Mohammed Sulaymon Barre

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Mohammed Sulaymon Barre (born December 27, 1964) is from Somaliland, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detention camps, in Cuba.^[1] His Guantanamo Internee Security Number is 567. Joint Task Force Guantanamo counter-terror analysts report that he was born on December 27, 1964, in Burco, Somaliland.

[edit] Identity

Captive 567's name was spelled inconsistently on official documents released by the United States Department of Defense.

• Captive 567 was named Mohammed Sulaymon Barre on official lists of captives released on April 20, 2006 May 15, 2006 September 4, 2007, and Summary of Evidence memos prepared for his Combatant Status Review Tribunal and his first annual Administrative Review Board hearing.^{[1][2][3][4][5]}
• Captive 567 was named Mohammed Soliman Barre on the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his second annual Administrative Review Board hearing, on 4 October 2006.^[6]

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor.^[7][8] Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.^[9]

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Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

Barre chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.^[10]

Barre's Tribunal convened on October 29, 2004.^[11]

[edit] Witness requests

Barre had requested the testimony of three witnesses.

Abdul Aziz Al Matrafi, alleged to have been one of the founders of al Wafa, a charity accused of ties to terrorism, declined to testify on Barre's behalf.

The other two witnesses Barre had requested were also detainees he was told were associated with al Wafa. He had requested their testimony to establish that he was not associated with al Wafa. But, he withdrew his requests after his Personal Representative met with them, and they stated they weren't associated with al Wafa either. The transcript does not record their names or ID numbers.

[edit] Allegations

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for his Combatant Status Review Tribunal on September 19, 2004.^[12][13]

a.The detainee supported forces engaged in hostilities against the United States and its coalition partners.

1. The detainee voluntarily traveled from Somalia to Pakistan in 1994.
2. The detainee worked for the Dehabshiil Company ^[sic] .
3. The detainee was identified as a member of the non-governmental organization al Wafa.
4. Al Wafa was identified as a terrorist organization on Executive Order 13224.

[edit] Testimony

Barre described the circumstances under which he traveled to Pakistan.^[10] His country was in the middle of a civil war. He was a student, and he was cut off from his family. The area where he lived was a battleground, and when he fled the United Nations helped him relocate to an official refugee camp in Pakistan. After some years in Pakistan he started working for the Dehabshiil Company.

The Dehabshiil Company is a money transfer company that allows Somalian expatriates to transfer money to and from Somalia. Barre said that the company had multiple offices, around the world, wherever there were a large number of Somalian expatriates. The company had internet sites, and his name and email address were listed on the site, to help customers contact him. Barre questioned whether his company could be on the list of organizations suspected of ties with terrorism, because the USA had taken no steps to shut down the Dehabshiil Company's offices in the USA.

Barre pointed out that his phone number was readily available on the internet. He argued that if someone associated with al Wafa had written down his phone number did not mean he had been involved in a questionable money transfer, or even that the al Wafa suspect had taken the next step, and actually phoned him.

Barre's Personal Representative provided the Tribunal with printouts from the then current Dehabshiil web-site.^[14] The printouts confirmed Barre's account that Dehabshiil was a legitimate organization that continued to operate legally in the USA, and that the phone numbers and email addresses of the agents were available on the web-site. The Dahabshiil web-site currently has a prominent anti-money-laundering policy.^[15]

[edit] Barre's account of his capture and the conditions of his detention

According to Barre, he had been visited by Pakistani intelligence officers three times before he was taken into custody. Barre said he wasn't worried by these interviews because he knew he hadn't done anything wrong. He was taken into custody, from his home, around 3am, November 1, 2001.

Barre said that he was treated humanely during his first four months in Pakistani custody. His interrogators said that the large number of international calls was what had drawn suspicion on him, but it was readily explained by the nature of his work. He thought his release was imminent.

However, rather than being released he was blindfolded and transferred to American custody, with three other men. Barre told his Tribunal he believed he was sold for a bounty, based on trumped up allegations.

He spent time in American prisons in Kandahar and then Bagram, where he was tortured:

"They interrogated me and one of the interrogators told me I was from al-Wafa and I needed to confess to that. You have no choice. I told them it wasn't true. They pressured me. They were whispered something then spoke to the guard. The guard came in, grabbed me by my neck and threw me. He took me in a bad way to isolation. AH my blankets, except one, were taken from me. It was freezing cold. They didn't feed me lunch and sometimes they didn't feed me twice. At night it is very cold and if you don't eat dinner it gets colder. This torture lasted fifteen to twenty days. My feet and hands were swollen. I wasn't able to stand because I was in so much pain. I asked for treatment and an interrogator brought a nurse and asked if I wanted treatment. They told me they could cut my legs to stop the pain. They did this so I would confess to the accusations that I didn't do. Nothing happened. After the torture ended, I met another interrogator who told me- injustice was done to me and I didn't have anything to do with this. He said he would do a report so I could go home. He told me I would be released. Suddenly, I was taken back to Kandahar and then to Cuba. The investigations and interrogations continue to this day and the accusation is still made against me. During the time I was here, the interrogators have never accused me of being from al-Wafa. When my Personal Representative gave me the Unclassified Summary I thought the accusation was cleared up until I saw it back on the paper."

Many other detainees have reported extremely abusive interrogation techniques being practiced at Bagram. Two prisoners died as a direct result of the abusive techniques practiced there.

Main article: Bagram torture and prisoner abuse

The transcripts of some other detainees who reported torture or abuse record their Tribunal's President advising them that the abuse they reported would be drawn to the attention of the appropriate military authorities. Barre's transcript does not record any reaction from the Tribunal's officer to his account of his abuse.

[edit] Barre's response the questioning from the Tribunal's officers

The Tribunal's President asked Barre: "Were you aware of the Due Diligence Policy after the 11 September attacks?" -- When Barre didn't understand, he rephrased his question: "Did you received ^[sic] training on 'Know your customer' procedures?"

Barre replied that he had not received this training. He suggested that the training might have happened following his capture. He said, "...the orders usually came to me via the fax.machine."

Barre said his immediate supervisor was the company's President, a man named Mohammed Said.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearings

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".^[16]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board hearing

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for his first annual Administrative Review Board hearing, on September 22, 2005.^[17]

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Connections

1. The detainee worked for the Dahabshiil Company in Karachi, Pakistan.
2. Dahabshiil is closely related to Al-Barakaat, a Somali financial company designated by the United States Government as a terrorist finance facilitator. Following Al-Barakaat’s designation and shutdown, Dahabshiil took over much of Al-Barakaat’s business.
3. The detainee was identified as a member of the non-governmental organization al Wafa.
4. The al Wafa organization has been identified as a terrorist organization on the United States’ State Department’s Terrorist Exclusion list.
5. The non-governmental organization al Wafa reportedly was believed to have had connections to Usama Bin Laden and Afghan Mujahidin.
6. The detainee received a Tablighi Jamiat Visa ^[sic] to Pakistan.
7. Jama’at Al Tablighi, a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization that is being used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, to include ^[sic] members of al Qaida.

b. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee ran an illegal money transfer business out of his home.
2. Some of the detainee’s counterparts in the United States did not have licenses. They were operating illegally, also out of their houses. In addition, there was reason to believe that the detainee had contact with people involved in the support network for al Qaida.
3. The detainee lied to obtain his three-month Pakistani visa.
4. The detainee was captured after Pakistani authorities had conducted three raids on his home and finally detained him for illegal money transfer.^[18]

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee stated he was never involved in an Islamic Militant group or knowingly transferred funds for their cause.

The detainee, during his oral Combatant Status Review Tribunal statement, stated that he had no knowledge of al Wafa until he entered prison in Pakistan.

[edit] Transcript

Barre chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.^[19]

[edit] Barre's Response to the factors

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board hearing

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for his second annual Administrative Review Board hearing, on 4 October 2006.^[6]

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was identified as a Mujahedin in Afghanistan until 1992.

b. Training

1. The detainee was identified as a member of an institute operated by a senior al Qaida member in Qandahar ^[sic] that used to be associated with religious and language studies near a Mujahedin guest house.
2. The detainee was identified as a participant of jihadist training in Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

The detainee knew Usama bin Laden personally and, from 1992 to 1995, worked on Usama bin Laden's compound in Khartoum, Sudan. The detainee worked in the building occupied by Usama bin Laden's security detachment.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

[edit] Barre's refugee status

The United Nations High Commission for Refugees wrote the Pentagon, on December 20, 2006, seeking information on why Barre, and another man were being detained in Guantanamo.^[20] The UNHCR had not known until December 2006 that the Americans were holding internationally recognized refugees in Guantanamo. Barre was granted UN refugee status in Pakistan in 1994. Mammar Ameur was granted UN refugee status in Pakistan in 1996. A third captive, Fethi Boucetta, was one of the 38 captives who was determined not have been an "enemy combatant" after all.

[edit] Al Barakat removed from the USA's watchlist of organizations tied to terrorism

One of the justifications for Barre's continued detention was that American intelligence analysts suspected that Dershabiil, the Somalia-based hawala he worked for had ties to Al Barakat, another Somalia-based hawala that had its assets frozen, and some of its agents arrested, because it was suspected of laundering money for terrorists. On August 28, 2006 the BBC reported that Al Barakat had been removed from the US terrorist organization watchlist.^[21] The BBC's report stated that al Barakat made the watchlist because American intelligence analysts had suspected it had been used to finance the 9-11 hijackers, but that the 911 Commission had investigated this theory and found it baseless. Some al Barakat agents were also individually listed as suspected terrorist. The owner of al Barakat, Ahmed Nur Ali Jimaale, said that the company's agent in Sweden was the last to be cleared of suspicion.

[edit] References

1. ^ ^{a b} OARDEC (May 15, 2006). List of Individuals Detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from January 2002 through May 15, 2006. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
2. ^ list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, April 20, 2006
3. ^ OARDEC (July 17, 2007). Index for Combatant Status Review Board unclassified summaries of evidence. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
4. ^ OARDEC (August 9, 2007). Index to Summaries of Detention-Release Factors for ARB Round One. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
5. ^ OARDEC (July 17, 2007). Index of Summaries of Detention-Release Factors for ARB Round Two. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
6. ^ ^{a b} OARDEC (4 October 2006). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Barre, Mohammed Soliman page 61-62. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-10-17.
7. ^ Guantánamo Prisoners Getting Their Day, but Hardly in Court, New York Times, November 11, 2004 - mirror
8. ^ Inside the Guantánamo Bay hearings: Barbarian "Justice" dispensed by KGB-style "military tribunals", Financial Times, December 11, 2004
9. ^ Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials. United States Department of Defense (March 6, 2007). Retrieved on 2007-09-22.
10. ^ ^{a b} Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Mohammed Sulaymon Barre's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 30-37
11. ^ Guantanamo Bay Panel Hears Three Cases, mirror of Associated Press, October 29, 2004
12. ^ OARDEC (September 19, 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Barre, Mohammed Sulaymon 89. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-10-17.
13. ^ The allegations against the detainees was always supposed to be read out to the detainee at the beginning of the Tribunal. Most detainees were invited to hear the allegations read out again, one at a time, giving them an opportunity to respond to each allegation in turn. Most of the transcripts of detainees who agreed to this offer contained the allegations as they were read aloud. Barre's transcript does not record whether this offer was made to him. And the allegations against him are not recorded in the transcript.
14. ^ Dahashiil's web-site
15. ^ Dahabshiil's anti-money-laundering policy
16. ^ (Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", The Wire (JTF-GTMO), Friday March 10, 2006, pp. 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-12. 
17. ^ OARDEC (September 22, 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of page 19-20. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-10-17.
18. ^ This factor was not recorded in the transcript from the hearing.
19. ^ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Mohammed Sulaymon Barre's Administrative Review Board hearing - pages 144-156
20. ^ Carol Rosenberg. "U.N. refugee agency seeking information on 2 detainees", Kansas City Star, Monday January 29, 2007. Retrieved on February 7. 
21. ^ "US ends Somali banking blacklist", BBC, August 28, 2006. Retrieved on 2007-02-24.