Keith DeRose
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Keith DeRose (born April 24, 1962) is an American philosopher currently teaching at Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut. His primary interests include epistemology, philosophy of language and history of modern philosophy. He is best known for his work on contextualism in epistemology.
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[edit] Education
DeRose graduated from Calvin College in 1984 with a B.A. in Philosophy. He then studied at UCLA, earning an M.A. in 1986 and a PhD in 1990; his dissertation was entitled Knowledge, Epistemic Possibility, and Skepticism, under Rogers Albritton. While at UCLA, he won the Robert M. Yost Prize for Excellence in Teaching (1988), was awarded the Griffin Fellowship in 1990, and won the Carnap Essay Prize in 1989 and again in 1990.
[edit] Academic career
After graduation, DeRose was Assistant Professor of Philosophy at New York University from September 1990 to June 1993. He then taught at Rice University in Houston, Texas from July 1993 to June 1998. At Yale University he has been Associate Professor of Philosophy (1998-2000), Professor of Philosophy (2000-present) and Allison Foundation Professor of Philosophy from April 2005-present.
[edit] Selected publications
- The Ordinary Language Basis for Contextualism and the New Invariantism, The Philosophical Quarterly, 2005.
- Direct Warrant Realism, in A. Dole and A. Chignell, ed., God and the Ethics of Belief: New Essays in Philosophy of Religion (Cambridge University Press, 2005).
- Single Scoreboard Semantics, Philosophical Studies, 2004.
- Assertion, Knowledge, and Context, Philosophical Review, 2002; Philosopher's Annual, vol. 26.
- Solving the Skeptical Problem, Philosophical Review, 1995; Philosopher's Annual, vol. 18.
- Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1992
- Epistemic Possibilities, Philosophical Review, 1991.
- Reid's Anti-Sensationalism and His Realism, Philosophical Review, 1989
