Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon

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Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued November 14, 1922 Decided December 11, 1922
Full case name: Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon Citations: 260 U.S. 393 Prior history: On appeal from Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Holding
Whether a regulatory act constitutes a taking requiring compensation depends on the extent of diminution in the value of the property.
Court membership
Chief Justice: William Howard Taft Associate Justices: Joseph McKenna, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., William R. Day, Willis Van Devanter, Mahlon Pitney, James Clark McReynolds, Louis Brandeis, George Sutherland
Case opinions
Majority by: Holmes Dissent by: Brandeis
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV.

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)^[1], was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that whether a regulatory act constitutes a taking requiring compensation depends on the extent of diminution in the value of the property. The decision thereby established the doctrine of regulatory taking and the dimunition-of-value test, in contrast to other tests, such as the permanent physical occupations test (Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.), the nuisance-control measures test (Hadacheck v. Sebastian), and the total takings test (Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council). Additionally, the case was one of the first to address the denominator problem with regard to regulatory taking.

Contents 1 Parties 2 Background 2.1 State of law 2.2 Facts of case 2.3 Prior history 2.4 Procedural posture 3 Legal analysis 3.1 Issue 3.2 Arguments/theories 3.3 Rule of law 3.4 Holding 3.5 Reasoning 3.6 Notable concurring and dissenting opinions 4 Result 4.1 Judgment/disposition 4.2 Subsequent History 4.3 Selected Articles 5 See also 6 References

[edit] Parties

Plaintiff/Respondent 

H.J. Mahon, owner of surface rights to a parcel of land, et al.

Defendant/Petitioner 

Pennsylvania Coal Co., owner of mining rights to a parcel of land.

Amici Curiae 

Attorney General of Pennsylvania, the Scranton, Pennsylvania, and the representatives of other extensive interests.

[edit] Background

[edit] State of law

A 1921 act of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania known as the Kohler Act prohibited the mining of anthracite coal in such way as to cause the subsidence of, among other things, any structure used as a human habitation, with certain exceptions including when the miner owned such habitation and the underlying coal is more than one hundred and fifty feet from an improved property belonging to any other person.

[edit] Facts of case

In a 1878 deed, the Pennsylvania Coal Co. granted to H.J. Mahon the surface rights to a parcel of land, but retained the mining rights to the land, and Mahon accepted any risk from, and waived all claim for damages resulting from, mining below the property. Pennsylvania Coal provided notice to Mahon that it planned to mine for coal under the Mahon's habitation.

[edit] Prior history

Mahon sued in the Court of Common Pleas to enjoin Pennsylvania Coal from conducting mining, but the court denied the injunction. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed, and granted an injunction.

[edit] Procedural posture

Pennsylvania Coal, on writ of error, sought reversal of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania judgment.

[edit] Legal analysis

[edit] Issue

The Court considered the issues of (1) whether the Kohler Act as applied to the property in question constitutes an exercise of the police power, requiring no compensation, or of eminent domain, requiring compensation; and (2) whether the act in general constitutes an exercise of the police power or of eminent domain.

[edit] Arguments/theories

Court of Common Pleas 

The statute on which the claim is based is an unconstitutional taking, and is prohibited.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 

The Defendant had property and contract rights that would be damaged, but the statute is a legitimate exercise of the police power.

[edit] Rule of law

The Court ruled that whether a regulatory act constitutes a taking requiring compensation depends on the extent of diminution in the value of the property.

[edit] Holding

The Court held that (1) the Kohler Act as applied to the property in question constitutes an exercise of eminent domain, requiring compensation; and (2) the act in general constitutes an exercise of eminent domain.

[edit] Reasoning

The Court argued as follows: (1) The damage done by the activity prohibited by the act is a private, not a public nuisance; there is no public safety justification for the statute, as notice before mining would suffice to protect public safety. On the other hand, the damage done by the statute is significant, insofar as it abolishes an estate in land—a very valuable estate—and a binding contract. (2) The statute, in general, purports to extinguish the mining rights to properties under surfaces owned by the public and the government. The statute makes prohibitively expensive the mining of coal in these areas, and thereby effectively destroys the right. The rights of the public to its streets and other property are rights paid for. If the representatives of the public have been so shortsighted as not to pay for the mining rights of the land as well, there is no authority to grant those rights without compensation. (If the land above required compensation, so therefore does the land below.)

[edit] Notable concurring and dissenting opinions

Brandeis, J., dissenting. 

Justice Brandeis argued as follows: Every restriction upon the use of property entails a deprival of some right of the owner, but this can be justified by the police power. In this case, the police power applies insofar as the Kohler Act prohibits a noxious use. If the noxious use is removed, the restriction will have to be removed. The fact that the restriction benefits a particular party is irrelevant. Additionally, the dimunition-of-value test is flawed because value is so relative, and cannot be determined by a court of law. It raises unanswerable questions: how much value is required, and compared to what? The overall value of the land? And if public safety is imperiled, neither grant, nor contract, can prevail against the exercise of police power. As for the applicability of the law to other properties, especially public properties, notice will not sufficiently protect public safety.

[edit] Result

[edit] Judgment/disposition

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania judgment reversed.

[edit] Subsequent History

Today, the Supreme Court quotes Justice Holmes in Mahon for the recognition of the invalidity of a government regulation that goes too far when it takes private property for public use under the Fifth Amendment. Among others the cases include: Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 488 U.S. 104, 127 (1978); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992).

[edit] Selected Articles

• Evan B. Brandes, "Legal Theory and Property Jurisprudence of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Louis D. Brandeis: An Analysis of Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon," 38 Creighton Law Review 1179 (2005)

[edit] See also

• List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 260

[edit] References