Norm (sociology)

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In sociology, a norm, or social norm, is a rule that is socially enforced. Social sanctioning is what distinguishes norms from other cultural products or social constructions such as meaning and values. Norms and normlessness are thought to affect a wide variety of human behavior.

1 Overview
2 Levels of enforcement
3 Enforcement/Distribution of Norms
4 Heteronormativity
5 Game-theoretical analysis of norms
6 Example (gift exchange)
7 References
8 See also
9 Further reading
10 External links

[edit] Overview

Social norms can also be viewed as statements that regulate behavior and act as informal social controls. They are usually based in some degree of consensus and are enforced through social sanctions. In order to explain the content of normative rules, three different models are identified:

Focus on the actions of ones personal ego,
Focus on ego's reactions to actions of alter, and
Negotiation between ego and alter.

[edit] Actions of Ego

This model revolves around the wide-spread assumption that norms reflect existing patterns of action.^{[citation needed]} "An individual may change his behavior, especially his social actions, either to protect his interests under new external conditions or simply to promote them more effectively under existing conditions" (Weber 1978). In other words, after an action is initially carried out it will be repeated as it is now associated with a sense of rightness.

Though this model's arguments are at first appealing, it brings up two difficult questions: How does habitual behavior become normative, and how are changes in normative behavior brought about?

How does habitual behavior become normative?

In an effort to address this question, Emile Durkheim (1915) conducted a study of religion that included a focus on why a group comes to label an emblem as being sacred. "It is by uttering the same cry, pronouncing the same word, or performing the same gesture in regard to some object that [individuals] become and feel themselves to be in unison ... It is the homogeneity of these movements that [makes the group] exist" (262-63). Though this idea correctly emphasizes the importance of commonality, it fails to explain why certain behaviors (or objects) do or do not become inexplicably valuable. However, it can be claimed that any observed act will come to be considered as usual; consequently, deviation from what is expected violates the value of certainty that many individuals harbor (Opp 1982). The frequency with which these behaviors are observed, the following effects, and personal preference of individuals all contribute to the strengthening of the sense of rightness that makes these actions normative. It has also been observed that there may be an intuitively-based difference between typical and normative behavior that keeps the latter from becoming a norm; for example, "Taking off your hat to escape the heat is different from taking off your hat to satisfy an obligation. The former is a regularity and the latter is a norm" (Cooter 1996, 1656; see also Weber 1978, 34).

How are changes in normative behavior brought about?

In order to finally be able to explain this question, the points at which norms are changed and the reasoning behind such changes must be examined. "New norms are thought to emerge when costs of compliance with existing norms become too high relative to the rewards" (Horne 8). However, it is not always easy to obtain an explanation of how to weigh concerns of costly normative actions against concerns of morality or social opinion (Montgomery 1998). Though unlikely to change their behavior when norms become costly, individuals will praise those willing to do so; after a few have tested the waters, a domino effect of individuals who harbor less fear of social sanction will follow. If these innovators receive social approval, individuals will continue to participate in new strategies in order to gain recognition.

What makes people conform to norms?

Since people are social beings, we must exchange with one another, we evolve norms to reduce the risk by making one another’s behavior sufficiently predictable. (we are in a way programmed to know how to act, behave, or respond when interacting with each other)

Example: “Hello sir could you point me in the direction of the men’s room?” – This man asked this question to a complete stranger, he was following his injunctive norms (behaviors which are perceived as being approved of by other people) when asking this question the man also predicted the response he would get. “oh yes the bathrooms are in the back left corner” If these social norms were not "pre-programmed" in us like they are, this man would have had a very hard time even with something as simple as asking directions.

We accept norms not only because our friends expect us to but because we risk our self-respect if we deviate. Religious beliefs may be one contributor to why we might conform and follow norms. The phrase “I’m not that kind of person” indicates that we have certain beliefs about proper behavior (Rodney Stark). Norms like these are generally taught to us as we grow up.

[edit] Ego’s Reactions to Actions of Alter

This second model focuses on one’s concerns with the behavior of others. Rather than simply monitor one’s own behavior as the previously model does, this theory concentrates on the attention paid to the actions of another individual; the norms emerge in response to externalities produced by the behaviors of others (Coleman 1990). Actions that result in beneficial or positive outcomes will gain approval, and those that warrant disappointing or negative outcomes will gain disapproval, thus molding an individual’s measured response to social situations (Horne). Consistent with this approach is Gerry Mackie's (1996) reasoning behind female genital mutilation and foot binding. The separate interests of men and women propel this explanation: Mackie makes the assumption that men want to know they have faithful wives and pure-blooded children, while women seek reassurance of support and partnership. Men tend to have too many wives to keep track of in stratified polygamous societies, thus they use foot binding and genital mutilation as a signal of reliability. Scholars that follow this approach believe norms emerge in response to externalities produced by the behaviors of others (Coleman 1990). Thus, "people will approve of actions that result in positive outcomes for them and disapprove of those that have negative consequences" (Horne). Depending on the situation, individuals will favor norms that either discourage or encourage a certain reaction from others. However, the emergence of a normative rule is not necessarily caused by the mere existence of externalities.

Linking behavior with negative effects

The ability to link behavior with negative effects gives individuals the chance to object to such behavior by others, thus making the dissemination of information more significant. For example, it was only after research came out the public proving that alcohol-related car accidents were preventable that there was a vast disapproval of drunk driving; thus, a link between the behavior and the resulting harm was established by the public (McCarthy 1994). However, this approach is not always so in the absence of adequate information.

"Even if people are able to link consequences to underlying cause, however, their responses will be affected by the extent to which they perceive those consequences as harmful or beneficial" (Horne). More simply put, it is more difficult to predict the content of norms when there are discrepancies between what is objectively identified as a cost and what is subjectively experienced.

With this model, it is apparent that behaviors that create externalities will be evaluated by the group and those that produce only personal consequences will not; these are the behaviors that become normative. Though this model allows norm content to be more easily predicted, it is only useful in situations in which the costs and benefits of externalities are determinative.

[edit] Negotiations between ego and alter

This third and final way of explaining normative content attempts to answer the question raised by the previous model: In situations in which they are not predictive, how is the appropriateness of a behavior determined? Focusing most intently on meanings produced through negotiation, this model suggests that there must exist a common understanding of situations, behaviors, and roles in order for people to interact successfully. These commonalities (such as speaking the same language) have usually been established during past interactions. "When individuals are placed in new situations, they are able to draw on their past experiences to evaluate what is happening and to assess what they ought to do" (Fine). However, when situations become problematic - as they often do - participants may find themselves struggling with outdated definitions learned from past encounters or conflicting understandings (Becker 1982; Heiss 1981, 116-26). When this occurs, the interaction can unfold successfully only if mutual understandings are negotiated. This negotiation involves "interpretation, or ascertaining the meaning of the actions or remarks of the other person, and definition, or conveying indications to another person as to how he is to act. Human association consists of a process of such interpretation and definition. Through this process the participants fit their own acts to the ongoing acts of one another and guide others in doing so" (Blumer 1966, 537-38).

Negotiating common understandings

In her analysis of between spouses, Arlie Hochschild (1989) the conflicts that can occur when husbands and wives attach different meanings to a behavior. If one puts forth what he or she perceives to be a gift (for example, a husband offering to wash the dishes after dinner) that the other perceives as an entitlement (the wife believes that husbands are supposed to share housework), then both spouses feel unloved and unappreciated. Negotiating common meanings for these kinds of actions ensures a mutually rewarding relationship.

Catalysts for negotiations

Gary Alan Fine relates the establishment of new common meanings to the similar experience among mushroom gatherers. He argues that "when individuals engage in behavior that conflicts with existing norms to which they adhere, a problematic situation is created" (Horne). Though mushroom gatherers accept norms supporting respect for natural life, they alter natural settings and thus, must justify their actions. Potential difficulties are also created by conflicts of interest. As is the nature of mushroom gathering, those who participate in such behavior must compete with each other and consequently create rules deciding who is entitled to what. As Fine aptly describes, a myriad of circumstances lead to the negotiation of new, commonly accepted meanings.

[edit] Levels of enforcement

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Levels of enforcement, in decreasing order:

Violations of norms are punished with sanctions, possibly enforced by law.
Violators of norms are considered eccentric or even deviant and are stigmatized.
Alternative behaviors are not acknowledged. The norm is presumed, often to an extreme, in an attempt to avoid any challenge that might provoke stigma or sanction or even lead to redefinition of normative behavior. As a series of examples that are under tremendous contemporary pressure as norms evolve: the term "lover" once was presumed to denote a person of the opposite sex; a "mature" adult once was presumed to be or have been married; and a "couple" once was presumed to have or want children.

There are three kinds of norms:

[edit] Folkways

A society's web of cultural rituals, traditions and routines. Deviation is not usually considered a serious threat to social organization and is thus sanctioned less severely than moral deviation. Example: In certain households in the U.S., it is a folkway to say grace before eating Thanksgiving dinner. See Faux pas.

[edit] Mores

Moral judgments that define wrong and right behavior, the allowed and the disallowed, what is wanted and not wanted within a culture. The word is the plural of the Latin mor-, mos, which means "custom". A violation of mores is usually considered by society as a threat to social organization and harshly sanctioned. Examples: Drug use, sexual promiscuity, and extreme styles of dress.

"More than ambition, more than ability, it is rules that limit contribution; rules are the lowest common denominator of human behavior. They are a substitute for rational thought."—Hyman G. Rickover

[edit] Laws

In highly organized societies, formalized and precisely delimited norms. The breaking of legal norms, or laws, invokes procedures and judgments through formal, legal institutions, such as police and the courts, set up to enforce them. These norms generally relate to individual violations of mores or to the adjustment of proprietary relationships.

[edit] Enforcement/Distribution of Norms

The existence of social norms is directly related to the enforcement of norms. Enforcement is vital when individual and group interests conflict, as it encourages people to act in a desired or appropriate way. Informal sanctioning by group members is the primary source of enforcement (Coleman 1990; Hechter 1984; Scott 1971). Distribution focuses on the prediction of patterns across a group or several groups in order to explain how norms are accepted by group members as norms.

Social Sanctioning

Sanctioning, when under certain conditions, occurs as a result of various self- interested behavior. Most scholars argue that sanctioning is costly (Axelrod 1986). When punishing others, the risks involved include the possibility of retaliation, loss of a relationship, loss of time or money, emotional discomfort, etc. Therefore, sanctioning that results in compensating benefits provides an incentive for interacting individuals. For example, it is beneficial when sanctioning results in the alteration of deviant behavior. "In other words, to the extent that another's behavior produces externalities, discouraging that behavior will reduce those externalities. For some people the benefits of this reduction will reduce those externalities. For some people the benefits of this reduction outweigh the costs of sanctioning, and they will punish such behavior" (Horne 2001). More often than not, however, individuals avoid sanctioning as the incentive is too small to motivate them. Because of this, scholars identified another possible source of benefits: the reaction of others. These reactions constitute metanorms that encourage sanctioning (Axelrod 1986). This solution raises the question: why do individuals reward punishers? Two likely sources of motivation are the benefits resulting from a change in the rate of externality- producing behavior and the potential reactions of others. Thus, potential rewarder's relationships takes precedence, rather than the rewarding of sanctioners for changing rates of deviance. The willingness to berate or reward is effected by variations in those relationships (for example, the distribution of resources and people's dependence on one another). Thus, "sanctioning is motivated not just by norm content (an interest in the share of the benefit) but also by an interest in exchange relationships and the rewards that can be obtained from them. Structural factors like interdependency, therefore, affect reactions to norm-violating behavior" (Horne forthcoming).

Other Types of Control

Aside from informal sanctioning, there exists other types of control mechanisms. For example, the extent to which behavior complies with social norms can be directly affected by formal responses to deviance provided by legal systems. Legal systems may also have an indirect effect through its influence on informal control processes. Because certain institutions such as the legal system exist side by side with normative controls, how social conditions that contribute to informal sanctioning are related to it must be explained. Experimental research has shown that although law has a direct effect on compliance, it also reduces the likelihood that group members will impose social sanctions (Horne 2000; Posner 1996).

Just as some conditions weaken informal sanctioning, others may supplement it. In other words, other social processes can make up for the shortcomings of weak social controls. So, when informal sanctions fail to prompt compliance, there are other processes that may coerce cooperative behavior. It is argued that when informal controls prove ineffective, a sense of trust is established amongst group members that allows them to involve themselves in successful interactions even if the assurances that controls provide is absent. They simply act on the assumption that others will behave appropriately and treat them that way - initiating cooperative exchanges (Yamagishi, Cook, and Watabe, 1998). In places like Japan where control mechanisms are established, antisocial behavior is consequently discouraged. If such sanctions do not exist, however, profitable exchanges require trust between individuals. Thus, in societies like that of the United States, trust results from the desire that others act prosocially, which increases the chances of cooperative interactions. "Apparently, the existence of risk resulting from the lack of informal control creates the need for trust, which leads in turn to higher levels of cooperation behavior" (Kollock, 1994). This argument pushes the notion that trust comes about when controls are absent, and encourages cooperative behavior which otherwise would not exist.

The Distribution of Norms

A rule can be identified also as a norm if it is accepted by group members. Various research and explanations geared toward the distribution of norms often emphasizes structural elements, such as network ties and position in the social structure or impersonal selection. These focuses translate into several key processes. Innovations may spread across networks through diffusion from one actor to another; group members in similar social structural positions may independently develop similar strategies; or the survival of a norm may be determined by selection processes.

Diffusion

Norms may become widespread as a result of diffusion (Horne 2001). In an effort to explain distribution of innovations within a group, Michael Macy and John Skvoretz (1998) explored the conditions under which cooperation spreads using computer simulations. "They began by identifying decision rules (or norms) that actors might follow during interaction. Certain combinations of these rules are more successful - that is, produce better outcomes for the actor - than others ... over time, successful combinations spread across the group . As this process unfolds, norms favoring cooperation develop first in small, embedded groups and then diffuse outward as group members have contact with strangers" (Horne 2001).

The diffusion of new medical practices, as analyzed by Ronald Burt (1987) proposed a different mechanism in the way it revealed the acceptance of a new procedure as appropriate and normative. He found that physicians adopt innovations not as a result of interaction but in response to what others in similar structure positions do (see also Mark 1998). This finding showed that norms spread among people in the same role position, not just those engaged in personal contact. Though diffusion research varies in its treatment of the individual, the structural arguments that result help to provide more understanding of norm distribution.

Structural Equivalence

Similarities in structural positions can also explain how group members come to adopt the same norms. People in these positions are able to receive the same information, struggle with the same constraints, and are likely to develop a mutual understanding of certain situations. According to William Graham Sumner, "the operation by which folkways are produced consists in the frequent repetition of petty acts, often by great numbers ... acting in the same way when face to face with the same need ... It produces habit in the individual and custom in the group" (Park and Burgess 1924, 101). Well-known research conducted by Melvin Kohn (1977) provides an example of work of this type. Parents' expectations of and reactions to their children's behavior, he argues, varies with social positions. Middle-class adults value direction and integrity while working-class parents are more likely to value obedience. These differences can be linked to variety in disciplinary measures. Working- class parents sanction children based on the consequences, whereas middle-class parents contrastingly punish based on the child's intentions. Ths proves that social structural position affects not only the norms people accept and enforce but values as well. Structural factors such as occupation may affect many facets of psychological functioning; thus, social structure placement acts on individuals, affecting the values they hold and the norms to which they adhere.

Selection

Selection processes are a third focus that can be used to explain group-level distribution of norms. Groups without adaptive norms fail, and those that have them persist (Romanelli 1991). Selection arguments explain the distribution of norms (Horne 2001). They often predict that adaptive norms will survive, to the degree that they address content. Supportters of this approach argue "that groups with belief systems that cause individuals within the group to cooperate effectively survive longer and produce more cultural propagules. Eventually this process would cause self-sacrificial belief systems to predominate" (Boyd and Richerson 1985, 205). It can be argued that although these between-group pressures may be functioning, within the group itself other forces favor self-interested rather than prosocial behavior (Boyd and Richerson 1985). This proves that selection will happen only if it is stronger across, rather than within, groups.

Look up Heteronormativity in
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[edit] Heteronormativity

Main article: Heteronormativity

Heteronormativity is a system of norms dictating the range of socially acceptable sexual and gender identities. It is based around the notion that all people fall into two categories, male and female, and that there are essentialized notions of how these two sexes are expected to act.

[edit] Game-theoretical analysis of norms

A general formal framework that can be used to represent the essential elements of the social situation surrounding a norm is the repeated game of game theory.

A norm gives a person a rule of thumb for how they should behave. However, a rational person only acts according to the rule if only it is optimal for them. The situation can be described as follows. A norm gives an expectation of how other people act in a given situation (macro). A person acts optimally given the expectation (micro). In order for a norm to be stable, people's actions must reconstitute the expectation without change (micro-macro feedback loop). A set of such correct stable expectations is known as a Nash equilibrium. Thus, a stable norm must constitute a Nash equilibrium.

There exist various norms throughout the world. What accounts for the vast variety? From a game theoretical point of view, there are two explanans for this. One is the difference in games. Different parts of the world may give different environmental contexts and different people may have different values, which may result in a difference in games. The other is equilibrium selection not explicable by the game itself. Equilibrium selection is closely related to coordination. For a simple example, driving is common throughout the world, but in some countries people drive on the right and in other countries people drive on the left (see coordination game). A framework called comparative institutional analysis is proposed to deal with the game theoretical structural understanding of the variety of social norms.

[edit] Example (gift exchange)

The Norm of Reciprocity:

In the western world, it is a custom to exchange gifts on various holidays. It is so deeply ingrained in the minds of people that many do not think of acting otherwise.

Now, suppose you become fed up with exchanging gifts. It is not necessarily easy to change your actions. Unilaterally changing your actions to stop giving gifts may give others the impression that you are a selfish person, and that impression is probably not in your interest. Notice, that your friends may be following the norm for the same reasons as you. If that is the case, you are wrongly coordinating due to the customary norm of gift exchange and are trapped in a prisoner's dilemma game. Coordination with communication may be necessary to get out of the prisoner's dilemma situation.

[edit] References

Coleman, James S. 1990. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press.
Weber, Max. 1978. Economy and Society, ed. by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Horne, Christine. 2001. Social Norms, ed. by Michael Hechter and Karl-Dieter Opp. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
Opp, Karl-Dieter. 1982. "The Evolutionary Emergence of Norms." British Journal of Social Psychology 21(2): 139-49.
Durkheim, Emile. 1915. The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. New York: Free Press.
Hechter, Michael. 1984. "When Actors Comply: Monitoring Costs and the Production of Social Order." Acta Sociologica 27(3): 161-83.
Scott, John Finley. 1971. Internalization of Norms: A Sociological Theory of Moral Commitment. Englewoods Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
McCarthy, Jon D. 1994. "Activists, Authorities, and Media Framing of Drunk Driving." In New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity, edited by Enrique Larana, Hank Johnston, and Joseph R. Gusfield. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Becker, Howard S. 1982. "Culture: A Sociological View." Yale Review 71(4): 513-27.
Heiss, Jerold. 1981. "Social Roles." In Social Psychology: Sociological Perspectives, edited by Morris Rosenburg and Ralph H. Turner. New York: Basic Books.
Blumer, Herbert. 1956. "Sociological Analysis and the 'Variable'." American Sociological Review 21(6): 683-90.
Fine, Gary Alan. 2001. Social Norms, ed. by Michael Hechter and Karl-Dieter Opp. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
Hochschild, Arlie. 1989. "The Economy of Gratitude." In The Sociology of Emotions: Original Essays and Research Papers, edited by David D. Franks and E. Doyle McCarthy. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press.
Axelrod, Robert. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
Posner, Eric. 1996. "The Regulation of Solidary Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action." University of Chicago Law Review 63(1): 133-97.
Yamagishi, Toshio, Karen S. Cook, and Motoki Watabe. 1998. "Uncertainty, Trust, and Commitment Formation in the United States and Japan." American Journal of Sociology 104(1): 165-94.
Kollock, Peter. 1994. "The Emergence of Exchange Structures: An Experimental Study of Uncertainty, Commitment, and Trust." American Journal of Sociology 100(2): 313-45.
Macy, Michael W. and John Skvoretz. 1998. "The Evolution of Trust and Cooperation Between Strangers: A Computational Model." American Sociological Review 63(5): 638-60.
Burt, Ronald S. 1987. "Social Contagion and Innovation: Cohesive Versus Structural Equivalence." American Journal of Sociology 92(6): 1287-1335.
Mark, Noah. 1998. "Birds of a Feather Sing Together." Social Forces 77(2): 453-85.
Sumner, William Graham. 1979. Folkways. New York: Arno Press.
Park, Robert E. and Ernest W. Burgess. 1924. Introduction to The Science of Sociology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kohn, Melvin L. 1977. Class and Conformity: A Study in Values . 2d ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Romanelli, Elaine. 1991. "The Evolution of New Organizational Forms." Annual Review of Sociology 17: 79-103.
Boyd, Robert and Peter J. Richerson. 1985. Culture and the Evolutionary Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

[edit] See also

[edit] Further reading

Cialdini, R., 2007, Descriptive Social Norms as Underappreciated Sources of Social Control. Psychometrika, vol. 72, no. 2, 263-268, [1].
McElreath, R., Boyd, R., & Richerson, P.J. (2003). Shared norms and the evolution of ethnic markers. Current Anthropology, 44(1): 122-129. Full text
Quah, Stella R. and Sales, Arnaud, 2000, The International Handbook of Sociology. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. ISBN 0-7169-5378-7.
Schultz, P.W., Nolan, J. M., Cialdini, R. B., Goldstein, N. J., Griskevicius, V., 2007, The Constructive, Destructive, and Reconstructive Power of Social Norms. Psychological Science, vol. 18, no. 5, 429-434, 2007. [2].
Stark, Rodney. 2007 Sociology, 10th ed. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth. ISBN 0-495-09344-0.

[edit] External links

Common Knowledge in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Model Citizenship Real World Examples of Expected Normative Behavior

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