Talk:Ronald Dworkin
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[edit] Scepticism
Have added a note on scepticism. I think it's important to mention this because Dworkin's RAT turns on showing the sceptical claim to be a fallacious one. Hope to supplement the entry soon as there is a lot to say about it. KCL
[edit] Huh?
"Dworkin argues that moral principles that people hold dear are often wrong, even to the extent that certain crimes are acceptable if your principles are skewed enough. In order to discover and apply these principles, courts interpret the legal data (legislation, cases etc) with a view to articulating an interpretation which best explains and justifies past legal practice. "
I can't see any connection whatsoever between sentences 1 & 2 and sentence 3 -- these seem like random thoughts on Dworkin tossed into one paragraph. 24.90.82.121 19:21, 3 October 2007 (UTC)
[edit] Dworkin and Habermas
Would someone please explain to this Habermasian lawyer exactly how Dworkin's metaphor of the Judge as Hercules bears any resemblance whatsoever to Habermas's ideal speech situation?? --Paultopia 14:32, 5 August 2005 (UTC)
Right. I've taken it out. Removed: "Dworkin's judge Hercules is not without connection to Habermas' 'ideal speech situation'." -- I don't think it's right, or at least not right enough to assert in such a vague fashion. --Paultopia 20:31, 11 August 2005 (UTC)
Hi! 'Didn't see your question before. Both Hercules and the ideale Sprechsituation are metaphors trying to show that the right solution would be reached if a certain method could be followed with perfection. Habermas changed a bit his position on this; I'm referring to the «Kommunikationssturktur die alle systematischen Verzerrungen der Kommunikation ausschliesst und eine symmetrische Gleichverteilung von Redechancen gewährleistet» (Wahrheitstheorien, 1972). --Velho 21:54, 11 August 2005 (UTC)
I'm not completely sure I agree with that general principle: Habermas argues that claims about normative statements are analagous to truth-claims about factual statements, but I don't think he holds that there is in fact a "right solution" in the same way that there are "right solutions" to factual assertions. (BTW: I only know Habermas in the English translations, but if you want I'll dig up a reference for this.) I also think the methods are very, very different. Habermas's "certain method" is a discourse spread out through the entire society and continuing into the future, whereas Dworkin's seems to be primarily internal reflection. Dworkin bears more resemblance to Rawls than Habermas in that sense: Habermas explicitly denies that internal reflection on what satisfies the universalization principle is appropriate, but insists that proposed norms be directly put to a public test. I know Dworkin a lot less well than I know Habermas though, so please correct me if I'm horribly wrong. --Paultopia 15:42, 14 August 2005 (UTC)
Habermas firstly claimed that even (factual) truth would be a matter of consensus. As far as I know, he doesn't believe that anymore (see Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung/Truth and Justification, 1999), but he does maintain his consensus theory of correctness regarding normative claims. In fact, he expressly accepted much of Robert Alexy's developments of consensus theory into practical/normative matters, both ethical and legal. Anyway, what I mean is that Habermas' "ideal speech situation", Rawls' "veil of ignorance" and Dworkin's "judge Hercules" are quite similar metaphors or thought experiments created to show the possibility -- at least, the "thinkability" -- of objectively (if I may say "objectively") correct and just solutions to normative questions. And all the three of them talk about a perfect situation where those solutions would be found. I think we are just being fair to Dworkin if we include the references to Habermas and Rawls on his article. Moreover, both Habermas and Dworkin show some influence from Gadamer, which suggests that this coincidence isn't just a coincidence. As far as I see it, the difference between internal reflection and public discussion doesn't eliminate the resemblance. Velho 23:49, 14 August 2005 (UTC)
Hmm... actually, when you put it that way, it's a lot more convincing. Making reference to both Habermas and Rawls would resolve the problem with the difference between reflection and discourse. How about "Dworkin's metaphor of judge Hercules bears some resemblance to Rawls' veil of ignorance and Habermas' ideal speech situation, in that all suggest idealized methods of arriving at more or less valid normative propositions?" (Although I think validity for Habermas is always contingent.) --Paultopia 02:37, 19 August 2005 (UTC)
Ok! It's good for me. I'll just change "more or less" into "somehow". I suppose it's right for you. "Somehow" seems enough to care for the contingency of Habermas' validity. I'll do it now. Velho 19:19, 19 August 2005 (UTC)
[edit] Example of the sacrilegious contract
Last change, by Simon Dodd, should be reverted. First, the example is Dworkin's example. Second, it's a hypothetical example. It doesn't mean to have any connection to any existing legal system. So, the change is absolutely pointless. Velho 19:51, 22 November 2005 (UTC)
[edit] NPOV
I'm not enitirely sure this article has a NPOV. Several statements are a bit... opinionated. WP shouldn't have opinions IMHO, Although wether or not this applies here is beyond me. Hmm. Comments? HawkerTyphoon 14:13, 23 April 2006 (UTC)
[edit] Neutral?
I must point out that Dworkin himself would reject the idea that there is such a thing as a value-free or neutral point of view. So on one hand, you could say, yes, NPOV doesn't apply here. On the other, I don't think there is anything grossly off-kilter on the page. It goes further than a conventional encyclopedia might in describing a famous thinker, in that it presents not only Dworkin's ideas but also criticisms thereof, thus presenting a debate, and connecting the ideas more wholesomely to the ideas of others. This is what we should value Wikipedia for. More importantly perhaps, it highlights the fact that Dworkin's ideas are in some respects highly controversial, which is informative in itself.
[edit] NPOV tag
I added the NPOV tag to draw attention to the second original paragraph under "Law as rule and principle." It is so biased that it does not even help in expounding his argument. I would fix it myself, but I am not too familiar with his views.
As a post script, of COURSE he thinks his view is the right view! If he didn't, he wouldn't hold that view!
[edit] Issues with The Rawls-Habermas paragraph
This is the first time I've involved myself in the Wikipedia project, so I don't know if this is the right place to post critical comments without also offering improved text, but I'll comment anyway.
The second-to-last paragraph under "The right answer thesis" seems to be lacking. The surface comparisons between Dworkin's Hercules, Rawls's original position (OP), and Habermas's ideal speech situation are right about one thing: they are "idealized methods of arriving at somehow valid normative propositions." But the article has two problems with which I take issue.
First, the original position is not to be used on the basis of the strategic justification offered in this article, such as a person who adheres to the outcome of the OP because she 'might be in the opposition at some point in the future.' Rather, the OP is used because it is the reasonable (or moral) thing to do--a commitment to justice requires it. To say that it is used for a strategic reason is misleading to the reader. (This is related to Rawls's concepts of what is required for Overlapping Consensus, but I don't have time or know-how to make my point really clear on this matter.) I suggest that the further description of the veil of ignorance, if not the whole reference, should be deleted if it cannot be improved.
Second, the reader of this article gets the misleading impression that these thought experiments are like black boxes that "somehow" produce "valid normative propositions." "Somehow," as if the process is obscure. The Hercules model is idealized, but it is not just a groundless "leap of faith; it is what a good judge would strive to be like--a judge who follows Dworkin's procedure for finding right answers. Similarly, Rawls's OP does not just "somehow" produce "valid normative propositions." The somehow is central, and it should be elucidated in this article, if the article is going to contain this reference. The OP is only valuable if it models the moral notions that reasonable people think it should model, and if it is the agreed upon way to determine principles of political justice. I suggest that the characterization of Hercules as a "leap of faith" should be removed or clarified.
Though I don't know enough about Dworkin and Hercules to correct these passages (and hardly know enough about Habermas's ideas to even comment), I do know enough to confidently suggest that the second-to-last paragraph of the "right answer thesis" section is off and misleading. 66.245.70.208 04:30, 28 December 2006 (UTC)David from Chicago
[edit] About mathematics and the one right thing
Dworkin obviously does not claim that there is one right answer for parcial (wh-) questions, but for yes-no questions. The issue is not on curves, but on the law of excluded middle. Velho 21:33, 2 March 2007 (UTC)
[edit] Dworkin's ethnicity
I've just deleted recent and some older claims the Dworkin is a Jew. Nothing shows that in the biographical sketch. In a recent interview to the New York Times, conducted and written by Adam Liptak, nothing is said about Dworkin's hypothetical Jewish origin. Liptak says only that Dworkin is "emphatically American". Velho (talk) 21:18, 31 January 2008 (UTC) Actually, the interview comes in NYU Law magazine. Sorry for that. Velho (talk) 21:22, 31 January 2008 (UTC)
