Policy of deliberate ambiguity

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A policy of deliberate ambiguity (also known as a policy of strategic ambiguity) is the practice by a nation of being intentionally ambiguous on certain aspects of its foreign policy or whether it possesses certain weapons of mass destruction. It may be useful if they have contrary foreign and domestic policy goals, or if they want to take advantage of risk aversion to abet a deterrence strategy. Such a policy can be very risky as it may cause misinterpretation of a nation's intentions, leading to actions that contradict that nation's wishes.

[edit] Examples

People's Republic of China and Republic of China
- 1992 consensus: the governments of mainland China and Taiwan formed a consensus in 1992 that both sides recognise that there is one China, but remain ambiguous on the content of that concept. See also Cross-Strait relations.
- Due to the controversial political status of Taiwan, foreign governments have long felt a need to be ambiguous regarding Taiwan. In practice, they maintain different levels of ambiguity on their attitudes to the Taiwan issue: see Foreign relations of the Republic of China and Foreign relations of the People's Republic of China.

United States
- Whether it would retaliate to a chemical or biological attack with nuclear weapons; specifically, during the Persian Gulf War.
- Whether it would defend the Republic of China (Taiwan) in the event of an attack by the People's Republic of China. This policy was intended to discourage both a unilateral declaration of independence by ROC leaders and an invasion of Taiwan by the PRC. The United States has since been much less ambiguous after George W. Bush stated to "do whatever it takes" to defend Taiwan,^[1] but has continued to express dissatisfaction over moves towards a unilateral declaration of independence.