Gibbons v. Ogden
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| Gibbons v. Ogden | ||||||||||||
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| Argued February 4, 1824 Decided March 2, 1824 |
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| Holding | ||||||||||||
| The New York law was found invalid due to the Supremacy clause. The interstate commerce clause designated power to Congress to regulate interstate commerce. | ||||||||||||
| Court membership | ||||||||||||
| Chief Justice: John Marshall Associate Justices: Bushrod Washington, William Johnson, Thomas Todd, Gabriel Duvall, Joseph Story, Smith Thompson |
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| Case opinions | ||||||||||||
| Majority by: Marshall Joined by: Washington, Todd, Duvall, Story, Thompson Concurrence by: Johnson |
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| Laws applied | ||||||||||||
| U.S. Const. art. I | ||||||||||||
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824),[1] was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the power to regulate interstate navigation was granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
The case was argued by some of America's most admired and capable attorneys at the time. Exiled Irish patriot Thomas Addis Emmet and Thomas J. Oakley argued for Ogden, while William Wirt and Daniel Webster argued for Gibbons.
The case started from an attempt by the State of New York to grant a monopoly of steamboat operation between New York and neighboring New Jersey. Robert Fulton and Robert Livingston were granted such exclusive rights. They licensed the New Jersey operator Aaron Ogden, formerly a U.S. Senator and Governor of New Jersey, to operate the ferry between New York City and Elizabeth Point in New Jersey. Thomas Gibbons was operating a competing ferry service which had been licensed by Congress in regulating the coasting trade. Ogden obtained an injunction from a New York court against Gibbons to keep him out of New York waters, maintaining that navigation was not a distinct form of commerce, and was thus a legitimate area of state regulation. Gibbons then sued for entry into the state, and the case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
The Court found in favor of Gibbons, stating that "The mind can scarcely conceive a system for regulating commerce between nations which shall exclude all laws concerning navigation." The ruling determined that "a Congressional power to regulate navigation is as expressly granted as if that term had been added to the word 'commerce'."
The Court went on to conclude that Congressional power over commerce should extend to the regulation of all aspects of it, overriding state law to the contrary:
- If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations and among the several states is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the Constitution of the United States.
The broader interpretation of Congressional power established by Gibbons v. Ogden survived until 1895, when the court began to limit Congressional power in the case of United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). Although this marked the start of a 40 year period of history during which the commerce clause was limited in scope, during the 1930s and from then until at least the 1990s, the Supreme Court returned to its broad view of the commerce clause originally established in Gibbons.
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[edit] Opinion excerpts
♦Defining what the power to “regulate Commerce” is:
| “ | It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution. (emphasis added) | ” |
♦In interpreting the power of Congress as to commerce “among the several states”:
| “ | The word “among” means intermingled with. A thing which is among others, is intermingled with them. Commerce among the States, cannot stop at the external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced into the interior….Comprehensive as the word “among” is, it may very properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one. | ” |
♦Defining how far the power of Congress extends:
| “ | The power of Congress, then, comprehends navigation, within the limits of every State in the Union; so far as that navigation may be, in any manner, connected with “commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States.” | ” |
The ICC, a commission set up in the aftermath of the Ogden decision, has recently been disbanded.
[edit] Other developments
The Court was also asked in this case to determine whether New York had exceeded its power in issuing a patent to Robert Fulton, which had been assigned to Ogden, and which was also a basis of the action against Gibbons. The Court declined to address the issue,[2] and did not do so for over a hundred years thereafter.
[edit] See also
[edit] References
- Jean Edward Smith, John Marshall: Definer Of A Nation, New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1996.
- Jean Edward Smith, The Constitution And American Foreign Policy, St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Company, 1989.
