Talk:Inequity aversion
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[edit] Disambiguation link repair: Expert knowledge needed!
This page has a link to the disambiguation page equilibrium. Please edit it to point to the specific most relevant article. Thanks. --Coppertwig 21:49, 4 February 2007 (UTC)
[edit] Re-write needed
The page needs to be re-written. Currently there is too much discussion and detail on individual studies and specific researchers. I've done the first little bit of the sections, but it needs considerably more work to finish up the rest of the article. WLU 23:57, 12 June 2007 (UTC)
[edit] Nonsense paragraph
I can't really make sense of this paragraph:
In 2004 Dirk Engelmann and Martin Strobel performed experiments to test the predictions of IA, and found inconsistencies.2 Although it can hardly be expected that such a simple model will produce falsifiable results in a complex area like human psychology there may be other, equally simple models that fit the data better. (See Bounded rationality.) For instance, the Raúl López Pérez alternative: Anger and Guilt (2004). 2 The alternative hypothesis that Fehr and Schmidt's Inequity Aversion (IA) model is most commonly tested against is Charness and Rabin's 2002 quasi-maximin model, which predicts a preference for maximizing both the aggregate reward and the reward of the party doing the worst. Engelmann and Strobel's experiments from 2004 seem to fit the quasi-maximin predictions better than the IA. Quasi-maximin is more concerned with economic efficiency than fairness, and may predominate when the 'players' know one another or are playing for psychologically low stakes. Other empirical results give IA the greater predictive power. For instance, Güth, Kliemt and Ockenfel (2003), and Chmura, Kube, Pitz, & Puppe (Working Paper, 2004) find that 'fairness' dominates when the payoff asymmetry is large.
It seems like the footnote should be integreated into the paragraph itself to make a complete section. WLU 20:56, 7 August 2007 (UTC)
[edit] Organization
Since this is such an active topic of research, it may be difficult for WP to keep fully on top of it. I think there are several aspects to emphasize:
- The Fehr-Schmidt model is precise and clear, whatever its empirical failings may be. I think it would make sense to fully restate that model here, and interpret it.
- Fehr-Schmidt does reasonably well as an explanatory model among the class of consequentialist models (ie, models that depend only on pecuniary payoffs). However, consequentialism doesn't suffice: people care about the intent of those they interact with (cf Thaler, Falk-Fehr-Fischbacher, and many others).
- The best place to organize top-level discussion of these issues would be an article on social preferences, which I just started. Jeremy Tobacman 22:01, 7 August 2007 (UTC)
[edit] Uh?
[...] it is studied in non-humans in anthropology
Methinks that somebody doesn't know what anthropology is. --76.217.95.43 (talk) 08:22, 24 February 2008 (UTC)
