CIA transnational human rights actions

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Main article: Central Intelligence Agency

This article deals with those activities of the Central Intelligence Agency that preserve or violate human rights.

Contents 1 General principles 2 Torture and rendition 2.1 Questionable interrogation techniques 2.1.1 Intense interrogation methods 2.1.2 Waterboarding 2.1.3 Training in harsh interrogation 2.1.4 Possible attempt to mediate torture 2.2 Rendition and disappearance 2.2.1 2007 status of "ghost" prisoners 3 Police training 3.1 Background 3.1.1 ICITAP 3.1.2 Investigation of relationship between ICITAP and CIA 3.2 Results in brief 3.3 Legislative provisions on police assistance 3.4 Police assistance 3.4.1 Concerns on management of assistance 3.4.2 Scope and methodology 3.5 Legislative exemptions to the prohibition on U.S. assistance to foreign police 3.5.1 The International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 3.5.2 International Security and Development Assistance Authorizations Act of 1983 3.5.3 International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 3.5.4 International Narcotics Control Acts 3.5.5 Urgent Assistance for Democracy in Panama Act of 1990 3.5.6 The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act for 1991 3.5.7 Other exceptions to police assistance prohibition 3.6 U.S. assistance provided to foreign police 3.6.1 Antiterrorism assistance 3.6.2 International narcotics control 3.6.3 Investigative and international police training 3.6.4 National Police Force Development 3.6.5 Counterterrorism and military assistance 3.6.6 Difficulties in determining cost and extent of assistance 3.6.6.1 Concerns expressed about police assistance 3.6.6.2 Limited policy guidance or central management 3.6.6.3 Program objectives and activities duplicated 4 Human experimentation 4.1 Rockefeller Commission 4.2 Specific experiments 4.3 Outcome 5 Assassination and targeted killing 5.1 Assassinations 5.1.1 Castro 5.1.2 Diem 5.1.2.1 Planning overtaken by events 5.1.2.2 Possible White House knowledge 5.1.3 Trujillo

[edit] General principles

In 2003, Assistant Secretary of state for Human Rights Patricia Derian when she wrote, "Through these [U.S. military and intelligence] agencies the United States government is sending a dangerous and double message. If this continues, it will subvert our entire human rights policy."^[1]

In understanding the CIA's role in human rights, there are challenging problems of ethics. John Stockwell, a CIA officer who left the Agency and became a public critic, said of the CIA field officers: "They don't meet the death squads on the streets where they're actually chopping up people or laying them down on the street and running trucks over their heads. The CIA people in San Salvador meet the police chiefs, and the people who run the death squads, and they do liaise with them, they meet them beside the swimming pool of the villas. And it's a sophisticated, civilized kind of relationship. And they talk about their children, who are going to school at UCLA or Harvard and other schools, and they don't talk about the horrors of what's being done. They pretend like it isn't true."^[2].

See Honduras 1987 training by Argentina and Chile, where Florencio Caballero, a former Honduran Army interrogator, said that he had trained by the Central Intelligence Agency, which the New York Times confirmed with US and Honduran officials . Much of his account was confirmed by three American and two Honduran officials. may be the fullest given of how army and police units were authorized to organize death squads that seized, interrogated and killed suspected leftists. He said that while Argentine and Chilean trainers taught the Honduran Army kidnapping and elimination techniques, the C.I.A. explicitly forbade the use of physical torture or assassination.^[3]

Caballero described the CIA role as ambiguous. "Caballero said his superior officers ordered him and other members of army intelligence units to conceal their participation in death squads from CIA advisers. He added that he was sent to Houston for six months in 1979 to be trained by CIA instructors in interrogation techniques. "They prepared me in interrogation to end the use of physical torture in Honduras - they taught psychological methods," Mr. Caballero said of his American training. "So when we had someone important, we hid him from the Americans, interrogated him ourselves and then gave him to a death squad to kill."

[edit] Torture and rendition

Main article: Extraordinary rendition by the United States

In public testimony, CIA officials have described individuals being subjected to harsh interrogation and imprisonment methods, although there has been much arguing about when those methods constitute torture, and if torture is illegal under US law. There have been allegations and substantial evidence the CIA uses black sites in other countries, to avoid US law about harsh interrogation on US territory.

While there are US officials (e.g., John Yoo)^[4] and scholars (e.g., Alan Dershowitz)^[5]who argue that torture may be justifiable, American opinion is generally opposed to US personnel inflicting torture or ordering it done. Unfortunately, torture and violation of human rights were endemic in many countries before the CIA ever existed. CIA personnel, who become aware of such violations, may or may not be able to stop them. As with legitimate US military interrogators, who became aware of torture by host country interrogators (e.g., Sedgwick Tourison in South Vietnam), the American may conclude that he cannot stop the activity, but he can advise against it, and hope to change the traditions of that country.^[6] American personnel in these difficult circumstances face the ethical question, to which there is no simple answer, is whether greater harm would be caused by withdrawing all American contact with the country. Variations of this problem occur throughout Just War Theory.

A claim that the black sites existed was made by The Washington Post in November 2005 and before by human rights NGOs.^[7] US President George W. Bush acknowledged the existence of secret prisons operated by the CIA during a speech on September 6, 2006.^{[8][9] [10]}

[edit] Questionable interrogation techniques

Issues have arisen as to whether CIA has itself practiced torture, trained foreign countries in it, or condoned its use. There are balancing assertions that CIA personnel attempted to minimize abuses by foreign governments who practiced torture before any involvement with CIA. There is evidence that CIA has funded academic research, unwitting in some cases, which was then used to develop harsh interrogation techniques.^[11]

[edit] Intense interrogation methods

There are a variety of methods of coercion and conditions of imprisonment that may well constitute torture, and CIA personnel have been involved in their use. Various officials of the George W. Bush administration have argued that "harsh" techniques such as waterboarding is not torture, or the end objectives of the War against Terror justify those means. There has been considerable domestic and international protest against these practices.

Torture and harsh imprisonment accusations and documented examples were not limited to the recent War on Terror. Yuri Nosenko, a Soviet KGB defector, was held in stark conditions of solitary confinement, in a clandestine CIA facility in the continental US, for over three years.^[12]

[edit] Waterboarding

Waterboarding is a method that gives the subject the sensation of drowning, and may cause permanent damage to the lungs and other parts of the body. Some individuals being waterboarded, who may have had preexisting cardiac or respiratory disease, died under the method.

For example, the CIA used waterboarding, and other "harsh" interrogation techniques against three suspected Al Quaeda members, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaydah and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri ^[13][14].

[edit] Training in harsh interrogation

Further information: U.S. Army and CIA interrogation manuals

Further information: questionable interrogation techniques

In 1984, a CIA manual for training the Nicaraguan contras in psychological operations and unconventional warfare, entitled "Psychological Operations in Guerrilla War", became public.^[15] The manual recommended “selective use of violence for propagandistic effects” and to “neutralize” (i.e., kill) government officials. Nicaraguan Contras were taught to lead:

“

...demonstrators into clashes with the authorities, to provoke riots or shootings, which lead to the killing of one or more persons, who will be seen as the martyrs; this situation should be taken advantage of immediately against the Government to create even bigger conflicts.

”

The manual also recommended:

“

...selective use of armed force for PSYOP [psychological operations] effect.... Carefully selected, planned targets — judges, police officials, tax collectors, etc. — may be removed for PSYOP effect in a UWOA [unconventional warfare operations area], but extensive precautions must insure that the people “concur” in such an act by thorough explanatory canvassing among the affected populace before and after conduct of the mission.[16]

”

The CIA claimed that the purpose of the manual was to "moderate" activities already being done by the Contras.^[17]

On January 24, 1997, two additional manuals were declassified in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request filed by the Baltimore Sun in 1994. The first manual, "KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation," dated July 1963, is the source of much of the material in the second manual. The second manual, "Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual - 1983," was used in at least seven U.S. training courses conducted in Latin American countries, including Honduras, between 1982 and 1987. Both manuals deal exclusively with interrogation and have an entire chapter devoted to "coercive techniques."^[18][19] These manuals recommend arresting suspects early in the morning by surprise, blindfolding them, and stripping them naked. Interrogation rooms should be windowless, soundproof, dark and without toilets. Suspects should be held incommunicado and should be deprived of any kind of normal routine in eating and sleeping. The manuals describe coercive techniques to be used "to induce psychological regression in the subject by bringing a superior outside force to bear on his will to resist."^[20]

[edit] Possible attempt to mediate torture

See Honduras 1987 training by Argentina and Chile. While the US manuals contained coercive measures, they did not rise to the level of what is generally defined as torture. Torture, however, has been culturally a part of authoritarian South American governments. See Argentine practices especially in 1973-1983. Argentinia, in turn, had learned them from the French in Operation Charly. In particular, see Argentinian training of other South American countries. It is not clear to what extent agencies of the US government (i.e., CIA, Defense, AID, and possibly State) were aware of this, condoned it, or actively assisted it^{[citation needed]}.

In 2007, the chief Argentinian interrogator,Ernesto Guillermo Barreiro, was arrested in the US.^[21]It is not clear whether he will be deported, held, or extradited. The other two arrested were Peruvians, Telmo Ricardo Hurtado and Juan Manuel Rivera Rondon, accused of having participated in the massacre of 69 peasants in an Andean village in 1985, when President Alan García was trying to suppress the Maoist Shining Path guerrilla movement. Garcia is again the Peruvian president.

Chilean practices under the Pinochet government also had substantial violations.

CIA involvement ranged from no knowledge, to knowledge but no participation, to knowledge with the suggestion that less brutal techniques were appropriate, to particpation or observation.

[edit] Rendition and disappearance

Rendition is the process of clandestinely moving a prisoner from where he was captured, to an interrogation center in a country not subject to US law regarding extreme methods of interrogation. Some reports indicate CIA personnel operated the prison and performed the interrogations, while others state that while the CIA delivered the prisoner, third-country intelligence personnel did the actual interrogation. The Wikipedia Category:Black sites details the list of known or suspected black sites where CIA prisoners may be detained. Known or suspected aircraft used to transport prisoners are in Rendition aircraft.

A claim that the black sites existed was made by The Washington Post in November 2005 and before by human rights NGOs.^[22] US President George W. Bush acknowledged the existence of secret prisons operated by the CIA during a speech on September 6, 2006.^{[23][24] [10]}

[edit] 2007 status of "ghost" prisoners

A 50-page Human Rights Watch report, “Ghost Prisoner: Two Years in Secret CIA Detention,” contains a detailed description of a secret CIA prison from a Palestinian former detainee who was released from custody last year. Human Rights Watch has also sent a public letter to US President George W. Bush requesting information about the fate and whereabouts of the missing detainees. ^[25]

“President Bush told us that the last 14 CIA prisoners were sent to Guantanamo, but there are many other prisoners ‘disappeared’ by the CIA whose fate is still unknown,” said Joanne Mariner, terrorism and counterterrorism director at Human Rights Watch. “The question is: what happened to these people and where are they now?”^[26]

In early September, 14 detainees were transferred from secret CIA prisons to military custody at Guantanamo Bay. In a televised speech on September 6, President Bush announced that with those 14 transfers, no prisoners were left in CIA custody.

[edit] Police training

While this article stays as focused on the CIA role as possible, there are broader US policy aspects that need to be understood to put human rights in perspective. Serious Congressional concern with human rights abuses first manifested in 1973.

Before that, Administrations were principally concerned with a Communist threat of subversion, to be met with host country internal security forces such as the police. For example, a 1961 Defense Department paper, during the Kennedy Administration,^[27] makes the assumptions that the US should encourage the concept that the U.S. has "primary responsibility for the defense of Latin America against external attack, that the role of the Latin American nations in this mission is to be de-emphasized, and that the internal security mission of Latin American nations is to be accorded increased emphasis.

"As further means of coping with indirect communist penetration of the hemisphere, the U.S. should:

• Seek to create increased awareness on the part of Latin American countries of the danger to hemispheric security posed by Castroism and communism in general and of the need to take prompt multilateral action, when necessary, to eliminate this danger.
• Negotiate, or renegotiate, as may be required, bilateral agreements designed to provide assistance to countries requesting help in defending themselves against indirect aggression and subversion directed and sustained by communists from within or without the hemisphere." Human rights issues simply are not mentioned.

Police and military roles were blurred, as shown in a memorandum from President John F. Kennedy to Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara:^[28]

I would appreciate hearing what steps we are taking to train the Armed Forces of Latin America in controlling mobs, guerrillas, etc. In addition, as the events of the past week have shown in Brazil, the military occupy an extremely important strategic position in Latin America. I would like to know how many officers we are bringing up from Latin America to train here and whether we could increase the number. Also, what other steps we are taking to increase the intimacy between our Armed Forces and the military of Latin America. It has been suggested that we set up a camp in the United States similar to the FBI Academy which brings in police from all over the United States. We would bring up a good many officers from the different countries of Latin America for a period from 1 to 2 months; we would have FBI people there who could talk to them about the techniques they have developed to control communism, subversion and we could have our military coming in to teach them how to control mobs and fight guerrillas. In addition to increase their effectiveness it would also strengthen their ties with the United States. Will you let me know your view of this?

Many of the details in this section come from a study, ordered by Congress, by the General Accounting Office in 1992. the programs involved do not mention CIA participation, but it is widely accepted that CIA personnel, especially at the embassy level, certainly are aware of the effort. Being aware of training, however, does not necessarily mean participation in the training. Both the CIA and military intelligence with Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations^[29] may have intelligence collecting relationships with local police.

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, under the Department of State representatives at any embassy is expected to be aware of all contacts between US personnel and local law enforcement organizations. The 1973 legislation significantly limited police training of all sorts, partially in response to human rights concerns.

The majority of this training went to Latin America, but some did go to countries elsewhere in the world, according to Senator Alan Cranston,^[30] especially those with narcotics or terrorism problems. Cranston cited six reasons why the Congress, in 1974, banned police training, after learning of training and equipping "police in Iran, Vietnam, Brazil, and other countries were involved in torture, murder, and the suppression of legitimate political activity":

1. training was provided to so-called friendly anti-Communist regimes, without regard to whether they were dictatorships or not.
2. law enforcement efforts were subordinated to U.S. counterinsurgency goals. As the GAO noted, U.S. training included such topics as counterinsurgency techniques, weapons use, and Communist ideology. This also meant, in practice, reinforcing the control of recipient countries' militaries over the police.
3. and this is clearly borne out in the Langguth book,^[31]U.S. trainers were not always the best America had to offer.
4. U.S. intelligence agencies were given an important role in the development and execution of these programs.
5. police training was not placed in the broader context of administration of justice, with its emphasis on judicial and prison reform.
6. finally, human rights was rarely a factor in policy considerations at the time.

Cranston went on to say,

This ban remained virtually ironclad until 1985, when Congress authorized the President to support `programs to enhance investigative capabilities conducted under judicial or prosecutorial control' in functioning democracies in the Western hemisphere.

As a result, the Department of Justice--together with the State Department and the Agency for International Development--established the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program ICITAP. Operational responsibility was left entirely to ICITAP under the supervision of officials in the Deputy Attorney General's office, with policy guidance provided by the Department of State.

With an annual budget of less than $8 million, ICITAP has trained thousands of police, judges, prosecutors, and other criminal justice personnel from 17 Caribbean island states, 6 Central American nations, as well as Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and Uruguay. It is important to point out that, under the direction of David `Kris' Kriskovitch, a former FBI special agent, ICITAP has steered clear of any hint of the kind of problems that plagued the old AID Office of Public Safety.

Many observers credit ICITAP with spreading a consciousness of the need for civilianized law enforcement in new and emerging democracies in the region, and the recently agreed-to Salvadoran peace treaty--with its emphasis on the role of a civilianized police force in internal security--is proof of the soundness of this approach.

Unfortunately, the ICITAP Program remains underfunded, overextended, and relegated to playing only a regional role. As we see from the GAO report, it may provide the only bright spot in an area characterized by administration ineptness and neglect.

In principle, training and assistance to police, as opposed to military organization, is against US law, but the relevant law allows Presidential waiver of most provisions. A GAO report^[32] provides "information on

1. the legislative authority for providing assistance to foreign law enforcement agencies and personnel,
2. the extent and cost of U.S. activities, and
3. experts' opinions on the management of these programs.

[edit] Background

US assistance to foreign police began in the 1950s,^[30], and increased in the early 1960s when the Kennedy administration became concerned about growing communist insurgent activities and established a public safety program within the Agency for International Development (AID) to train foreign police.^[33]

By 1968 the United States was spending $60 million a year to train police in 34 countries in areas such as criminal investigation, patrolling, interrogation and counterinsurgency techniques, riot control, weapon use, and bomb disposal^[32] The United States also provided weapons, telecommunications, transportation, and other equipment. In the early 1970s, the Congress became concerned over the apparent absence of clear policy guidelines and the use of program funds to support repressive regimes that committed human rights' abuses. As a result, "the Congress determined that it was inadvisable for the United States to continue supporting any foreign police organizations".^[32]

[edit] ICITAP

ICITAP was created in 1986 to help gain prosecution in key human rights cases in El Salvador and to bolster the criminal investigative capacity of Latin American security forces. Beginning with Panama in 1990, however, ICITAP became the principal U.S. agency involved in filling the “institutional gap,” restructuring of the entire law enforcement apparatus of countries in transition.^[33] "The Criminal Division's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training (OPDAT) office foster, support, and strengthen democratic principles and structures of law enforcement in foreign countries. Particularly in those countries that have recently embraced democracy, ICITAP and OPDAT provide training for police, prosecutors, and the judiciary and advice on American laws and programs to combat crime within a democratic framework."^[34]

As the U.N. role in police monitoring and training during peacekeeping operations has expanded over the past several years, ICITAP collaboration with U.N.-sponsored police monitors (CIVPOL) from around the world has grown as well. Although the ICITAP mandate prevents it from doing actual policing in postintervention scenarios, its capacity to build local police forces is increasingly viewed as the ticket to quick military withdrawal following interventions or peacekeeping missions. As the scope of ICITAP activities has widened, so has its geographic reach. In 1996 alone, ICITAP initiated new projects in Rwanda, Bosnia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and the Croatian province of Eastern Slavonia, with new projects set for Brazil, Albania, Belize, and Liberia.

In theory, in rebuilding a justice system it would be logical to attempt to mobilize civilian experts in the field. Certain factors tend to preclude this, at least in the initial phases of an operation. The environment may be such that the security threat is still beyond that which civilian police forces could cope with. States generally do not have a spare capacity of civilian policing, as these personnel are fully engaged in daily policing at home. As a consequence the police contribution may be of the wrong category (i.e., border police) or from jurisdictions with an inferior human rights record. It has proven difficult to recruit civilian police for peace operations. Even more difficult is the problem of what to do about the other arms of the justice administration, such as the judiciary and prisons. The judiciary in particular presents a major problem, because judges and magistrates cannot be trained and employed within the same time frame as a police force. This aspect must be addressed, however, as a functioning police force cannot exist without a judiciary to serve.^[35]

[edit] Investigation of relationship between ICITAP and CIA

There is no specific indication that ICITAP operations are linked to CIA operations. Wayne Madsen speculated there may be, or the CIA involvement might be through private military companies. Madsen did not suggest that the private military companies were providing the police training.^[36] He observed that "Janice Stromsem, a career employee of the Justice Department who served as ICITAP's director, resisted the program's takeover by CIA elements. In February [1999], Stromsem was relieved of her duties after complaining to the Justice Department Inspector General that ICITAP was being used by the CIA to recruit agents among foreign police officials." This issue had apparently come up before her relief, as the Inspectors General began their investigation in April 1997, looking into ICITAP and OPDAT, "...following allegations of program mismanagement and supervisory misconduct. The investigative team of special agents, auditors, inspectors, and support personnel, under the direction of a senior attorney, interviewed over 90 witnesses in the United States and several foreign countries and has reviewed over 5,800 pages of documents. The investigation is ongoing. Stromsem's complaint was investigated jointly by the Inspectors General of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and CIA.^[34]

[edit] Results in brief

In 1973 and 1974, the Congress enacted legislation forbidding U.S. agencies from using foreign economic or military assistance funds to assist foreign police, but it subsequently granted numerous exemptions to permit assistance in some countries and in various aspects of police force development, including material and weapons support, force management, narcotics control, and counterterrorism tactics. The 1974 prohibition did not apply to the use of other funds by agencies such as the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) or United States Department of Transportation (DOT) to train or assist foreign law enforcement personnel.

No government agency is in charge of calculating the cost. However, GAO identified 125 countries that received U.S. training and assistance for their police forces during fiscal year 1990 at a cost of at least $117 million.^[37]

A constant refrain of current and former government personnel, as well as outside experts, said there is little headquarters coordination of training, certainly among countries and even in the same country.^[38] Some thought that activities may not be efficiently implemented nor supportive of overall U.S. policy goals.

[edit] Legislative provisions on police assistance

In the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, the Congress prohibited the use of foreign assistance funds for police training and related programs in foreign countries. In December 1974, the Congress added section 660 to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to terminate AID's public safety program and expand the prohibition by stating that:

On and after July 1, 1975, none of the funds made available to carry out this Act, and none of the local currencies generated under this Act, shall be used to provide training or advice, or provide any financial support, for police, prisons, or other law enforcement forces for any foreign government or any program of internal intelligence or surveillance on behalf of any foreign government within the United States or abroad.

The amendment applies only to funds appropriated to carry out the purposes of the Foreign Assistance Act, and does not apply to other agencies' appropriations.^[39] Also, the prohibition does not apply to any activity of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) related to `crimes of the nature of which are unlawful in the United States' or assistance to combat international narcotics trafficking. According to DEA and FBI officials, the exemption permits these agencies to train foreign police. The act also permitted U.S. agencies to complete contracts for police assistance entered into before enactment of the amendment.

In 1981, the Congress began exempting specific countries or activities from the prohibition. Police in the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System received training in antiterrorism , police investigation. Panama received police force development assistance^[40]

[edit] Police assistance

During fiscal year 1990 at a cost of about $117 million, the GAO estimated the major programs were: U.S. programs providing

• United States Department of State(DOS)

• International Narcotics Control ($45 million)
• Antiterrorism Assistance ($10 million) programs

• Department of Justice

• International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program ($20 million)

• United States Department of Defense's (DOD)

• program to assist national police forces ($42 million).^[41]

[edit] Concerns on management of assistance

Current and former State Department and other government officials, and academic experts who have been involved in assistance to foreign police forces, stated that the U.S. government lacks:^[42]

1. (a clear policy on the role of U.S. assistance to police forces in the new and emerging democracies,
2. clearly defined program objectives,
3. a focal point for coordination and decision-making, and
4. a means for determining whether individual programs and activities support U.S. policy or contribute to overall U.S. interests.

They noted that each program is managed individually, and the only place that coordination is occurring is at the U.S. embassy in the country. They expressed concern that in a country with more than one program, activities may be duplicative. One official expressed the opinion that the U.S. government needs to develop national policy guidelines for all police assistance programs to insure that cumulatively they support common objectives. GAO is continuing to look at these issues in our on-going work.

[edit] Scope and methodology

The US General Accounting Office obtained information on CIA training and assistance provided to foreign law enforcement personnel, reviewed the legislative authority for providing this training and assistance, and identified efforts to coordinate these activities. They did not review program implementation in recipient countries. They interviewed officials and obtained records from AID and the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense, in Washington, D.C.; reviewed legislation and agency legal opinions on foreign police assistance; interviewed academic and legal experts on current U.S. assistance to foreign police; and reviewed literature published on foreign police assistance and AID's public safety program.^[43]

[edit] Legislative exemptions to the prohibition on U.S. assistance to foreign police

Congressionally approved exemptions generally authorize activities that benefit a specific U.S. goal, such as countering the terrorist threat to U.S. citizens overseas or combating drug trafficking.^[44]

[edit] The International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981

This act the section 660 prohibition on assistance to foreign police forces in Haiti and allowed such assistance for Haiti during fiscal years 1982 and 1983. The purpose was to help stop illegal emigration from Haiti to the United States. Subsequent acts continued this exemption for fiscal years 1984, 1986, and 1987^[45]

[edit] International Security and Development Assistance Authorizations Act of 1983

Congress authorized an antiterrorism program to train foreign police in the United States. In 1990 Congress relaxed the section 660 restrictions to allow training outside the United States for 30 days or less if it relates to aviation security, crisis management, document screening techniques, facility security, maritime security, protection for very important persons, and handling of detector dogs.^[46]

[edit] International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985

The Act addressed a series of police assistance activities. It expanded upon a 1984 act that authorized a judicial reform project in El Salvador and exempted assistance to Salvadoran police in judicial investigative roles from the section 660 prohibition.^[47]

The 1985 act expanded the judicial reform program and the police training exemption to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. In 1988 the Congress further expanded the judicial reform program to allow police assistance to promote investigative and forensic skills, develop law enforcement training curricula, and improve administration and management of law enforcement organizations. This act specifically prohibited the Department of Defense (DOD) and the U.S. armed forces from providing training under this program.^[47]

Maritime subjects were exempted from the section 660 prohibition, as well as the prohibition for any country that has a long-standing democratic tradition, does not have armed forces, and does not engage in a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights. The act permitted such countries to receive any type of police assistance.

It authorized assistance to Honduran and El Salvadoran police for fiscal years 1986 and 1987, provided that the President determined and notified the Congress that those countries had made significant progress in eliminating human rights violations. This exemption permitted DOD to train and equip these countries' police forces to respond to acts of terrorism. The exemption was not renewed beyond FY 1987.

[edit] International Narcotics Control Acts

This series of acts approved certain police assistance activities in Latin America and the Caribbean for narcotics control purposes. The International Narcotics Control Act of 1986 permitted DOD to provide training to foreign police in the operation and maintenance of aircraft used in narcotics control. The International Narcotics Control Act of 1988 expanded DOD's role and allowed it to provide training and weapons and ammunition in fiscal years 1989 and 1990 to foreign police units that are specifically organized for narcotics enforcement in eligible countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. This act also allowed economic support funds to be provided to Colombian police for the protection of judges, government officials, and members of the press against narco-terrorist attacks.

A 1989 version of this Act extended DOD's authority to train and provide defense articles to foreign police units in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru in fiscal year 1990, if the units are only for narcotics enforcement. This authority differs from the 1988 act in that it allowed DOD to provide, in addition to weapons and ammunition, other defense articles such as helicopters, vehicles, radios, and personnel gear.

The International Narcotics Control Act of 1990 authorized DOD to continue to train and equip police forces in the Andean region in fiscal year 1990. This act was similar to the previous acts in that it permits DOD to train police forces in the operation and maintenance of equipment and in tactical operations in narcotics interdiction and also allowed DOD to provide defense articles to these units. However, it also allows DOD to provide commodities, such as nonmilitary equipment or supplies, to narcotics control police forces. This act also continued the assistance to Colombia to protect against narco-terrorist attacks and extended this assistance to Bolivia and Peru for fiscal year 1991.^[48]

[edit] Urgent Assistance for Democracy in Panama Act of 1990

In 1990, after the U.S. intervention in Panama, the Congress significantly enhanced the U.S. role in the development of the new police force in Panama. The Urgent Assistance for Democracy in Panama Act of 1990 permitted training in areas such as human rights, civil law, and overall civilian law enforcement techniques. The act also permitted DOD, using prior year military assistance funds, to procure defense articles and related services for law enforcement forces in Panama.^[49]

[edit] The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act for 1991

This Act amended section 660 to allow U.S. assistance to police forces of countries that are members of the regional security system of the Eastern Caribbean. With the exception of Antigua and Barbados, other member countries did not require this exemption to receive assistance because they were covered under the existing exemption that permitted assistance to police forces in countries with long-standing democratic traditions, and no armed forces. Antigua and Barbados have armed forces.^[50]

[edit] Other exceptions to police assistance prohibition

In addition to the exemptions previously discussed, there are other authorities that waive the prohibition on assistance to police forces of foreign countries. For example, the President may authorize foreign assistance when `it is important to the security interests of the United States'. This allows the President to waive any provision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, including section 660.^[51]

[edit] U.S. assistance provided to foreign police

[edit] Antiterrorism assistance

The goal of the Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA) is to improve foreign governments' antiterrorist capabilities to better protect U.S. citizens and interests.^[41] In fiscal year 1990, the United States provided antiterrorism assistance to 49 countries at a cost of nearly $10 million. Sixty-two percent of the funds were spent in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Europe, and less than $500,000 was used to purchase equipment. Representative training included judicial protection, protection to very important persons, hostage negotiation, and antiterrorist operations. The Department of State manages the program and contracts with other U.S. government agencies, state or local police departments, and private firms to conduct the training. The Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, and the U.S. Marshals Service are regular trainers. In compliance with legislative requirements, most training takes place in the United States.

In addition to training provided under the ATA program, the Federal Aviation Administration provides aviation security training to a limited number of foreign officials who attend their basic security training courses.^[41] The course deals in part with the role of law enforcement in support of passenger screening procedures and airport security programs.

[edit] International narcotics control

One of the objectives of the Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM) international narcotics control training program is to strengthen host country enforcement and interdiction capabilities^{[citation needed]}. During fiscal year 1990, INM provided a minimum of $45 million in training and equipment to foreign police, principally in Mexico, Jamaica, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, Venezuela, Pakistan, Thailand, and Turkey. These are all narcotics producing and trafficking countries.

INM reimburses other U.S. government agencies, primarily the Drug Enforcement Administration(DEA), Customs, and Coast Guard, to conduct the actual training. DEA provides narcotics investigative training, Customs teaches air, sea and land port search procedures, and Coast Guard teaches courses in maritime interdiction. Other agencies may also be requested to train on a reimbursable basis in areas where they have specific expertise. For example, DOD provides helicopter training to police in drug trafficking countries. Training is conducted both overseas and in the United States and is reviewed and approved by INM.^[48]

In addition, DOD used military assistance funds to train and equip narcotics enforcement police in several drug producing and trafficking countries. Documents provided by DOD show that in fiscal year 1990, DOD provided training and equipment with a value of at least $17 million to Mexico, $1.3 million to Bolivia, $10 million to Colombia, $1 million to Ecuador, and $1 million to Peru. DOD officials informed us that training and equipment valued at more than these amounts may also have been provided. However, documentation was not available at the Washington, D.C., agency headquarters level that specified the amounts for law enforcement activities. The equipment provided consisted of UH-1 helicopters and spare parts, ammunition, small arms, riot control equipment, radios, and miscellaneous personal gear.

[edit] Investigative and international police training

In FY1986, AID transferred funds to DOJ to design, develop, and implement projects to improve and enhance the investigative capabilities of law enforcement agencies in the Latin America and the Caribbean region. This was part of AID's effort to reform judicial systems. Using these funds, DOJ established the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP).^[52]Operating under State Department oversight, ICITAP has conducted criminal justice sector needs assessments in the region and has expanded its training to include basic police management and police academy development. In fiscal year 1990, ICITAP received $7 million from the Department of State for its regional program. It trained more than 1,000 students from the Caribbean, Central and South America and sponsored 7 conferences. Training includes police management, criminal investigation, crime scene search, and forensic medicine courses. Except for students sent to training programs in the United States, ICITAP training takes place overseas.

The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) also provides limited training for foreign law enforcement officials.^[52] Each year approximately 100 international police officials attend the 11-week college level course at the FBI National Academy that includes studies on management and forensic sciences. The FBI pays for the training and subsistence, but does not pay for the students' transportation. Over the last 10 years, more than 1,100 foreign police officials from 89 countries have graduated from this course.

Using its own funds, the FBI created two training courses:

• Training for Mexican police to better assist the United States in its investigations. Mexican officers receive a 3-day course in basic law enforcement techniques to include crime scene management, collection and preservation of evidence, hostage negotiations, forensic science, and investigative techniques. Since 1987, over 400 Mexican border police have been trained. FBI officials stated that the FBI plans to establish a training school in Mexico during 1992 at an estimated cost of about $250,000 annually, excluding salaries.
• The second course developed by the FBI for foreign police was to provide mid-level management training for police officials from the Pacific Island nations. The 4-week course includes first-line supervision, investigative techniques, and hostage negotiations. During 1991, 52 students graduated from the course held in Guam at a cost to the FBI of about $35,000. About 50 students are expected to attend this course during the spring of 1992.

The FBI also provides other training and assistance to foreign police as requested, but the cost is unknown.^[52] For example, the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime provided training to Canadian police. The Criminal Investigative Division conducted a training seminar for officers from Italy's three national law enforcement agencies on the use of sensitive investigative techniques such as the operation of confidential sources, undercover operations, and electronic surveillance. The FBI also furnishes on-the-job assistance to governments who request help during particularly difficult or sensitive investigations.

[edit] National Police Force Development

After the U.S. intervention in Panama in December 1989, ICITAP implemented a program to help develop the newly formed Panamanian Public Force using $13.2 million in fiscal years 1990 and 1991 foreign assistance funds.^[32] This effort intended a professional, civilian national police force that is fully integrated into Panamanian society, capable of protecting its people, and dedicated to supporting the Panamanian constitution, laws, and human rights. Since the program began, ICITAP has trained about 5,500 police officers and provided institutional development assistance, such as help in starting the National Police Academy, improved recruitment procedures, and creating an in-house self-monitoring organization. In addition, ICITAP has worked closely with U.S. Embassy and Panamanian government officials to develop plans and policies appropriate for a police force in a democracy.

[edit] Counterterrorism and military assistance

DOD supplies a limited amount of military training and assistance to police officials. During fiscal years 1986 and 1987, DOD trained and equipped the El Salvadoran and Honduran police to counter urban terrorist activities.^[52][53]

This assistance was authorized in response to the murder of U.S. Marines by terrorists in El Salvador and was managed and delivered by the U.S. Army Military Police. The assistance consisted of training in counterterrorism techniques and the supply of police vehicles, communications, weapons, and other equipment. This effort cost $19.8 million, of which $17 million was provided to El Salvador.

In fiscal year 1990, DOD spent $6.4 million in previously authorized but unused military assistance funds to purchase needed equipment and weapons for Panama's newly formed national police force. Items procured included police vehicles, communications equipment, small arms, and personal gear. This assistance was a one-time, emergency program.

DOD has an ongoing military assistance program to support Costa Rican police. In fiscal year 1990, DOD supplied $431,000 in military equipment and $232,000 in military training to the Costa Rican Civil Guard to help them carry out their responsibility to protect the border regions of the country. DOD provided equipment such as vehicles, personnel gear, and radios, and military training in areas such as coastal operations. Additionally, DOD conducted technical training courses in equipment maintenance and medical skills among others.^[53]

DOD, along with the United Kingdom, supports the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System^[54] that was formed after the U.S. intervention in Grenada. The Security System is composed of a few permanently assigned military officers, but largely depends upon island nation police officers who can be called up for military duty in case of emergency. The United States equips and trains these personnel to prepare them for such an eventually. In fiscal year 1990, DOD provided $4.2 million in military assistance funds that were used to purchase equipment such as jeeps, small arms, uniforms, and communications gear. DOD also provided $300,000 for training in special operations, rural patrol, field survival, and surveillance, as well as technical courses in communications, navigation, maintenance, and medicine.

[edit] Difficulties in determining cost and extent of assistance

Since some agencies fund assistance out of their own budgets, without necessarily having a line item for police assistance, the GAO "could not accurately determine the extent or cost of assistance to foreign police" In the GAO estimates, "some double counting of students may be occurring and agencies may not be differentiating between assistance provided to police and assistance provided to the military." This might happen when "the agency supplying the training and the agency paying for the training may both include the trainees in their reporting systems, such as when ICITAP pays for students attending the FBI academy."

While the DOJ was asked to calculate information on its work with foreign police, it could not assign a dollar value to items including "travel expenses, salaries, and expendable items such as course materials." H.^[55] "Also, GAO could not always determine whether a student was a police officer or a military member because some agencies do not collect such data, DOD officials informed us that once they receive permission to train police in a specific activity they do not provide a further accounting breakdown. For example, training provided to the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System was for law enforcement personnel, although a few trainees may have belonged to military organizations."

[edit] Concerns expressed about police assistance

High-level program officials, former U.S. officials, and academic experts identified several issues that they believe affect the effectiveness of foreign police assistance. Their views are presented below; however, we did not verify whether the problems they identified have adversely affected programs in recipient countries.

[edit] Limited policy guidance or central management

Officials with whom the GAO investigators spoke stated that overall police training policy guidance at the Washington, DC, headquarters management level was limited. A former U.S. Ambassador in Latin America said that because there is no U.S. policy guidance, each agency pursues its own program agenda, which may not be in concert with long-term U.S. interests. Thus, he said, the U.S. government lacks a mechanism for considering how the various activities contribute to a strategy of fostering democratic institutions or to serving other national interests.

Program managers said each program is managed separately. According to the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, "the effect of the various pieces of legislation and resulting programs is that there is a lot of disparate police training and some interagency competition, but without anyone in charge. The coordinator believes that this does not serve U.S. interests. He stated that a Policy Coordinating Committee coordinates all antiterrorism assistance delivered by participating agencies such as the FBI and the State Department. He noted however, that the committee does not coordinate with agencies providing police training outside of the ATA umbrella. In addition, although INM, DEA, and the other agencies providing narcotics control assistance coordinate with each other, officials informed us that they do not routinely coordinate with ATA or ICITAP on police assistance activities."

In the absence of centralized management, decisions are made at the embassy level, by officials who may lack expertise in police training. Different officials, in the same embassy, may manage different programs. "For example, the ATA program generally is coordinated through the embassy's regional security officer, while ICITAP generally coordinates its activities through a political officer, or directly with the Ambassador, and DEA manages its programs through either an in-country attache or a special narcotics coordinator." A former ambassador in Latin America observed that delegating these decisions to the embassy makes the emphasis given to police activities completely dependent on the level of interest of the local ambassador.

[edit] Program objectives and activities duplicated

A State Department official said that because of the proliferation of programs and the overlap in objectives, U.S. agencies may be duplicating efforts^{[citation needed]}. As a result, determining which agency will provide training may depend largely on whether an agency has the resources or takes the initiative. A program officer acknowledged that some foreign officials are receiving similar courses from different agencies and similar program objectives may also result in duplicative administrative and assessment functions. An ATA official stated that although ATA's charter limits its training to antiterrorism, the strategy and objectives of ATA's training parallel those of ICITAP; both want to improve law enforcement capabilities. DEA is also concerned about general enforcement capabilities as part of its drug interdiction activities. However, each agency conducts in-depth force capability and training needs assessments before commencing training.^[55]

[edit] Human experimentation

Project MKULTRA, or MK-ULTRA, was the code name for a CIA mind-control research program that began in 1950, involved primarily with the experimentation of drugs and other "chemical, biological and radiological" stimuli on both willing and uninformed subjects.

[edit] Rockefeller Commission

In December 1974, The New York Times reported that the CIA had conducted illegal domestic activities, including experiments on U.S. citizens, during the 1960s. The report prompted investigations by both the U.S. Congress (in the form of the Church Committee) and a presidential commission (known as the Rockefeller Commission). The congressional investigations and the Rockefeller Commission report revealed that the CIA and the Department of Defense had in fact conducted experiments to influence and control human behavior through the use of psychoactive drugs such as LSD and mescaline and other chemical, biological, and psychological means. Experiments were often conducted without the subjects' knowledge or consent.

MK-ULTRA was started on the order of CIA director Allen Dulles, largely in response to alleged Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean use of mind-control techniques on U.S. prisoners of war in Korea. The goal of the experiments was to study mind-control in order to develop methods of interrogation and behavior modification and manipulation, as well as to develop a possible truth drug.

[edit] Specific experiments

Documents have revealed that experiments were conducted on CIA employees, military personnel, doctors, other government agents, prostitutes, prisoners, mentally ill patients, and members of the general public in order to study their reactions. The drugs were administered alone and in combination with other drugs and at varying doses and frequencies. The drugs included LSD, heroin, morphine, temazepam (used under code name MKSEARCH), mescaline, psilocybin, scopolamine, marijuana, alcohol, and sodium pentothal.^{[citation needed]}

During one set of experiments, named Operation Midnight Climax, the CIA set up several brothels in New York City and California in order to lure men in, who were then secretly administered LSD. The brothels were equipped with one-way mirrors and video surveillance equipment for observation, recording, and study. In another case, volunteers were given LSD for 77 days straight.^{[citation needed]}

Another technique investigated was connecting a barbiturate IV into one arm and an amphetamine IV into the other. The barbiturates were released into the subject first, and as soon as the subject began to fall asleep, the amphetamines were released. The subject would begin babbling incoherently at this point, and it was sometimes possible to ask questions and get useful answers.^{[citation needed]}

[edit] Outcome

MK-ULTRA research ultimately proved useless to the CIA and they have abandoned the program. Because most MK-ULTRA records were deliberately destroyed in 1973 by order of then CIA Director Richard Helms, it is difficult if not impossible to have a complete understanding of the more than 150 individually funded research sub-projects sponsored by MK-ULTRA and related CIA programs.

Following the recommendations of the Church Committee, President Gerald Ford in 1976 issued the first Executive Order on Intelligence Activities which, among other things, prohibited "experimentation with drugs on human subjects, except with the informed consent, in writing and witnessed by a disinterested party, of each such human subject" and in accordance with the guidelines issued by the National Commission. Subsequent orders by Presidents Carter and Reagan expanded the directive to apply to any human experimentation.

[edit] Assassination and targeted killing

At least since World War II, a distinction has been drawn between assassination of civilian leaders, and targeted killings of leaders of fighting organizations. Some cases were blurry, such as the British-Czech Operation Anthropoid, the killing of uniformed SS officer Reinhard Heydrich, the German governor, at the time, of Czechoslovakia. A failed attempt, by British troops, to kill Field Marshal Erwin Rommel was clearly aimed at a military leader, as was the successful shooting down of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto.

CIA has admitted being involved in assassination attempts against foreign leaders. Recently, there have been targeted killings of suspected terrorists, typically with missiles fired from unmanned aerial vehicles, in a manner that a number of legal authorities believe was a legitimate act as opposed to a prohibited assassination.

[edit] Assassinations

Of the cases cited, it appears that no CIA personnel or even directly controlled foreign agents actually killed any leader, but there certainly were cases where the CIA knew of, or supported, plots to overthrow foreign leaders. In the cases of Lumumba, Qasim, and Castro, the CIA was involved in preparing to kill the individual, but a native group killed him first. In other cases, such as Diem, the Agency knew of a plot but did not warn him, and communications at White House level indicated that the Agency had, with approval, told the plotters the US didn't object to their plan. The gun or poison, however, was not in the hands of a CIA officer.

CIA personnel were involved in attempted assassinations of foreign government leaders such as Fidel Castro. They provided support to those that killed Patrice Lumumba. In yet another category was noninterference in the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) coup in which President Ngo Dinh Diem was killed.

A distinction has been drawn between political assassinations and "targeted killing" of leaders of non-state belligerents.

[edit] Castro

Perhaps the best-documented account of CIA-sponsored assassination plans were against President Fidel Castro of Cuba.

According to columnist Jack Anderson,^[56] the first attempt was part of the Bay of Pigs operation, but five more teams were sent, the last apprehended on a rooftop within rifle range of Castro, at the end of February or beginning of March 1963. Anderson speculated that President Fidel Castro may have become aware of it, and somehow recruited Lee Harvey Oswald to retaliate against President John F. Kennedy.

Maheu was identified as the team leader, who recruited John Roselli, a gambler with contacts in the American and Cuban underworlds. The CIA assigned two operations officers, William Harvey and James O'Connell, to accompany Roselli to Miami to recruit the actual teams.

Anderson's story appears to be confirmed by two CIA documents, the first referring to an Inspector General report of investigation of allegations that the Agency conspired to assassinate Fidel Castro. The story first appeared in Drew Pearson's column and has since appeared in Jack Anderson's column. "While the columns contained many factual errors, the allegations are basically true.^[57] Second, a declassified memo from Howard Osborne, director of the CIA Office of Security, dated 15 February 1972, in the "CIA Family Jewels" series, from to the Executive Director, speaks of John Roselli, then serving time in a Federal penitentiary in Seattle, Washington, with deportation scheduled at the end of his sentence.^[58] While the CIA was aware "Roselli intended to expose his partipation in the plot should we not intervene in his behalf. The DCI at the time, John McCone, decided to take a calculated risk and accept the consequences of possible disclosure. Two articles by Jack Anderson discuss the plot, as well the Washington Post Sunday magazine, Parade

Individuals who were aware of this project were: Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, Richard Bissell (Deputy Director for Plans (DDP)) Colonel J. C. King (Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, DDP) Colonel Sheffield Edwards, William Harvey, and James P. O'Connell. Also included were Robert A. Maheu (former FBI agent, public relations agent who did work for the CIA, and later an aide to Howard Hughes) and his attorneys Edward P. Morgan and Edward Bennett Williams.

On 26 February 1971, Osborne arranged with the Commissioner of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service to flag any deportation. INS confirmed they did this again for 1972.

[edit] Diem

In summary, CIA, Embassy, and other US personnel, up to White House level, were aware of yet another coup being planned against President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam. While the US had no direct participation in the coup, the plotters were told, in a deniable way, that the US did not object to it. No documentary evidence has surfaced that the US knew that Diem and his brother were to be killed, and it is unclear that all the Vietnamese plotters knew or agreed to it. President John F. Kennedy was aware of the coup plans, but apparently had not considered the hazard to Diem.

According to the Pentagon Papers, the final US loss of confidence in Diem began when his government violently suppressed a protest on Buddha's Birthday, May 8, 1963. Up to that point, the majority Buddhists had not been very politically active, even though Diem had given preference to the Catholic minority. Quickly, however, the Buddhists put a "cohesive and disciplined [political] organization" into action. By June, the situation moved from dissidence from a religious group to a "grave crisis of public confidence". ^[59]

Then-Ambassador Frederick Nolting had tried to persuade Diem to moderate government actionagainst Buddhists, but with no success. While Nolting was on leave, President John F. Kennedy appointed Henry Cabot Lodge as the new Ambassador. In June 1963, senior leaders began, for the first time, to discuss the effect of a coup to remove Diem. Nolting and the US military in Vietnam, however, argued that Diem was keeping chaos at bay. Nolting left permanently in mid-August, but the assurances from Diem died with multiple August 21 night raids on Buddhist temples in many parts of Vietnam. Two days later, a US representative was approached by generals considering a coup. On August 23, the first contact with a U.S. representative was made by generals who had begun to plan a coup against Diem. They were told that the U.S. had determined that Diem's brother, who had led the raids on the Buddhists, could not stay in any kind of power, and that, "then, we must face the possibility that Diem himself cannot be preserved."

A White House tape of President Kennedy and his advisers, published this week in a new book-and-CD collection and excerpted on the Web, confirms that top U.S. officials sought the November 1, 1963 coup against then-South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem without apparently considering the physical consequences for Diem personally (he was murdered the following day). The taped meeting and related documents show that U.S. officials, including JFK, vastly overestimated their ability to control the South Vietnamese generals who ran the coup 40 years ago this week [November 2003].

The Kennedy tape from October 29, 1963 captures the highest-level White House meeting immediately prior to the coup, including the President's brother voicing doubts about the policy of support for a coup: "I mean, it's different from a coup in the Iraq or South American country; we are so intimately involved in this…^[60]

An 8 May 1973 memorandum^[57] states that "An Inspector General report of investigation of a11egatipns that the Agency was instrumental in bringing about the assassination of President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam. The allegations were determined to be without foundation."

Nevertheless, the Pentagon Papers observed,

For the military coup d'etat against Ngo Dinh Diem, the U.S. must accept its full share of responsibility. Beginning in August of 1963 we variously authorized, sanctioned and encouraged the coup efforts of the Vietnamese generals and offered full support for a successor government. In October we cut off aid to Diem in a direct rebuff, giving a green light to the generals. We maintained clandestine contact with them throughout the planning and execution of the coup and sought to review their operational plans and proposed new government. Thus, as the nine-year rule of Diem came to a bloody end, our complicity in his overthrow heightened our responsibilities and our commitment in an essentially leaderless Vietnam.^[59] The report included, "In February 1960, the Near East Division [of the Directorate of Plans (i.e., Clandestine Service)] sought the endorsement of what the Division Chief called the "Health Alteration Committee" for its proposal for a "special operation: to “incapacitate” an Iraqi Colonel believed to be "promoting Soviet bloc political interests in Iraq." The Division sought the Committee’s advice on a technique, "which while not likely to result in total disablement would be certain to prevent the target from pursuing his usual activities for a minimum of three months," adding: "We do not consciously seek subject’s permanent removal from the scene; we also do not object should this complication develop." Memo, Acting Chief N.E. Division to DC/CI [organization code not clear; it is the usual abbreviation for counter-intelligence. "In April, the [Health Alteration] Committee unanimously recommended to the DDP (Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Bissell)that a "disabling operation" be undertaken, noting that the Chief of Operations advised that it would be “highly desirable" Bissell’s deputy, Tracy Barnes, approved the action on behalf of Bissell. (Memo. Denuty Chief CI to DDP. 4/l/62) "The approved operation was to mail a monogrammed handkerchief containing an incapacitating agent to the colonel from an Asian country [i.e., country not yet named]. [James] Scheider [Science Advisor to Bissell] testified that, while he did not now recall the name of the recipient, he did remember mailing from the Asian country. during the period in question, a handkerchief "treated with some kind of material for the purpose of harassing that person who received it." (Scheider Affidavit. 10/20/75. pp. 52-56) During the course of this Committee’s investigation, the CIA stated that the handkerchief was “in fact never received (if, indeed, sent).” It added that the colonel: “Suffered a terminal illness before a firing squad in Baghdad (an event we had nothing to do with) after our handkerchief proposal was considered.” (Memo from Chief of Operations, Near East Division to Assistant to the SA/DDO 10/26/75.)

[edit] Planning overtaken by events

On Feb. 8, 1963, the conspirators staged a coup in Baghdad. For a time the government held out, but eventually Qasim gave up, and after a swift trial was shot; his body was later shown on Baghdad television.

[edit] Possible White House knowledge

Washington immediately befriended the successor regime. "Almost certainly a gain for our side," Robert Komer, a National Security Council aide," wrote to President John F. Kennedy on the day of the takeover.

That Komer wrote that memo to Kennedy, without spending any time on additional research, may suggest, but does not confirm, the National Security Council, a covert operations approval committee, or Kennedy knew of planning agains Qasim. Even if Komer or Kennedy knew of a plot to overthrow Qasim, approval of the plan, above CIA level, has not yet been documented.

[edit] Trujillo

An Inspector General report of investigation of allegations that the Agency was instrumental in bringing about the assassination of Rafael Trujillo, dictator of the Dominican Republic. Trujillo was effective head of government at the time of his assassination in 1961.

Conditions leading to a desire, by Dominicans, appeared to begin Johnny Abbes, took control the Intelligence Military Service (the secret police), and the country developed more internal violence and increasingly isolated from other nations. This isolation compounded Trujillo's fears, prompting him to worsen his foreign interventionism.

To be sure, Trujillo did have cause to resent the leaders of some nations, such as Cuba's Fidel Castro, who assisted a small, abortive invasion attempt by dissident Dominicans in 1959. Trujillo, however, expressed greater concern over Venezuela's president Rómulo Betancourt (1959-64). An established and outspoken opponent of Trujillo, Betancourt had been associated with some individual Dominicans who had plotted against the dictator. Trujillo developed an obsessive personal hatred towards Betancourt and supported numerous plots of Venezuelan exiles to overthrow him. This pattern of intervention led the Venezuelan government to take its case against Trujillo to the Organization of American States (OAS).

This development infuriated Trujillo, who ordered his foreign agents to plant a bomb inside Betancourt's car. The assassination attempt, carried out on June 24, 1960, injured but did not kill the Venezuelan president.^{[citation needed]} The firestorm caused from the incident inflamed world opinion against Trujillo. The members of the OAS, expressing this outrage, voted unanimously to sever diplomatic relations and to impose strong economic sanctions on the Dominican Republic.

Finally on the night of the May 30 1961, Rafael Trujillo was shot to death on San Cristobal Avenue, Santo Domingo. He was the victim of an ambush plotted by a number of Dominicans. According to American reporter Bernard Diederich, the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had supplied some of the guns used to kill the president.^{[citation needed]}

In a report to the Deputy Attorney General of the United States, CIA officials described the agency as having "no active part" in the assassination and only a "faint connection" with the groups that planned the killing.^[61], but the internal CIA investigation, by its Inspector General, "disclosed quite extensive Agency involvement with the plotters."^[57]

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35. ^ Kelly, Michael J.. "11: Legitimacy and the Public Security Function", Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security. National Defense University. 
36. ^ Madsen, Wayne (August 1999), “Mercenaries IN KOSOVO: The U.S. connection to the KLA - includes related article comparing United States foreign policy in Central America and Kosovo”, Progressive, <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1295/is_8_6/ai_55309049/pg_3> 
37. ^ U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division (5 March 1992), “RESULTS IN BRIEF”, Foreign Aid: Police Training and Assistance; report to Congressional requesters, <http://www.fas.org/irp/gao/920300-train.htm> 
38. ^ U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division (5 March 1992), “LIMITED POLICY GUIDANCE OR CENTRAL MANAGEMENT”, Foreign Aid: Police Training and Assistance; report to Congressional requesters, <http://www.fas.org/irp/gao/920300-train.htm> 
39. ^ Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-559, sec. 30(a), 88 stat. 1795, 1804)
40. ^ U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division (5 March 1992), “Appendix III. Countries Receiving Police Assistance”, Foreign Aid: Police Training and Assistance; report to Congressional requesters, <http://www.fas.org/irp/gao/920300-train.htm> 
41. ^ ^{a b c} U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division (5 March 1992), “Appendix II. U.S. Assistance Provided to Foreign Police ANTITERRORISM ASSISTANCE”, Foreign Aid: Police Training and Assistance; report to Congressional requesters, <http://www.fas.org/irp/gao/920300-train.htm> 
42. ^ U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division (5 March 1992), “CONCERNS ON MANAGEMENT OF ASSISTANCE”, Foreign Aid: Police Training and Assistance; report to Congressional requesters, <http://www.fas.org/irp/gao/920300-train.htm> 
43. ^ U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division (5 March 1992), “SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY”, Foreign Aid: Police Training and Assistance; report to Congressional requesters, <http://www.fas.org/irp/gao/920300-train.htm> 
44. ^ U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division (5 March 1992), “Appendix I. Legislative Exemptions to the Prohibition on U.S. Assistance to Foreign Police”, Foreign Aid: Police Training and Assistance; report to Congressional requesters, <http://www.fas.org/irp/gao/920300-train.htm> 
45. ^ The International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 (U.S. Congress): P.L. 97-113, sec. 721(d), 95 stat. 1519
46. ^ International Security and Development Assistance Authorizations Act of 1983
47. ^ ^{a b} International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985
48. ^ ^{a b} U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division (5 March 1992), “INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL ACTS”, Foreign Aid: Police Training and Assistance; report to Congressional requesters, <http://www.fas.org/irp/gao/920300-train.htm> 
49. ^ Urgent Assistance for Democracy in Panama Act of 1990
50. ^ The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act for 1991
51. ^ Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 USC 2364
52. ^ ^{a b c d} U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division (5 March 1992), “INVESTIGATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL POLICE TRAINING”, Foreign Aid: Police Training and Assistance; report to Congressional requesters, <http://www.fas.org/irp/gao/920300-train.htm> 
53. ^ ^{a b} U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division (5 March 1992), “COUNTERTERRORISM AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE”, Foreign Aid: Police Training and Assistance; report to Congressional requesters, <http://www.fas.org/irp/gao/920300-train.htm> 
54. ^ Center for International Policy, Eastern Caribbean Overview, <http://ciponline.org/facts/ecr03.htm> 
55. ^ ^{a b} U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division (5 March 1992), “Appendix II. U.S. Assistance Provided to Foreign Police: DIFFICULTIES IN DETERMINING COST AND EXTENT OF ASSISTANCE”, Foreign Aid: Police Training and Assistance; report to Congressional requesters, <http://www.fas.org/irp/gao/920300-train.htm> 
56. ^ Anderson, Jack (18 June 1971), “6 Attempts to Kill Castro laid to CIA”, Washington Post: B7 
57. ^ ^{a b c} Blanton, William (editor), ed. (8 May 1973), Memorandum for the Executive Secretary, CIA Management Committee. Subject: Potentially Embarrassing Agency Activities, vol. George Washington University National Security Archives Electronic Briefing Book No. 222, "The CIA's Family Jewels", <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/index.htm> 
58. ^ Blanton, William (editor), ed. (15 February 1972), Memorandum for the Executive Director, Subject: John Roselli, vol. George Washington University National Security Archives Electronic Briefing Book No. 222, "The CIA's Family Jewels", <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/index.htm> 
59. ^ ^{a b} “Chapter 4, "The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, May-November, 1963,"”, The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 2, Beacon Press, 1971, pp. pp. 201-276., <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/pent6.htm> 
60. ^ Prados, John (3 November 2003), JFK and the Diem Coup, vol. George Washington University National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 101, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/index.htm> 
61. ^ Justice Department Memo, 1975; National Security Archive
62. ^ Bilal Hussein

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