Sharifullah

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Sharifullah
Born:	1980 (age 27–28) Jalalabad, Afghanistan
Detained at:	Guantanamo
ID number:	944
Conviction(s):	no charge, held in extrajudicial detention

Sharifullah is a citizen of Afghanistan held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detainment camps, in Cuba.^[1] Sharifullah's detainee ID number 944. JTF-GTMO counter-terrorism analysts estimate he was born in 1980 in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

[edit] Identity

Captive 944 was identified inconsistently on official Department of Defense documents:

• Captive 944 was identified as Sharifullah LNU on the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 14 December 2004, on the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his first annual Administrative Review Board, on 21 July 2005, and on five official lists of captives' names.^{[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]}
• Captive 944 was identified as Sharifullah on the first official list of captives' names, published on April 20, 2006.^[8]
• Captive 944 was identified as Sharifullah (LNU) on the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his second annual Administrative Review Board, on 30 April 2006.^[9]

[edit] Background

• Captive 944 had been an anti-Taliban fighter prior to the America's aid in ousting the Taliban.
• Captive 944 had helped overthrow the Taliban in the fall of 2001.
• Captive 944 had been rewarded for his efforts in fighting the Taliban.
• However, he was later the target of an anonymous tip that he had been part of a Taliban plot to plant IEDs.
• He also faced the allegation that a large refugee camp where he had once lived in Pakistan was visited by a militant recruiter long after he stopped living there.

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Wikisource has original text related to this article:

Summarized Detainee Sworn Statement (Sharifullah, ISN 944)

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor.^[10][11] Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.^[12]

The neutrality of this section is disputed. Please see the discussion on the talk page.(December 2007) Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Sharifullah LNU's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 14 December 2004.^[2] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

A. The detainee is associated with the Taliban or al Qaida.

1. The detainee trained at Grand Talimi Military School.
2. While at the Grand Talimi Military School, the detainee was trained on the Kalashnikov, low crawl and the riot control with the use of shields.
3. The detainee also trained for 10 days at military camp in Zahar Khel Village.
4. At this camp, the Detainee was trained in the use of personal weapons, the disassembly of land mines and the production of bombs from parts of the disassembled land mines.
5. The detainee stayed at the Shamshato Refugee Camp in Pakistan.
6. Hezb-E-Islam/Gulbuddin (HIG) members recruited young and impressionable radical men from the Shamshato Refugee camp to train at camps focusing on advanced training including remote controlled Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and electronics.
7. When the detainee was arrested, a search revealed the storage of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).

[edit] Transcript

Sharifullah chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.^[13] On March 3, 2006, in order to comply with a court order, the Department of Defense published a nineteen page summarized transcript from his Tribunal.

[edit] Testimony

Sharifullah testified that he a member of an anti-Taliban militia led by Haji Qader, that had been resisting the Taliban prior to the American entry in the war.

Sharifullah testified that after the Taliban were ousted he worked, for a while, as part of Hamid Karzai's security detail. Hamid Karzai appointed one of Qader's brother's to his cabinet.

Sharifullah testified that his brother Naqib Ullah was commissioned as an officer serving in a Brigade commanded by General Said Agha, who had been one of Qader's officers. Sharifullah said he went to visit his brother in hopes that Said Agha would commission him too.

Sharifullah testified that his brother and other officers serving under Said Agha were billeted in a house that had been confiscated from Taliban leaders.

Sharifullah denied receiving any military training.

Sharifullah acknowledged living in the Shamshato Refugee Camp when he was a refugee in Pakistan. But he denied ever being aware of any jihadist recruiting going on in the camp.

Sharifullah disputed being captured anywhere near improvised explosives.

[edit] Testimony of Ghurzang

Sharifullah called on the testimony of Ghurzang, another of Said Agha' officers, who had been captured at the same time he was.

Ghurzang confirmed they were captured at the same time. Ghurzang also disputed the allegation that they had been captured near any IEDs. The Brigade had an armory, where AK-47 were kept under lock and key. Said Agha's men didn't normally walk around with weapons. Only the soldiers on guard duty were issued weapons.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".^[14]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Sharifullah LNU's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 21 July 2005.^[3] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. During the occupation of Afghanistan by the Russians and the rule of the Taliban, the detainee stated he and his family fled to Pakistan. He was housed in the Kacha Garai refugee camp and the Shamshato refugee camp.
2. A Hezb-e Islami/Gulbuddin ^[sic] (HIG) member was recruiting men from Shamshato refugee camp.
3. The first group was recruited circa summer 2002 and consisted of 30 to 35 men between the ages of 17 and 20. After training, the men fought against U.S. and Afghan forces in Shahi Kowt, Paktika Province, Afghanistan.
4. HIG has long-established ties with Bin Ladin. HIG founder Gulbuddin Hikmatyar ^[sic] offered to shelter Bin Laden after the latter fled Sudan in 1996. HIG has staged small attacks in its attempt to force US troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrwo the Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA), and establish a fundamentalist state.

b. Training

1. After the fall of the Taliban the detainee became a soldier for General Said Agha before going to Kubal ^[sic] to train as an officer.
2. The detainee stated he completed two months of training at the Gund Talimi Military School, Kabul, Afghanistan and was tasked as a soldier on the Afghani National Assembly Presidential Palace detail, but not commissioned as an officer.
3. The detainee's training for the Presidential detail involved the Kalishnikov, physical training, low crawl, and using riot gear such as helmets and shields.
4. The detainee also trained for 10 days at a military camp in Zakar Khel Village, Pakistan.

c. Connections/Associations

The brother of the detainee Qari Naqib, had brought Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) to the compound ^[sic] at an unknown time.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee, his brother and two others decided to join Haji Qadir's campaign in Afghanistan fighting the Taliban. The detainee stated he assisted Haji Qadir in Afghanistan for approximately three years.
2. On 27 January 2003 coalition personnel learned of an impending attack involving a four man bombing cell utilizing remotely detonated IEDs mounted to bicycles.
3. The detainee had purchased a motorcycle and had the bill of sale when he was captured.
4. When the detainee was arrested, a search revealed the storage of IEDs.
5. IEDs recovered included ^[sic] two bombs in propane tanks, two bombs in wooden boxes inside "Nice Sweet" candy boxes, two bombs located in a wax box, one box of igniters and fuses, two nokia cell phones wired as an igniter, one portalbe cellular base station, one motorcycle, two bicycles and 15-20 82mm mortar rounds.
6. The detainee admitted during initial questioning the morning of his capture that he was going to place the bombs last night ^[sic] but was convinced to wait until morning.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.	The detainee stated that he holds no resentment toward Americans and will not harbor any bad will to Americans if released and returned to Afghanistan. The detainee stated that he would not hurt Americans, even if he believed he could get away with it and no one would see or know about it.
b.	The detainee then stated that he has never nor [sic] would ever fight the Americans, because the Americans came to Afghanistan to help the people, not hurt or kill them.
c.	The detainee had denied any knowledge of the plan to use the IEDs.

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Sharifullah (LNU)'s second annual Administrative Review Board, on 30 April 2006.^[9] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee claimed that he obtaine his counterfeit student identification from Karachi, Pakistan while he worked there for one month as a guard. He asked the dean of the school for the identification, which lists him as a Pakistani national, so that the Karachi police would not detaine him due to his Afghanistan citizenship.
2. The detainee, his brother, and two others decided to join Haji Qadir's campaign in Afghanist fighting the Taliban.
3. The detainee stated he assisted Haji Qadir in Afghanistan for approximately three years.
4. After the fall of the Taliban, Haji Qadir became the Governor of Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan. Subsequently, the detainee became a soldier for General Said Agha in Jalalabad, Afghanistan for approximately three months.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he completed two months of training at the Gund Talimi Military School in Kabul, Afghanistan.
2. The detainee's training for the Presidential detail involved two months of special training. During the two months the detainee and approximately forty others were trained by foreign government services on the Kalashnikov, physical training, low crawl, and the use of riot gear such as helmets and shields.
3. The detainee and other bombers studied how to use bombs in a madrasa ^[sic] in Pakistan where the bombs ^[sic] were made.
4. The detainee was identified by name as having attended the Zakar Khel training camp in Pakistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's brother is a captain at General Said Agha's compound in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The detainee stated that the day prior to his arrest he was in the city. When the detainee returned to the compound, his brother was with two men. The detainee stated he knew one of the men from the 22 days the detainee spent at the compound; however, this was the first time the detainee met the other man. The detainee stated the first individual was a soldier under the command of General Said Agha. However, the detainee said the other man (who goes by the Ajmal) was a soldier for General Said Agha.
2. The detainee stated that he was sleeping at one of General Agha's military compounds with his brother, Ajmal, and another man at the time of a raid and the detainee's ensuing arrest.
3. The third man present during the raid was known as Ghorzang.
4. The detainee stated that the night prior to the detainee's arrest Ghorzan had rotated back to the compound. The detainee stated he knew Ghorzand previously when they both worked as soldiers for General Agha.
5. The brother of the detainee was identified as a senior Taliban member and has initiated amnesty talks with the Afghan Army. As a condition of the amnesty talks, he desires the release of two men from prison. One individual was formerly a platoon commander under Qari Naqib identified as Ghorzang.
6. The detainee worked under the command of General Mohammad Karim for seven months. The detainee's direct supervisor for the detail was Major Abdul Manan.

d. Detainee Actions and Statements

During initial questioning the morning of their capture, the detainee and Ghorzang admitted that they were going to place the bombs the previous night but were convinced to wait until morning.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.	The detainee was questioned on 8 February 2003 and denied any knowledge of the plan to use explosives.
b.	The detainee was asked where he would go if released from Cuba. The detainee stated he would probably go home to Pakistan where most of his family lives and would work with one of his other brothers in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
c.	The detainee stated he has never, now would ever, fight the Americans because the Americans came to Afghanistan to help the people, not to hurt of kill them.
d.	The detainee stated he holds no resentment toward Americans and will not harbor any bad will to Americans if released and returned to Afghanistan. The detainee stated he would not hurt Americans even if he believed he could get away with it and no one would see or know about it.

[edit] References

1. ^ ^{a b} OARDEC (May 15, 2006). List of Individuals Detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from January 2002 through May 15, 2006. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
2. ^ ^{a b} OARDEC (14 December 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- LNU, Sharifullah pages 74. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-07.
3. ^ ^{a b} OARDEC (21 July 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of LNU, Sharifullah pages 66-68. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-01.
4. ^ OARDEC (July 17, 2007). Index for Combatant Status Review Board unclassified summaries of evidence. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
5. ^ OARDEC (September 4, 2007). Index for testimony. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
6. ^ OARDEC (August 9, 2007). Index to Summaries of Detention-Release Factors for ARB Round One. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
7. ^ OARDEC (July 17, 2007). Index of Summaries of Detention-Release Factors for ARB Round Two. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
8. ^ OARDEC (April 20, 2006). List of detainee who went through complete CSRT process. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
9. ^ ^{a b} OARDEC (30 April 2006). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of (LNU), Sharifullah pages 97-99. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-07.
10. ^ Guantánamo Prisoners Getting Their Day, but Hardly in Court, New York Times, November 11, 2004 - mirror
11. ^ Inside the Guantánamo Bay hearings: Barbarian "Justice" dispensed by KGB-style "military tribunals", Financial Times, December 11, 2004
12. ^ Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials. United States Department of Defense (March 6, 2007). Retrieved on 2007-09-22.
13. ^ OARDEC (date redacted). Summarized Detainee Sworn Statement pages 79-97. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-07.
14. ^ Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office, Friday March 10, 2006, pp. pg 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-10.