India and weapons of mass destruction

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Weapons of mass destruction

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India is believed to possess an arsenal of nuclear weapons and maintains intermediate-range ballistic missiles to deliver them. Though India has not made any official statements about the size of its nuclear arsenal, different estimates indicate that India has anywhere between 50 to 200 nuclear weapons^[1] ^[2]^[3]^[4]. Weapons-grade plutonium production is believed to be taking place at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, which is home to the CIRUS reactor acquired from Canada, to the indigenous Dhruva reactor, and to a plutonium separation facility.

According to a January 2001 Department of Defense report, "India probably has a small stockpile of nuclear weapon components and could assemble and deploy a few nuclear weapons within a few days to a week." A 2001 RAND study by Ashley Tellis asserts that India does not have or seek to deploy a ready nuclear arsenal.^[5]

According to a report in Jane's Intelligence Review (4), India's objective is to have a nuclear arsenal that is "strategically active but operationally dormant", which would allow India to maintain its retaliatory capability "within a matter of hours to weeks, while simultaneously exhibiting restraint." However, the report also maintains that, in the future, India may face increasing institutional pressure to shift its nuclear arsenal to a fully deployed status.^[6]

1 Nuclear Weapons
2 Chemical Weapons
3 Biological Warfare
4 Gallery
5 References
6 External links

[edit] Nuclear Weapons

[edit] Brief Historical Overview

As early as June 26, 1946, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, soon to be India's first Prime Minister, announced:

“

As long as the world is constituted as it is, every country will have to devise and use the latest devices for its protection. I have no doubt India will develop her scientific researches and I hope Indian scientists will use the atomic force for constructive purposes. But if India is threatened, she will inevitably try to defend herself by all means at her disposal.^[7]

”

India's first Nuclear test occurred on 18 May 1974. Since then she has conducted another series of test at the Pokhran test range in the state of Rajasthan on 1998. India has an extensive civil and military nuclear program, which includes at least 10 nuclear reactors, uranium mining and milling sites, heavy water production facilities, a uranium enrichment plant, fuel fabrication facilities, and extensive nuclear research capabilities.

[edit] Current Arsenal and Estimates of Force Inventory

It is widely estimated that India currently has approximately 200 warheads.^[8] It is known that about 75% of its warheads are assembled and the rest are in a sub-assembled position, and the number is expected to grow in time.^[9].

David Albright's report published by Institute for Science and International Security on 2000 estimates that india at end of 1999 had 310 kilograms of weapon grade plutonium which is enough for 65 nuclear weapons. He also estimates that India has 4200 kg of reactor grade unsafeguarded plutonium which is enough to build 1000 nuclear weapons.^[10]^[11]. By the end of 2004, he estimates India has 445 kilograms of weapon grade plutonium which is enough for around 85 nuclear weapons considering 5 kg of plutonium required for each weapon^[12]

Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) believes that India has a stockpile of about 30 to 35 nuclear warheads and claims that India is producing additional nuclear materials.^[13]

Former RAW official J.K. Sinha claimed that India has capability to produce 130 kilograms of weapon grade plutonium from six unsafeguarded reactors not included in nuclear deal between India and United States.^[14]

Joseph Cirincione at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (3) estimates that India has produced enough weapons-grade plutonium for 50-90 nuclear weapons and a smaller but unknown quantity of weapons-grade uranium^{[citation needed]}

[edit] Doctrine

India has a declared nuclear no-first-use policy and is in the process of developing a nuclear doctrine based on "credible minimum deterrence." In August 1999, the Indian government released a draft of the doctrine which asserts that nuclear weapons are solely for deterrence and that India will pursue a policy of "retaliation only." The document also maintains that India "will not be the first to initiate a nuclear first strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail" and that decisions to authorize the use of nuclear weapons would be made by the Prime Minister or his 'designated successor(s).'"

According to the NRDC, despite the escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan in 2001-2002, India remains committed to its nuclear no-first-use policy. But an Indian foreign ministry official told Defense News in 2000 that a "'no-first-use' policy does not mean India will not have a first-strike capability."

[edit] Command and Control

India's Strategic Nuclear Command was formally established in 2003, with an Air Force officer, Air Marshall Asthana, as the Commander-in-Chief. The joint services SNC is the custodian of all of India's nuclear weapons, missiles and assets. It is also responsible for executing all aspects of India's nuclear policy. However, the civil leadership, in the form of the CCS (Cabinet Committee on Security) is the only body authorized to order a nuclear strike against another offending strike: In effect, it is the Prime Minister who has his finger "on the button".

[edit] International Treaties

India is not a signatory to either the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but did accede to the Partial Test Ban Treaty in October 1963. India is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and four of its 13 nuclear reactors are subject to IAEA safeguards.

India announced its lack of intention to accede to the NPT as late as 1997 by voting against the paragraph of a General Assembly Resolution^[15] which urged all non-signatories of the treaty to accede to it at the earliest possible date.^[16]

India voted against the UN General Assembly resolution endorsing the CTBT, which was adopted on September 10, 1996. India objected to the lack of provision for universal nuclear disarmament "within a time-bound framework." India also demanded that the treaty ban laboratory simulations. In addition, India opposed the provision in Article XIV of the CTBT that requires India's ratification for the treaty to enter into force, which India argued was a violation of its sovereign right to choose whether it would sign the treaty. In early February 1997, Foreign Minister Gujral reiterated India's opposition to the treaty, saying that "India favors any step aimed at destroying nuclear weapons, but considers that the treaty in its current form is not comprehensive and bans only certain types of tests."

Controversially the United States is now willing to provide India access to civilian nuclear technology through the 2006 United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act, despite India not being a member of the NPT which normally precludes such international cooperation. This is the direct result of the fact that India is recognized by the US and many other developed regions of the world as an important ally in the war on terror and further testifies to the fact that the West believes that the nuclear technology is intended for peaceful purposes.

[edit] Delivery Systems

[edit] Ballistic Missiles

An Agni-II intermediate range ballistic missile displayed at the Republic Day Parade 2004 (Photo: Antônio Milena/ABr)

India has methodically built an indigenous missile production capability, using its commercial space-launch program to develop the skills and infrastructure needed to support an offensive ballistic missile program. For example, during the 1980s, India conducted a series of space launches using the solid-fueled SLV-3 booster. Most of these launches put light satellites into near-earth orbit. Elements of the SLV-3 were subsequently incorporated into two new programs. In the first, the new polar-space launch vehicle (PSLV) was equipped with six SLV-3 motors strapped to the PSLV's first stage. The Agni IRBM technology demonstrator uses the SLV-3 booster as its first stage.

The key missile applications and types are given below:

Prithvi. The Prithvi I is mobile liquid-fueled 150 kilometer tactical missile currently deployed with army units. It is claimed that this missile is equipped only with various conventional warheads (which stay attached to the missile over the entire flight path). The missile is of particular interest to the United States (and potential buyers) in that has the capability of maneuvering in flight so as to follow one of several different preprogrammed trajectories. Based on the same design, a modified Prithvi, the Prithvi II, is essentially a longer-ranged version of the Prithvi I except that it has a 250-kilometer range and a lighter payload. It is suspected that any nuclear missions will be executed by the Prithvi II. Currently, the Prithvi II has completed development and is now in production. When fielded, it will be deployed with air force units for the purpose of deep target attacking manoeuvres against objectives such as air fields. For the Indian Navy, a 350-kilometer version of the Prithvi is under development. The new system is being called the Dhanush, testing is planned to begin in December 1998. It is unclear whether or not this system will be deployed on India's new nuclear missile submarine (under construction).
Agni. The 1500-kilometer Agni technology demonstrator uses the SLV-3 booster for its first stage and a liquid-fueled Prithvi for its second stage. Three test shots were conducted before the U.S. successfully pressured India into suspending testing (1994). Of particular interest, the Agni tests demonstrated that India can develop a maneuvering warhead that incorporates endo-atmospheric evasive maneuvers and terminal guidance in the reentry vehicle. India has also developed the carbon-carbon composite materials needed for long-range missile components and reentry vehicle ablative coatings. India has recently inducted Agni II misiles that have a range of the 2500 to 3500-kilometers. Unlike the Agni I, the Agni II will have a solid-fueled second stage. It is believed that the Agni can only be equipped with a conventional warhead. India recently tested the Agni III IRBM with a range between 3500 and 5000 kilometers which has two stages. It is clear that one of the major constraints for this program is the lack of a proven nuclear warhead. Nuclear testing is a key related issue. India developed its own thermonuclear design which was tested in the 1998 Pokhran nuclear tests and yielded 45 KT.

Agni III Missile Launch

Surya. The Surya ICBM is an ICBM program that has been discussed repeatedly in the Indian press. Surya (meaning The Sun in Sanskrit and Many Indian Languages) is the codename for the first Intercontinental Ballistic Missile that India is reported to be developing. The DRDO is believed to have begun the project in 1994. Officials of the Indian government have repeatedly denied the existence of the project. According to news reports, the Surya-1 is an intercontinental-range, surface-based, solid and liquid propellant ballistic missile. The Surya-1 and -2 will be classified as strategic weapons, extending the Indian nuclear deterrent force to targets around the world. India currently is limited by the range of the Agni-3 missile. The development of a true ICBM would make strikes against almost any strategic target around the world possible and reduce India’s relative weakness. This would develop a credible global deterrent for India. The Surya-1 will have an expected range of 10,000 km. It reportedly has a length of 40 m and a launch weight of 80,000 kg (some reports indicate as much as 275,000 kg. As the missile has yet to be developed, the payload and warhead are as yet unknown. It is believed to be a three-stage design, with the first two stages using solid propellants and the third-stage using liquid. The Surya-2 is a longer-ranged variant of the Surya-1. It has a reported range of 20,000 km. The first test flight is expected in 2008, and it is expected to be operationally ready by 2015.

[edit] Aircraft

[edit] Nuclear Submarines

According to some accounts India plans to have as many as five nuclear submarines capable of carrying missiles with nuclear warheads. The Indian nuclear powered attack submarine design is said to have a 6,000-ton displacement and a single-shaft nuclear power plant of Indian origin.^[17] Once the vessel is completed, it may be equipped with Dhanush/Sagarika missiles and an advanced sonar system. However, according to some analysts the most probable missile for the Indian submarine would be the Brahmos anti-ship cruise missile designed jointly by India and Russia, based on the Yakhont missile by NPO Mashinostroyeniya.

[edit] Foreign assistance

Indian nuclear technology, that pertaining to the development of nuclear weapons is believed to be indigenous.
Most of India's modern weapons and armory, fighter planes and tanks are supplied by the Russian Federation [9].These consistent supplies date back to the Bangladesh Liberation War when United States decided to help Pakistan which prompted the Soviet Union to support India.
Israel today is the second largest supplier of arms to India after the Russian Federation and has provided sophisticated training to the Indian armed forces.[10][11][12]

[edit] Chemical Weapons

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BrahMos at the Indian Republic Day Parade

India has an advanced commercial chemical industry, and produces the bulk of its own chemicals for domestic consumption. In 1992 India signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, stating that it did not have chemical weapons and the capacity or capability to manufacture chemical weapons. India became one of the original signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC] in 1993, and ratified it on 2 September 1996. Since, unlike the nuclear non- proliferation treaty and the comprehensive test ban treaty, this treaty's provisions were equally applicable to all countries, including the powerful countries, India had readily accepted it. The treaty came into force on April 29, 1997. The full destruction of the weapons grade chemicals will take place only at the end of a 10-year period. As India has one of the largest chemical industries in the world, this industry will benefit from unrestricted trade and technology access which would be denied to non-members of the treaty. Although India had endorsed the treaty in September 1996, becoming the 62nd country to do so, when it appeared as though the United States might not approve it, India too declared that it might review its earlier decision endorsing the treaty. Indian observers were of the view that, should America itself fail to approve the treaty, there would be diminished pressure on China and Pakistan against producing chemical weapons. According to India's ex-Army Chief General Sunderji, a country having the capability of making nuclear weapons does not need to have chemical weapons, since the dread of chemical weapons could be created only in those countries that do not have nuclear weapons. Others suggested that the fact that India has found chemical weapons dispensable highlighted its confidence in the conventional weapons system at its command.

Nuclear capable Agni-III missile

When the Third UN Disarmament Conference, held in 1988, decided that the next logical step in the disarmament process would be measures to halt production of chemical weapons, Indian diplomats responded by claiming that India had no chemical weapons. Foreign Minister K Natwar Singh repeated this claim in 1989 in the Paris Conference of the State Parties to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, as did Minister of State Eduardo Faleiro repeated at the January 1993 Paris Conference CWC signing ceremony. However, India declared its stockpile of chemical weapons to the Chemical Weapons Convention in Geneva on 26 June 1997, the deadline for all signatories to the pact. New Delhi publicly declared that, in keeping with the stipulations arising from the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, India had filed initial declarations on "testing and development of chemical weapons and their related facilities which were developed only to deal with the situation arising out of possible use of chemical warfare against India."

In its required declarations under the CWC, India acknowledged the existence of a chemical warfare program. and disclosed the details of its stockpiles and the availability of manufacturing facilities on a very small scale. New Delhi has pledged that all facilities related to its CW program would be open for inspection. The declaration kept India's chemical armory under wraps, since the CWC Secretariat maintains the confidentiality of the declaration. ^{citation needed}

The published literature detailing India's chemical weapons capabilities is extremely sparse. According to one published report, India's stockpile of chemical weapons consists of mustard gas shells left by the British of World War II vintage. These shells, fired from a 25 pounder gun, are said to be in storage and not under the operational control of the Indian Army. India is also reported to have manufacturing facilities for production of agents in small quantities.

The Indian government has set up Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) warfare directorates in the Services, besides an inter-Services coordination committee to monitor the programme. The Indian Army established a Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) cell at Army HQ to study the effects of NBC warfare. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is also participating in the program. Research on chemical weapons has continued in various establishments of the military and DRDO research labs. In addition, work is carried out by DRDO to design and fabricate protective clothing and equipment for troops on the battlefield in case of a chemical weapons attack. The Defence Research and Development Establishment (DRDE) at Gwalior is the primary establishment for studies in toxicology and biochemical pharmacology and development of antibodies against several bacterial and viral agents. In addition, research is carried out on antibodies against chemical agent poisoning and heavy metal toxicology. Chemical agents such as Sarin and nerve gas are produced in small quantities to test on protective equipment.

Protective clothing and equipment are designed and manufactured amongst other places at the Defence Materials and Stores Research and Development Establishment at Kanpur. India has developed five types of protective systems and equipment for its troops as a safeguard against nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) hazards. The development of all five types of protective systems and equipment has been completed and their induction into the service has been formally approved. The five types of protective systems and equipment are: NBC individual protective equipment, NBC collective protection system, NBC medical protection equipment, NBC detection equipment and the NBC decontamination system.

It is reported that even after India ratified the Chemical Weapons Treaty in September 1996, efforts continued for manufacturing and stockpiling chemical weapons for use against Pakistan. India's Prithvi surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) can carry five different types of warheads. Two types of warheads have already been deployed, and three other warheads, presumably nuclear, chemical and biological, are under development. On 25 June 1997, the Indian government stated that "India will disclose to Pakistan stocks of its chemical weapons". The decision was taken to make a unilateral disclosure on the instruction of Prime Minister I.K. Gujral.

[edit] Biological Warfare

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India is a signatory to the BWC of 1972. India has a well-developed biotechnology infrastructure that includes numerous pharmaceutical production facilities bio-containment laboratories (including BSL-3 and BSL-4) for working with lethal pathogens. It also has highly qualified scientists with expertise in infectious diseases. Some of India’s facilities are being used to support research and development for BW defense purposes. These facilities constitute a substantial potential capability for offensive purposes as well. The Defence Research and Development Establishment (DRDE) at Gwalior is the primary establishment for studies in toxicology and biochemical pharmacology and development of antibodies against several bacterial and viral agents. Work is in progress to prepare responses to threats like Anthrax, Brucellosis, cholera and plague, viral threats like smallpox and viral haemorrhage fever and biotoxic threats like botulism. Researchers have developed chemical/biological protective gear, including masks, suits, detectors and suitable drugs. India has a 'no first use' policy.