Nayif Fahd Mutliq Al Usaymi

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Nayif Fahd Mutliq Al Usaymi is held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, in Cuba.^[1] His Guantanamo detainee ID is 436. American intelligence analysts estimate that he was born in 1979, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

1 Combatant Status Review Tribunal
2 Administrative Review Board hearing
- 2.1 The following primary factors favor continued detention:
- 2.2 The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
3 References

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

There is no record that Al Usaymi chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

The factors for and against continuing to detain Al Usaymi were among the 121 that the Department of Defense released on March 3, 2006.^[2]

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

In early February of 2001, the detainee met with a Taliban recruiter.
On more than one occasion, the detainee talked to the Taliban recruiter about military training in Afghanistan.
The recruiter provided the detainee instructions on obtaining a Pakistani visa as well as a specific rout to take. The detainee traveled to a Taliban guesthouse in Quetta, Pakistan, where the recruiter had sent him.
Many Taliban soldiers armed with Kalashnikov rifles walked in and out of the guesthouse. The detainee told a member of the Taliban guesthouse that he desired to receive military training.
In November of 2001, the Northern Alliance Forces captured the detainee in Konduz, Afghanistan.

b. Training

The detainee and about thirty to fifty men were trained near the front line on shooting the Kalashnikov rifle. A Taliban member, who claimed to handle the fighter and killer training of the soldiers, is the one who trained them.
The detainee was specifically trained on the Kalashnikov rifle, Beha gun, RPG (rocket propelled grenade) and the bolt action rifle.
The detainee was identified as having trained at al Farouq training camp.

c. Connection

In March of 2001, the detainee arrived in Kandahar, Afghanistan where he joined the Taliban.
The detainee frequently visited Al Iraqi’s office.
Al Iraqi is an al Qaida terrorist who was part of Usama Bin Laden’s inner circle and also commanded 200 Arab and Taliban soldiers in Kabul.

d. Intent

The detainee and about twenty to thirty Afghanistan fighters/soldiers traveled to Konduz, Affghanistan and stayed at a Taliban house.
The detainee wnet to the front line located near Kwahajhar, Afghanistan for approximately two weeks and then continued a two week rotating cycle for approximately six and a half months. At the front line, the soldiers used many weapons to include Kalashnikov rifles, PK and RPGs.
The detainee fought with the Taliban for approximately 13 months.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee did not receive any explosives training. The detainee was issued the Kalashnikov, but never saw any fighting because he was stationed at the rear of the front line. The detainee was never approached to joine al Qaida nor did he know anyone who was with al Qaida. The detainee never gave “Bayat” to Usama Bin Laden.
A delegation from Saudi Arabia visited GTMO in July 2002 and assessed the detainee as being of low intelligence or law enforcement value to the United States and also as unlikely to pose a terrorist threat to the U.S. or its interests. The Saudi delegation indicated that the Saudi government would be willing to take custody of the detainee for possible prosecution as soon as the United States determine it no longer wanted to hold him.