Gregorio García de la Cuesta
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Gregorio García de la Cuesta y Fernández de Celis (1741 – 1811) was a prominent Spanish general of the Peninsular War known for his participation in disastrous military and political episodes.
Born in Santander to a family of petty nobles, Cuesta entered military service in 1758 as a member of the Spanish Royal Guards Regiment. He saw some success as a Lieutenant General in the War of the First Coalition, but military setbacks and political intrigues prevented further advancement until the turmoil of 1805 produced his appointment to Commander in Chief of the Army of Old Castile.
When war with France broke out in 1808, Cuesta's army was virtually nonexistent. His hastily-recruited force of 5,000 militia stood no chance against the Grande Armée and was defeated at Cabezón, forcing Cuesta's withdrawal from his seat of command at Valladolid.
Cuesta managed to combine what was left of his army with Lieutenant General Blake's Army of Galicia but, insisting on a foolhardy march on Valladolid, left his new force vulnerable to a French counterattack. Paralyzed by disunity of command, the pair were defeated on July 14 at the Battle of Medina de Rioseco when Cuesta, for reasons not quite clear, failed to close the gap between his troops and Blake's.
Negotiations with the Central Junta led to Cuesta's brief promotion to Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish Army. In the absence of a military and political command structure, strategy and coordination with other Spanish forces proved impossible. He was soon sacked and arrested due to political machinating by his opponents.
Following the loss of Madrid to Napoleon at the Battle of Somosierra the situation in Spain became more desperate and Cuesta was allowed to reconstitute the Army of Extremadura in order to defend the southern frontier. In defiance of the military wisdom of the time Cuesta pursued an offensive as soon as he had constructed a fighting force. This met with success. In January and February of 1809, all of Badajoz was reclaimed from the French.
In a move characteristic of the Spanish bureaucracy's singular inefficiency, Cuesta was refused supplies and reinforcements until local authorities could review the appointments he had made to the army. As a result, a French offensive in the Spring annulled Cuesta's previous gains. On March 26, Cuesta was badly wounded and trampled by cavalry, and his army savagely defeated, at the Battle of Medellín. Like Blücher after him, he continued fighting as a near-invalid.
Cuesta joined forces with the British under Wellington. Relations with his British allies were difficult and more Spanish defeats followed. His enemies at court rejoiced and plotted.
In 1810, Cuesta suffered a serious stroke from which he died in retirement a year later. While his personal bravery was never in question, Cuesta's reputation suffered during and after the war, at least in part due to political and English hostility. Cuesta's reputation was that of a hopelessly proud, stubborn, xenophobic, and reactionary officer. At the same time, he was a devoted soldier who led a severely deficient military machine through almost hopeless campaigns.
[edit] References
- Chandler, David G. The Campaigns of Napoleon. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995. ISBN 0-02-523660-1
- Gates, David. The Spanish Ulcer: A History of the Peninsular War. Da Capo Press 2001. ISBN 0-306-81083-2
