Battle of Wadi Al-Batin

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Battle of Wadi Al-Batin
Part of the Gulf War
Date February 15, 1991 Location Iraq Result Tactical coalition victory
Belligerents
US Army	Iraqi Republican Guard
Commanders
General Norman Schwarzkopf	F.General Ayad Al-Rawi
Casualties and losses
Unknown	Unknown

v • d • e Gulf War Kuwait – Khafji – 73 Easting – Al Busayyah – Phase Line Bullet – Medina Ridge – Wadi Al-Batin – Norfolk

The Feint up the Wadi Al-Batin or Battle of Ruqi Pocket or Operation Red Storm happened before the beginning of the Desert Storm operations on February 15, 1991.

Iraqis thought that Allies were prepping the Wadi Al-Batin for the main attack. The desired effect was that the Iraqis would think that the main coalition ground attack would come up the Wadi Al Batin, a natural invasion route, and they would therefore reinforce their forces there, at the expense of the Western flank, where VII Corps would conduct the main attack.

On February 16, 1991, US 1st Cavalry Division's artillery started firing against Iraqi targets inside the Wadi Al-Batin. This misdirection allowed the coalition forces to perform the famous "hail Mary" to the West as the Iraqis focused on the Wadi.

(This is not to be confused with the "Battle of Wadi Al-Batin" which was fought later in the 4-day ground war between elements of the 3d Armored Division and the Iraqi Republican Guard.)

[edit] Aftermath

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The first feint was a night attack using the 319th Field Artillery Regiment of the First Cavalry Division. This attack allowed Iraqi forces to briefly fix and, as intended, move and shoot counter-battery fire against US forces. The 319^th immediately moved out of the area after firing, and as the Iraqis maneuvered to fire their artillery, a combined Aviation raid by Apache Helicopters crossed the border and attacked and destroyed a significant portion of the Iraqi Corps artillery. Not only was this key to facilitating the ruse that the Wadi Al Batin would be the main theater attack, but also reduce the risk to the British and Syrian forces attacking along the western and southern border of Kuwait on G- Day. On the morning of 18th of February, the 1st Cavalry followed up the artillery attack with a Reconnaissance in Force by Task Force 1-5 CAV (Black Knights) of the 2nd Black Jack Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division. The Task Force consisted two M1-A1 Abrams Tank Companies, two M2-A1 Bradley Fighting Vehicle Companies, an M901 Anti Tank Company, Command and Control elements from the Headquarters of 2nd Brigade, elements of 1st ADA (Stinger and Vulcan Anti Aircraft Systems) and in a combat trains location, elements of the forward support battalion (C Co medical evac).

[edit] References

Personal account as witnessed.

• Note1.
• US 1st Cavalry Div..