Hindu-German Conspiracy Counter-intelligence
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British Counter-intelligence against the Hindu-German Conspiracy began from its initial roots in the late 1900s and ultimately came to span in extent from the Asia through Europe to the West Coast of the United States and Canada, and was effective in thwarting a number of attempts for insurrection in British India during World War I and ultimately in controlling the Indian revolutinary movement both at home and abroad.
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[edit] Background
- See also: Shyamji Krishna Varma, The Indian Sociologist, William Hutt Curzon Wyllie, Har Dayal, and Hindu-German Conspiracy
During World War I, although Indian political bodies and populace largely came to support the British war effort,Bengal and Punjab remained hotbeds of anti colonial activities. Terrorism in Bengal, increasingly closely linked with the unrests in Punjab, was significant enough to nearly paralyse the regional administration.[1][2] Also from the beginning of the war, expatriate Indian population, notably from United States, Canada, and Germany, headed by the Berlin Committee and the Ghadar Party, attempted to trigger insurrections in India on the lines of the 1857 uprising with Irish Republican, German and Turkish help in a massive conspiracy that has since come to be called the Hindu German conspiracy[3][4][5] This conspiracy also attempted to rally Afghanistan against British India.[6] A number of failed attempts were made at mutiny, of which the February mutiny plan and the Singapore mutiny remains most notable. This movement was suppressed by means of a massive international counter-intelligence operation and draconian political acts (including the Defence of India act 1915) that lasted nearly ten years.[7][8]
[edit] Counter-intelligence
[edit] Beginnings
- See also: W.C Hopkinson
Outlines and nascent ideas of the conspiracy began to be noted and tracked by British intelligence as early as 1911.[7] Incidents like the Delhi-Lahore Conspiracy and the Komagata Maru incident had already alerted the CID of the existence of a large-scale network and plans for pan-Indian militant unrest. Measures were taken which focussed on Bengal—the seat of the most intense revolutionary terrorism at the time—and on Punjab, which was uncovered as a strong and militant base in the wake of Komagata Maru.[9][10] Har Dayal's extant group was found to have strong links with Rash Behari Bose, and were "cleaned up" in the wake of the Delhi bomb case.[10]
[edit] In Asia
See also:Charles Tegart, Kirpal Singh, Oren, Vincent Kraft.
At the outbreak of the war, Punjab CID sent teams to Hong Kong to intercept and infiltrate the returning Ghadarites, who often made little efforts to hide their plans and objectives.[9] These teams were successful in uncovering details of the full scale of the conspiracy, as well as discovering Har Dayal's whereabouts. Immigrants returning to India were double checked against a list of revolutionaries.[11]
In Punjab, the CID, although aware of possible plans for unrest, was not successful in infiltrating the conspiracy for the mutiny until February 1915. A dedicated force was formed, headed by the Chief of Punjab CID, and including amongst its members Liaqat Hayat Khan (later head of Punjab CID himself). In February that year, the CID was successful in recruiting the services of one Kirpal Singh to infiltrate the plan. Singh, who had a Ghadarite cousin serving in the 23rd Cavalry, was able to infiltrate the leadership, being assigned to work in his cousin's regiment. Singh was soon under suspicion of being a spy, but was able to pass on the information regarding the date and scale of the uprising to British Indian intelligence.[12] As the date for the mutiny approached, a desperate Rash Behari Bose brought forward the D-day to the evening of 19 February, which was discovered by Kirpal Singh on the very day. No attempts were made by the Ghadarites to restrain him, and he rushed to inform Liaqat Khan of the change of plans. Ordered back to his station to signal when the revolutionaries had assembled, Singh was detained by the would-be mutineers, but managed to make good his escape under the cover of answering the call of nature.[12]
In Bengal, counter-intelligence, especially against the activities of Jugantar was led by Charles Tegart while the role of German or Baltic-German double-agents, especially the agent named Oren, was also important in infiltrating and preempting the plans for Autumn rebellions in Bengal in 1915 as well as scuttling Bagha Jatin's plans in winter that year. Jatin is believed to be personally shot by Tegart in his final battle on the banks of the river Burha Balang. Another source was the German double agent Vincent Kraft, a planter from Batavia, who passed information about arms shipments from Shanghai to British agents after being captured. Kraft later fled through Mexico to Japan where he was last known to be at the end of the war.[13] Later efforts by Mahendra Pratap's Provisional Government in Kabul were also compromised by Herambalal Gupta after he defected in 1918 and passed on information to Indian intelligence.[6]
[edit] In Europe and the Middle East
- See also: John Wallinger, Somerset Maugham, Tomas Masaryk, E.V. Voska, and Virendranath Chattopadhyay
By the time the war broke out an Indian Intelligence office, headed by John Wallinger, had been opened in Europe. In scale this office was larger than those operated by the British War Office, approaching the European intelligence network of the Secret Service Bureau. This network already had agents in Switzerland against possible German intrigues. After the outbreak of the war Wallinger, under the cover of an officer of the British General Head Quarters, proceeded to France where he operated out of Paris, working with the French Political Police, the Sûreté.[14] Among other enterprises, the European intelligence network attempted to eliminate some of the Indian leaders in Europe. A British agent called Donald Gullick was dispatched to assassinate Virendranath Chattopadhaya while the latter was on his way to Geneva to meet Mahendra Pratap to offer Kaiser Wilhelm II's invitation. It is said that Somerset Maugham, who was in the British Secret Service in Europe during the war, based a number of his stories on his first-hand experiences, modelling the character of John Ashenden after himself and Chandra Lal after Virendranath. The short story of Giulia Lazzari is a blend of Gullick's attempts to assassinate Virendranath and Mata Hari's story. Winston Churchill reportedly advised Maugham to burn 14 other stories.[15][16]
The Czech revolutionary network in Europe also had a role in the uncovering of Bagha Jatin's plans. The network was in touch with the members in the United States, and may have also been aware of and involved in the uncovering of the earlier plots.[17][18][19] The American network, headed by E.V. Voska, was a counter-espionage network of nearly 80 members who, as Habsburg subjects, were presumed to be German supporters but were involved in spying on German and Austrian diplomats. Voska had began working with Guy Gaunt, who headed Courtenay Bennett's intelligence network, at the outbreak of the war and on learning of the plot from the Czech European network, passed on the information to Gaunt and to Tomáš Masaryk who further passed on the information the American authorities.[20][18]
In the Middle East, British counter-intelligence was directed at preserving the loyalty of the Indian sepoy in the face of Turkish propaganda and the concept of The Caliph's Jihad, while a particularly significant effort was directed at intercepting the Kabul Mission.[21][22]
[edit] In the United States
- See also: Guy Gaunt and William Wiseman
In the United States, the conspiracy was successfully infiltrated by British intelligence through both Irish as well as Indian channels. The activities of Ghadar on the Pacific coast were noted by W. C. Hopkinson, who had grown up in India and spoke fluent Hindi. Initially W.C.H. had been despatched from Calcutta to keep the Indian Police informed about the doings of Taraknath Das. [23] The Home department of the British Indian government had begun the task of actively tracking Indian seditionists on the East Coast as early as 1910. Francis Cunliffe Owen, the officer heading the Home Office agency in New York, had become thoroughly acquainted with George Freeman alias Fitzgerald and Myron Phelps, the famous New York advpcate, as members of the Clan-na-Gael. Owens' efforts were successful in thwarting the SS Moraitis plan.[24] The Ghadar Party was incidentally established after Irish Republicans, sensing infiltration, encouraged formation of an exclusively Indian society.[25] Following this, a number of approaches were adopted, including infiltration through a "Native" Indian intelligence officer by the name of Bela Singh who successfully set up a network of agents passing on information to British intelligence, as well as the use of the famous American Pinkerton's detective agency.[26][25] W. C. Hopkinson himself was assassinated in a court in Victoria by a Ghadarite called Mewa Singh in October 1914.[27] An Irish double agent by the name of Charles Lamb is said to have passed on the majority of the information that compromised the Annie Larsen and ultimately helped the construction of the prosecution. An Indian operative, codenamed "C" and described most likely to have been the adventurous Chandra Kanta Chakravarty (later the chief prosecution witness in the trial), also passed on the details of the conspiracy to British and American intelligence.[28]
[edit] Impact
The British counter-intelligence operations effectively thwarted attempts within and from outside India, and ultimately was able to bring the Ghadar Party into the attention of American intelligence, while its counter-subversion within the Berlin committee and the Indian movement effectively broke the groups up and prevented a cohesive plan for being put into place.
[edit] References
- ^ Gupta 1997, p. 12
- ^ Popplewell 1995, p. 201
- ^ Strachan 2001, p. 798
- ^ Hoover 1985, p. 252
- ^ Brown 1948, p. 300
- ^ a b Strachan 2001, p. 788
- ^ a b Hopkirk 2001, p. 41
- ^ Popplewell 1995, p. 234
- ^ a b Popplewell 1995, p. 168
- ^ a b Popplewell 1995, p. 200
- ^ Popplewell 1995, p. 194
- ^ a b Popplewell 1995, p. 173
- ^ Strachan 2001, p. 802
- ^ Popplewell 1995, p. 216,217
- ^ Popplewell 1995, p. 234
- ^ Barooah 2004
- ^ Voska & Irwin 1940, p. 98,108,120,122,123
- ^ a b Masaryk 1970, p. 50,221,242
- ^ Bose 1971, p. 233,233
- ^ Popplewell 1995, p. 237
- ^ Popplewell 1995, p. 182,183,187
- ^ Seidt 2001, p. 4
- ^ Echoes of Freedom:South Asian pioneers in California 1899-1965.. UC, Berkley, Bancroft Library. Retrieved on 2007-11-11.
- ^ Popplewell 1995, p. 147
- ^ a b Popplewell 1995, p. 148
- ^ Radhan 2001, p. 259
- ^ Radhan 2001, p. 261
- ^ Plowman 2003, p. 93
- Gupta, Amit K (1997), Defying Death: Nationalist Revolutionism in India, 1897-1938.Social Scientist, Vol. 25, No. 9/10. (Sep. - Oct., 1997), pp. 3-27, Social Scientist, ISSN: 09700293.
- Strachan, Hew (2001), The First World War. Volume I: To Arms, Oxford University Press. USA, ISBN 0199261911.
- Popplewell, Richard J (1995), Intelligence and Imperial Defence: British Intelligence and the Defence of the Indian Empire 1904-1924., Routledge, ISBN 071464580X, <http://www.routledge.com/shopping_cart/products/product_detail.asp?sku=&isbn=071464580X&parent_id=&pc=>.
- Dignan, Don (1983), The Indian revolutionary problem in British Diplomacy,1914-1919, New Delhi, Allied Publishers.
[edit] See also
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