Griffith v. Kentucky

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Griffith v. Kentucky

Argued February 14, 1986
Decided January 13, 1987

Full case name:	Griffith v. Kentucky

Citations:	479 U.S. 314

Holding

The Court held that after a new rule had been decided in a particular case, "the integrity of judicial review requires that we apply that rule to all similar cases pending on direct review."

Court membership

Chief Justice: William Rehnquist
Associate Justices: William J. Brennan, Jr., Byron White, Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia

Case opinions

Majority by: Blackmun
Joined by: Marshall, Powell Jr., Stevens, Scalia
Concurrence by: Powell
Dissent by: Rehnquist
Dissent by: White
Joined by: Rehnquist, O'Connor

Laws applied

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV

Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1986), is a case decided by the United States Supreme Court.

1 Background
2 Question
3 Holding
4 See also
5 External links

[edit] Background

This case concerned the retrospective application of judge-made rules. Specifically, the Court had to decide whether a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors, combined with his call to the jury clerk, violated the black petitioner's right to an impartial jury. The Court was called upon to decide whether the previous decision in Batson v. Kentucky was applicable to pending litigation but not final when Batson was decided. This case was decided together with Brown v. United States.

[edit] Question

Could retroactive Supreme Court decisions be applied selectively to cases pending direct review or not yet final?

[edit] Holding

The Court held that after a new rule had been decided in a particular case, "the integrity of judicial review requires that we apply that rule to all similar cases pending on direct review." The Court reasoned that selective application of new rules violated the principle of treating similarly situated defendants on an equal basis. The Court also refused to make an exception to the rule of retroactivity in cases where there was a "clean break" with past precedent.