failed due to a malfunction with the 地面支援設施 at the test range on Kwajalein Island, not with the interceptor missile itself.^[5]

2005/2/24, the Missile Defense Agency, testing the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System, successfully intercepted a mock enemy missile. This was the first test of an operationally configured 標準三型飛彈 (SM-3) interceptor and the fifth successful test intercept using this system. 在2005/11/10, the USS Lake Erie detected, tracked, and destroyed a mock two-stage ballistic missile within two minutes of the ballistic missile launch.^[6]

2006/9/1, 陸基中途防禦系統測試成功.An interceptor was launched from 范登堡空軍基地 to hit a target missile launched from 阿拉斯加, with ground support provided by a crew at Colorado Springs. This test was described by Missile Defense Agency director Lieutenant General Trey Obering as "about as close as we can come to an end-to-end test of our long-range missile defense system."^[7] The target missile carried no decoys or other countermeasures.^[8]

海基X頻雷達系統已經開始部署於若干船艦.^[9]

2007/2/24, 經濟學人雜誌報告 that the 美國 ambassador to 北約, Victoria Nuland, had written to her fellow envoys to advise them regarding the various options for missile-defence sites in Europe. She also confirmed that “The United States has also been discussing with the UK further potential contributions to the system.”^[10]

在2007二月份 US started formal negiotiations with 波蘭 and 捷克 concerning construction of missile shield installations in those countries for a Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System. According to press reports the government of the Czech Republic agreed (while 67% Czechs disagree^[11]) to host a missile defence radar on its territory while a base of missile interceptors is supposed to be built in Poland. The objective is reportedly to protect most of Europe from long-range missile strikes from Iran.^[12].

2008/2/23, 美國成功擊落一枚衛星(演習)

The Ustka-Wicko base of Polish Army is mentioned as a possible site of US missile interceptors. See also Anti-ballistic missile#European front and Słupsk#Facilities. Russia objects; its suspension of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe may be related.

[编辑] 技術批評

There has been controversy among experts about whether it is technically feasible to build an effective missile defense system and, in particular, if the ground-based midcourse NMD will work.

An April 2000 study by the Union of Concerned Scientists and the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology concluded that “[a]ny country capable of deploying a long-range missile would also be able to deploy countermeasures that would defeat the planned NMD system.” Countermeasures studied in detail were bomblets containing biological or chemical agents, aluminized balloons to serve as decoys and to disguise warheads, and cooling warheads to reduce the kill vehicle’s ability to detect them.^[13][14]

In April 2004, a General Accounting Office report concluded that “MDA does not explain some critical assumptions—such as an enemy’s type and number of decoys—underlying its performance Goals.” It recommended that “DOD carry out independent, operationally realistic testing of each block being fielded” but DOD responded that “formal operational testing is not required before entry into full-rate production.”^[15]

Proponents did not suggest how to discriminate between empty and warhead-enclosing balloons, for instance, but said that these “simple” countermeasures are actually hard to implement, and that defense technology is rapidly advancing to defeat them.^[16] The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) said decoy discrimination techniques were classified, and emphasized its intention to provide future boost and terminal defense to diminish the importance of midcourse decoys.^[17] In summer 2002 MDA ceased providing detailed intercept information and declined to answer technical questions about decoys on grounds of national security.^[18]

A July 2003 study by the American Physical Society (APS) focused on the feasibilty of intercepting missiles in the boost phase, which the current NMD system does not yet attempt.^[19]

The study found it might be possible to develop a limited system capable of destroying a liquid-fuel propelled ICBM during the boost phase. This system could also possibly destroy some solid-propellant missiles from Iran, but not those from North Korea, because of differences in the boost time and range to target. However, there is a trend toward using solid-fueled ICBMs which are harder to intercept during boost phase.

Using orbital launchers to provide a reliable boost-phase defense against solid fuel missiles from Iran or North Korea was found to require at least 1,600 interceptors in orbit. Intercepting liquid-fueled missiles would require 700 interceptors. Using two or more interceptors per target would require many more orbital launchers.

The only boost phase systems the U.S. contemplates for near term use are the Airborne laser (ABL) and Kinetic Energy Interceptors. The study found the ABL possibly capable of intercepting missiles if within 300 km for solid fuel missiles or 600 km for liquid fuel missiles.^[20]

While the APS report did not address the current U.S. mid-course NMD system, it concluded that were the U.S. in the future to develop a boost-phase ABM defense, there could be significant technical problems limiting effectiveness.

See also the article on anti-ballistic missiles for further discussion on the feasibility of NMD-like systems.

[编辑] 參考資料

• Enrico Fels, Will the Eagle strangle the Dragon? An Assessment of the U.S. Challenges towards China's Nuclear Deterrence, Trends East Asia Analysis No. 20, (February 2008).
• Jack Mendelsohn, And it still won't work, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 55, No. 4 (1999).
• Report of the APS Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense - 15 July 2003

[编辑] 外部連結

• MissileThreat.com - Claremont Institute’s Ballistic Missile Defense Project.
• Missile Wars - A PBS Frontline report.
• National Missile Defense System - A short critique of the NMD scheme by Noam Chomsky (published in the American Prospect).
• The Militarization of Science and Space - Commentary and analysis by NMD critic Noam Chomsky.
• Clinton's War on Missile Defense - A conservative critique of missile defense opposition.
• Missile Defence: How and Why - An critical inter-active introduction by Yorkshire CND
• Holes in the Missile Shield - November 2004 Scientific American article criticizing NMD
• Missile Defense Agency Home Page - website of the Department of Defense agency responsible for National Missile Defense.
• Federation of American Scientists - website with extensive technical information about NMD
• Joint Australian-U.S. Press Release The Commonwealth of Australia officially 'signs on' to mutual missile defence with the United States of America
• The Honourable Alexander Downer, MP Australian Foreign Minister's press release on Australia's joining the U.S. missile defence system
• Short History of SDI History of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), including the role of TQM in its development
• Boost-Phase Defense Against Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (Physics Today)

[编辑] 参考文献

1. ^ 冯武勇，日本动手部署本国导弹防御系统，新华网
2. ^ US Department of Defense. MISSILE INTERCEPT TEST SUCCESSFUL. October 14, 2002.
3. ^ Federation of American Scientists. National Security Presidential Directive 23. December 16, 2002.
4. ^ BBC. US considers Polish missile base. November 17, 2005
5. ^ Missile Defense Agency. Missile Defense Flight Test Conducted. (PDF).February 14, 2005.
6. ^ Missile Defense Agency.Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Flight Test Successful. (PDF). February 24, 2005.
7. ^ US Department of Defense. DoD News Briefing with Lt. Gen. Obering from the Pentagon. September 1, 2006.
8. ^ Center for Defense Information Flight Tests for Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) System, June 18, 2007 . (PDF).
9. ^ UPI via Space Daily. Analysis: Missile Defense Semantics. January 17, 2005.
10. ^ （2007年2月）．“Missile defence systems Bombs bursting in air”．The Economist（24 February 2007）．于2007年2月24日访问．
11. ^ Citizens on U.S. Anti-Missile Radar Base in Czech Republic[1]
12. ^ Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich "US Missile Defense: A Strategic Challenge for Europe", Daniel Möckli, CSS Analyses in Security Policy no. 12, April 2007
13. ^ Union of Concerned Scientists/MIT Security Studies Program. Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned U.S. National Missile Defense System(Executive Summary and full text)(PDF). UCS-MIT Study, A.M. Sessler (Chair of the Study Group), J.M. Cornwall, R. Dietz, S.A. Fetter, S. Frankel, R.L. Garwin, K. Gottfried, L. Gronlund, G.N. Lewis, T.A. Postol, and D.C. Wright, April 2000.
14. ^ Don't Overestimate NMD: Common Countermeasures Can Slip By Shield, Richard Garwin, Lisbeth Gronlund and George Lewis, Defense News, July 10, 2000, p.15
15. ^ General Accounting Office report GAO-04-409 Missile Defense: Actions are Needed to Enhance Testing and Accountability(PDF)
16. ^ Countermeasure Doubletalk / UCS Overstates Ease of Defeating Missile Defense Scott McMahon, Stanley Orman, and Richard Speier, Defense News, June 19, 2000 p.19.
17. ^ Missile Defense Agency Statement of Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish, USAF Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization Before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations Committee on Government Reform, September 8, 2000 "NMD Counter Countermeasures" section
18. ^ Center for Defense Information IFT-9: A Questionable Success For Missile Defense. Weekly Defense Monitor, Volume 6, Issue #36 October 24, 2002.
19. ^ American Physical Society.Report of the American Physical Society Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept System for National Missile Defense: Scientific and Technical Issues, Rev. Mod. Phys. 76, S1 2004. David K. Barton, Roger Falcone, Daniel Kleppner, Frederick K. Lamb, Ming K. Lau, Harvey L. Lynch, David Moncton, David Montague, David E. Mosher, William Priedhorsky, Maury Tigner, and David R. Vaughan.
20. ^ Physics Today published by the American Physical Society. Boost-Phase Defense Against Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. January 2004.