Adel Hassan Hamad

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Adel Hassan Hamad
Born:	1958 (age 49–50) Port Sudan, Sudan
Arrested:	July 18, 2002
Detained at:	Guantanamo
ID number:	940
Conviction(s):	no charge, held in extrajudicial detention
Status	repatriated
Occupation:	Hospital administrator

Adel Hassan Hamad is a citizen of Sudan, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, in Cuba.^[1] His Guantanamo Internee Security Number is 940. Joint Task Force Guantanamo counter-terrorism analysts estimate he was born in 1958, in Port Sudan, Sudan.

[edit] Identity

Captive 940 was identified inconsistently on official Department of Defense documents:

• Captive 940 was identified as Adel Hassan Hamed on the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his [[Combatant Status Review Tribunal on November 19, 2004.^[2]
• Captive 940 was identified as Hassan Adel Hussein on the official list released on April 20, 2006.^[3] This spelling was used on several official lists released in September 2007.^{[4][5][6][7][8][9]}
• Captive 940 was listed as Adel Hassan on the official list released on May 15, 2006.^[1]
• Captive 940 told his Tribunal's President his name was Adel Hassan Hamad.

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a 3 x 6 meter trailer. The captive sat with his hands cuffed and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor.^[10] Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.^[11]

Initially the Bush Presidency asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush Presidency's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Adel Hassan Hamed's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 19 November 2004.^[12] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. The detainee is associated with al Qaida. The detainee was employed by the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) in Afghanistan and Pakistan for approximately one and one half years until the time of his capture 18 July, 2002. WAMY supports terrorist ideals and causes. During the Period 1986 through 1999, the detainee was employed by Lajanat Dawa Islamiya (LDI) in Afghanistan and Pakistan. LDI has been one of the most active Islamic non-governmental organizations to give logistical and financial support to mujahaddin operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan area. During the course of his duties with LDI, the detainee came in contact with persons who held positions of responsibility in al Qaida.

[edit] Transcript

Hamad chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.^[13] On March 3, 2006, in response to a court order from Jed Rakoff the Department of Defense published a seven page summarized transcript from his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.^[14]

[edit] Testimony

Hamad denied being a member of al Qaida, and said that he disagreed with their views; he said that, in his opinion, Islam forbids killing innocents. Hamad said that if he was a member of al Qaida he never would have traveled to Sudan on his annual vacation in June 2002.

Hamad denied that WAMY supports al Qaida. He said his charity worked to help Afghan refugees, providing them with food, medicine, clothes and education, building charter schools, educational training, and also works in the health department by establishing hospitals, small clinics, digging water wells, and building mosques.

Hamad confirmed that he worked for LDI for 14 years, but denied it had any ties to terrorism. He denied ever having any contact with any members of al Qaida, and told his Tribunal that he did not have any enmity towards the United States.

In answer to questions from his Tribunal's officers:

• Hamad said his last job for WAMY was hospital administration and the distribution of food, clothing and medicine to refugees.
• Hamad said he had a diploma in air conditioning systems and a Master's degree in Islamic studies.
• Hamad said he left LDI in 1999 due to layoffs which had been triggered by policy changes due to the first Gulf War. LDI was a Kuwaiti charity.

Hamad concluded by telling his Tribunal that his interrogators had decided within his first month and a half of detention that he was innocent, and told him that he could expect to be released shortly.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".^[15]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] Allegations

A Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his Administrative Review Board.^[16]

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment The detainee related he joined the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan during the early 1980's [sic] . He stated he was a student in school and his friends joined the group, so he did as well. The detainee was a member of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood until 1986. The detainee took a teaching job with the Hira Islamic Institute in 1986 where he worked until 1999. The detainee worked for the Hira Institute as a teacher at the Jelazee Refugee Camp. The Hira Institute is run by an organization named Lajnat Al-Da'wa al Islamia (LDI). Lajnat Al-Da'wa al Islamia (LDI) is a non-governmental organization that operated in Afghanistan and may be affiliated with Usama Bin Laden and al Qaida operations. In 1996 the detainee received a promotion and moved from Hira Institute to the LDI office in Peshawar, Pakistan. In 1997 the detainee was promoted again to the head of the Public Relations Division in Peshawar, Pakistan. After being laid off from LDI in 1999, the detainee was hired as the Director of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) Hospital in Afghanistan. WAMY is a non-governmental organization operating in Afghanistan that may be affiliated with Usama Bin Laden and al Qaida operations. According to top WAMY officials, both the United States and Israel must be destroyed. WAMY provides financial support to the Palestinians fighting against Israel. In addition, WAMY has put forward a proposal that the Palestinians should declare open war on Israel. After the 9/11 attacks, and due to the war and increased violence in the area, the detainee was told by Afghan government officials to leave Afghanistan. A 23 September 2001 copy of "The Brotherhood Letter" published by the Muslim Brotherhood Information Center was found during the capture raid in the detainee's home. Several identification documents were seized from the detainee's home at the time of the raid and his arrest, including a [sic] U.N. refugee card for his downstairs neighbor. The detainee initially claimed neither the Muslim Brotherhood newsletter nor copies of his neighbor's United Nations refugee cards reportedly found at his home were his. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) developed as a fundamentalist Islamic belief community in Egypt. Foundations of organizations under the umbrella of the Egyptian MB were in other Arab countries and started the armed fight by MB activists. They attacked what the considered to be un-Islamic representatives of the government of Egypt based on its cooperation with Russia. The MB developed into an underground organization. The detainee stated he did have copies of "The Brotherhood Letter" in his residence, as he was a former member of the Musllim Brotherhood. b. Connections/Associations The detainee met Khalid Sheikh Mohammed at the Jelazee Refugee Camp in 1987. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed operated a "cultural center" located at the camp. The center was used to prepare Afghan people who had been recruited for the jihad against the Russians. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's older brother, Zahid Al-Sheikh, was the director of the Jelazee Refugee Camp and LDI in Peshawar, Pakistan. Zahid Al-Sheikh has been identified from other sources as an extremist with terrorist ties. The detainee stated he was familiar with Shamshatoo Refugee Camp.[17] He distributed food to the camp on two occasions. The detainee stated the camp was run by Gulbidden Hekmatyar.[18] Gulbuddin Hikmatyar (variant of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar) found Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) as a faction of the Hizb-I Islami party in 1977, and it was one of the major mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. HIG has long established ties with Bin Laden. In the early 1990s, Hikmatyar ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and was a pioneer in sending mercenary fighters to other Islamic conflcts. Hikmatyar offered to shelter Bin Laden after the latter fled Sudan in 1996.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.	The detainee took a vacation to Sudan in June 2002. Before he returned to the office, detainee called his supervisor to find out about the situation of NGOs in Peshawar, Pakistan after hearing about the arrests of the [[Revival of Islamic Heritage Society workers. He was told that everything was normal, and that they needed him back at work.
b.	The detainee stated Al-Zawahiri and Usama Bin Laden were not Muslims and any acts their group perpetrated were against the Muslim faith.
c.	The detainee did not know of any connections between WAMY and al Qaida.
d.	The detainee did not like what the al Qaida stood for.
e.	The detainee believed the al Qaida/WAMY connection to be a false accusation.
f.	The detainee did not know any al Qaida individuals through relationship or just meeting.

[edit] Transcript

Guantanamo captive 940 chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.^[19]

[edit] Responses to the factors

• Captive 940 confirmed that he had joined the Muslim Brotherhood when he was a student, during the early 1980s. He confirmed he joined when all his friends joined. He stated that the Muslim Brotherhood had no program of violence when he was a member -- that their program then was a peaceful one, emphasizing participating in the electoral process.
• Captive 940 contirmed he left the Muslim Brotherhood decades ago, because he was concerned the group was starting to attract fanatics.
• Captive 940 confirmed he worked for the Hira Institute up until 1996. He said: "...I am proud of that because my students have now graduated from universities like medical school and others.
• Captive 940 confirmed that the Hira Institute was run by the Lajnat Al-Da'wa al Islamia.

  LDI is a Kuwaiti organization that falls under the Kuwait Association for Reform, which is registered with the Ministry of Social Awareness, and it is a quasi-governmental organization that represents humanitarian charity work and has projects in Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is also registered in Pakistan under the Commission for Refugee Affairs. We also got VISAs to Pakistan through this commission.

• Captive 940 denied that the LDI had any association with Osama bin Laden, or with terrorism.
• Captive 940 denied working in public relations.
• Captive 940 acknowledged being laid off by the LDI -- he attributed this to budget cutback which were an after effect of the first Gulf War's impact on Kuwait. He confirmed he was then hired to be an administrator for a hospital run by the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY). He denied any knowledge of WAMY having ever providing any ideological support for terrorism or aggression.
• Captive 940 confirmed that, after al Qaeda's attacks on the USA on September 11, 2001, the Taliban warned foreign non-governmental organizations like the WAMY that it "...would not be able to provide them with protection when the war started and that it would be best for everyone to leave Afghanistan."
• Captive 940 denied any knowledge of a September 23, 2001 "brotherhood letter", and he denied any knowledge of the Muslim Brotherhood Information Center the factor claimed published it.
• Captive 940 denied that his home contained any identity documents beyond the legitimate documents that belonged to him. He denied the allegation that he possessed his downstairs neighbor's refugee card.
• Captive 940 said the description of the Muslim Brotherhood as a violent group was at odds with his own experience of it. He repeated that when he was involved with the group it was committed to political change through the electoral process. He said that, to the best of his knowledge, other groups in Egypt were violent, like Egyptian Islamic Jihad.
• Captive 940 denied ever meeting Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, or that he had any personal relationship with him. He acknowledged seeing him from a distance.
• Captive 940 responded to the factor that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's older brother Zahid Al Sheikh was the director of the Jelazee Refugee Camp and LDI -- stating that Zahid Al Sheikh was a former manager of the LDI, but had not been the manager of the camp.
• Captive 940 responded to the allegation that Zahid Al Sheikh had been identified as an extremist by saying: "...that their relationship was purely an administrative one, but I do not think he is an extremist."
• Captive 940 confirmed he was familiar with the Shamshatu Refugee Camp. He said everyone who worked in the charity sector was familiar with it because of all the homeless refugees displaced by the Afghan-Russian war. He confirmed he did distribute food there twice.
• Captive 940 denied knowing Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, or that Gulbuddin Hekmatyar knew him.
• Captive 940 confirmed he took a vacation to Sudan in June 2002. He cited his return from his vacation as proof of his innocence.

  Yes, I traveled to Sudan in June of 2002 during a vacation from work that lasted for one month and I left my wife and daughters in Sudan for the sake of education. I returned to resume my work at the hospital in Afghanistan after calling the manager and hearing his eagerness for me to return and that is proof that I am innocent. If I had anything to do with terrorism, or if I had done anything wrong, I would not have returned from my country to Pakistan, and if I was helping the Taliban or if I had any relationship with the al Qaida organization, I would not have agreed ot return to my job at the hospital inside Afghanistan in Karzai's government. That confirms that we do humanitarian relief work that has nothing to do with governments and politics. Our goal is to help the poor of mankind and the people who have been harmed by wars and famines and natural disasters.

• Captive 940 confirmed that he had said that Osama bin Laden and his organization action were in contradiction to the teachings of Islam.
• Captive 940 confirmed that he did not know of any connection between the World Assemby of Muslim Youth and al Qaeda.
• Captive 940 confirmed that he did like what al Qaeda stood for.
• Captive 940 confirmed that he did not know any members of al Qaida.

[edit] Enemy Combatant election form

When Tribunal transcripts record the Assisting Military Officer reporting on the contents of his Enemy Combatant election form it almost always was read before the factors for and against continued detention were reported on first. However, Captive 940's transcript records the reading the form after the reading of the factors.

Captive 940 Assisting Military Officer said they met on August 1, 2005 for 155 minutes, and on August 3, 2005 for 100 minutes. The Assisting Military Officer described Captive 940 as polite throughout both interviews.

[edit] Opening Statement

The captive's opening statement usually preceded the dialogue over the factors. But Captive 940's transcript records that he was only invited to give his opening statement following the dialogue over the factors.

The transcript records captive 940 making two opening statments.

I implore your board to take my case into consideration, for I have been punished in prison for three years without committing a crime and I have lost my noble job through which I earned a living. I have been taken away from my wife and my family and I do not know what their fate is until now. I have lost my young daughter (Shifaa), who died of disease because of my separation from her and my family's inability to provide her with medicine in my absence. I have suffered psychologically from imprisonment as well as health-wise. I ask our (sic) Excellencies to unbind my chains and return me to my job, to live with my family and to earn a legal earning, and to live far away from politics. I will not affiliate with any party or political or jihadist organization. I promise you that. I will not assist any organization in any terrorist acts against the United States of America or its allies. Finally, I give to you all respect.

During his second opening statement captive 940 described his capture on July 17, 2002, the night after his first day back at work following his vacation.

When I returned and resumed my job in the first day I returned home and after dinner I went to sleep. At 1:30 AM a few men burst in on me armed [with weapons] they came in and raided the house. I woke up scared and disturbed as if I was in a nightmare. I asked them, "What do you want?" I couldn't believe myself. They told me, "Don't talk!" They put chains on my hands and they asked me, "Where is your passport?" I had it in my shirt pocket and I told them, "It's in my shirt pocket." So they took it. When they saw the passport, they saw that I had an extended VISA for two years. The Pakistanis told them to ask the American man, who was with them, "Should we take this man? He lives here officially." He said, "Yes, take him." They asked him another time; he said to them, "Yes, take him."

Captive said he was held in a Pakistani jail, for approximately six months, where his body weight dropped from 90 kilograms to 60 kilograms.

Captive 940 then described spending approximately two months in the Bagram Theater detention facility. Captive 940's detention in Bagram would have been shortly after two captives were beaten to death. Captive 940 described being abused in Bagram.

• He said he was beaten.

• He said he was humiliated by being stripped naked, and then mocked.

• He said he was made to stand for three days, without sleeping -- part of the treatment the GIs at Bagram meted out to the two captives they beat to death.

• He said that dogs were allowed to bite his clothes.

The instructions for every OARDEC officers was that they had to record every allegation of abuse captives offered, for later inquiry. Some of the transcript where captives reports abuse contain a record of the officers telling the captive that they were making note of the abuse, for a later inquiry. But captive 940's transcript does not record any note being made of his reports.

[edit] Response to Board questioning

• Captive 940 reported that he joined the Muslim Brotherhood when he was in hgh school.
• Captive 940 confirmed that he was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood when Anwar Sadat was assassinated. He said he knew nothing about the assassination and expressed skepticism that the Muslim Brotherhood was involved.
• Captive 940 confirmed that he had worked under Zahid Al Sheikh, recently after he was hired by LDI, and Zahid Al Sheikh was still one of the directors of LDI. Zahid Al Sheikh was then the General Manager, while he was then just a teacher.

Board Member:	Did you know of any leaders of the organization that were in favor of the United States and Israel being destroyed?
Captive 940:	No, I don't know anything about that. On the contrary when we were with that organization we had a relationship with the WHO (World Health Organization) and WFP. WHO would give us a package of medicine every year. We had an agreement with them. Every year they would provide us with medicine and WFP (World Food Program). They would give us food and we would distribute food at United Nations camps and we had a relationship with them and worked with them in relief work. The policy of our office would allow for that.
Board Member:	The workers for the WHO and WFP, were they Americans?
Captive 940:	Yes, yes World Food Program is American. World Health Organization is an American government organization. Even the United Nations were American and we'd go there to their camps and distribute food and cooperate with them.
Board Member:	Did you know of any connection between any of the organization that you worked for and terrorist organization?
Captive 940:	No, no nothing. We did not have any relationship at that time with anybody with al Qaida and we never approved of what al Qaida was doing or what was going on.

• Captive 940 acknowledged that he had a higher opinion of Americans before he was apprehended and held for three years, without charge.
• Captive 940 was asked whether the Taliban allowed him free access to the refugee camps. He said that all the camps he had worked at were on the Pakistani side of the Afghan-Pakistan border. He acknowledged that the year he spent as a hospital administrator was during the Taliban regime. But he said he did not agree at all with the Taliban agenda.
• Captive 940 was asked whether, if he were released to Sudan he would encourage his friends to join a jihad against America. He replied by reminding his Board he had never participated in jihad in the first place. He asserted that he never had any jihadist thought in his mind.
• Captive 940 confirmed that his college-age daughter was studying Science, in Ordurman Sudan.
• In response to a question about what Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's cultural center at the Jelazee Refugee Camp was like, he replied:

  I never visited the cultural center. I never went inside, but I did know from my students...I knew they had many cultural activities the students had to attend lectures and they were taught about religion and religious studies. In order when they would fight against the Russians...join the jihad against the Russians. I do know that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed supported jihad against the Russians.

• When asked if he knew why he was initially arrested, captive 940 replied he did not know.

Presiding Officer:	Why do you think the [sic] came to your house to arrest you?
Captive 940:	Until now I really don't know. If I knew I would have never returned there from Sudan. I really don't know.
Presiding Officer:	Mr. Hussein, you've done much good work...much charitable work over the years. Many of the organizations that you've been part of have an extremist part of them.
Captive 940:	What do you mean extremist?
Presiding Officer:	Some of the teachings of these organizations say it is good to kill Americans. The WAMY leaders have said it is good to kill Americans. You have been associated with these groups for many years.
Captive 940:	Only three years I worked for WAMY. Of course, I have nothing to do with the leaders of the organization. Why wouldn't you arrest the leaders of the organization? Why arrest a low level employee like myself?
Presiding Officer:	How do you feel about these thoughts?
Captive 940:	These are not good thoughts. I really don't think anyone would say something like that...a rational human being would not say anything like that.

• Captive 940's Presiding Officer congratulated him on being allowed to wear a white uniform -- the color the most compliant captives were allowed to wear.
• When asked what he would like to do if he were released to Sudan, he confirmed he would like to return to Sudan, to rebound with his family. He added:

Right now I just have plans to stay in my country, with my family, but if there was an organization that did good deeds, that did not have any ties to terrorism or any bad actions or a job that was available in another country then maybe...I'm just looking for an honest and noble source of income so I can support my family.

[edit] Recommendations

The recommendations of this Board, to Gordon England, the Designated Civilian Official, were made public on September 4, 2007.^[20][21] The recommendations were so heavily redacted that it is not possible to determine what the Board recommended. But the Department of Defense only made public the recommendations of captives who the Designated Civilian Official had cleared for release or transfer from Guantanamo.

[edit] Representing Adel: The Case of Guantanamo Detainee 940

William Teesdale, a Portland, Oregon public defender, who is part of a team defending several Guantanamo captives, wrote a description of his team's work representing Adel.^[22] He wrote:

"Then, in May, 2005, the Government produced the factual return, as ordered by the District Court. We learned something stunning. There was a dissenting voice on the military CSRT panel that declared Adel an Enemy Combatant. An army major, whose name is classified, had the courage to file a dissenting report calling the result in Adel’s case 'unconscionable.'"

Teesdale described traveling to Afghanistan, and searching for witnesses who could prove Adel's innocence.^[22] Teesdale wrote:

"All of the information gathered in this investigation was filed with the court in Mr. Hamad’s case in the form of a motion for summary judgment. On October 17th, 2006 President Bush signed the Military Commissions Act, which attempts to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear Guantanamo detainee habeas cases. All of our cases are presently stayed pending resolution of this issue."

[edit] Habeas corpus

Wikisource has original text related to this article:

Unclassified Summary of basis for dissenting decision (ISN 940 Adel Hassan Hamad)

Wikisource has original text related to this article:

Legal sufficiency review of Combatant Status Review Tribunal for Detainee ISN 940 (2005-01-25)

Wikisource has original text related to this article:

Legal sufficiency review of Combatant Status Review Tribunal for Detainee ISN 940 (2005-02-05)

On October 5, 2007 the lawyers for Adel Hassan Hamad filed an affidavit from an officer who had served with OARDEC who had criticisms of the process.^[23] The officer, an Army reservist whose name was redacted, was a prosecutor in civilian life. He wrote of the Tribunals: ``"training was minimal" -and- ``"the process was not well defined". The officer had sat on 49 Tribunals.

CBS News reports that the unnamed officer is a Major, who participated in meetings with the admiral in charge of OARDEC to discuss six instances where Tribunals that had determined captives were innocent had those determinations reversed by extraordinary second Tribunals.^[24] CBS News speculated that the Army major was the Tribunal member who recorded a minority opinion in Adel Hassan Hamad's case, calling his detention "unconscionable" because it was not based on sufficient evidence.

The Army major has described "acrimony" at a meeting convened to discuss why some Tribunals determined Uyghur captives in Guantanamo were not enemy combatants, when other Tribunals determined they were, even though the Uyghurs cases were so similar.^[24]

James R. Crisfield, the Legal Advisor who reviewed Tribunal determinations for "legal sufficiency" commented on the reasoning of the "dissenting Tribunal member":

The dissenting tribunal member also opined that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the detainee was part of or supporting al Qaeda forces engaged in hostilities against the U.S. or its coalition partners. In analyzing whether there was sufficient evidence to support a Tribunal's decision I have customarily used the test of whether there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable finder of fact to have found the detainee was an enemy combatant by a preponderance of the evidence. Given the low evidentiary hurdle posed by a preponderance of the evidence standard^[25] and the rebuttable presumption of genuiness and accuracy that attaches to the Government evidence, I believe that that the test is satisfied in this case. That is to say that reasonable finders of face could determine that this detainee meets the definition of "enemy combatant" based on the evidence presented.

[edit] Release

He and fellow Sudanese Salim Mahmud Adam were repatriated on December 13, 2007.^[26] InFocus, a Muslim newspaper in California, extensively quoted from him, after his release:

"When the [US] war started in Afghanistan, all foreigners left [for] Pakistan." "I only wanted to help refugees in Afghanistan and Pakistan." "I was woken up by Pakistani intelligence officers who told me not to move and asked for my papers." "We were taken in a cargo plane, tied to the floor. It took nearly 20 hours to get there." "They accused me of helping Taliban and al-Qaeda. I asked how so? They said that was secret information. I was accused of being an enemy combatant but I never carried weapons."

[edit] Lawsuit

On May 14, 2008 the Daily Times of Pakistan reported that "Salim Mahmud Adam" and "Adel Hasan Hamad" had announced plans to sue the USA over their detention.^[27] The article reports that he told the Daily Times that his 2004 Combatant Status Review Tribunal had cleared him of the allegation that he was an "enemy combatant".

[edit] References

1. ^ ^{a b} OARDEC (May 15, 2006). List of Individuals Detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from January 2002 through May 15, 2006. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
2. ^ OARDEC (19 November 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Hamed, Adel Hassan page 69. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-10-09.
3. ^ OARDEC (April 20, 2006). List of detainee who went through complete CSRT process. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
4. ^ OARDEC (July 17, 2007). Index for Combatant Status Review Board unclassified summaries of evidence. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
5. ^ OARDEC (September 4, 2007). Index for testimony. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
6. ^ OARDEC (August 8, 2007). Index for CSRT Records Publicly Files in Guantanamo Detainee Cases. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
7. ^ OARDEC (August 9, 2007). Index to Summaries of Detention-Release Factors for ARB Round One. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
8. ^ OARDEC (August 9, 2007). Index of Transcripts and Certain Documents from ARB Round One. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
9. ^ OARDEC (July 17, 2007). Index to Transfer and Release Decision for Guantanamo Detainees. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
10. ^ Inside the Guantánamo Bay hearings: Barbarian "Justice" dispensed by KGB-style "military tribunals", Financial Times, December 11, 2004
11. ^ Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials. United States Department of Defense (March 6, 2007). Retrieved on 2007-09-22.
12. ^ OARDEC (19 November 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal - Hamed, Adel Hassan page 69. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-02-26.
13. ^ OARDEC (date redacted). Summarized Statement pages 37-43. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-03-26.
14. ^ "US releases Guantanamo files", The Age, April 4, 2006. Retrieved on 2008-03-15. 
15. ^ Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office, Friday March 10, 2006, pp. pg 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-10. 
16. ^ OARDEC (28 June 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Adel Hussein, Hassan pages 56-58. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-10-09.
17. ^ The camp was spelled "Shamshani" in the transcript from his hearing.
18. ^ The militia leader's name was spelled "Gulduddin Hekmatyar" in his hearing transcript.
19. ^ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Adel Hassan Hamad's Administrative Review Board hearing - page 244-260
20. ^ OARDEC (November 10, 2005). Administrative Review Board assessment and recommendation for ICO ISN 940 page 43. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-10-09.
21. ^ OARDEC (August 4, 2005). Classified Record of Proceedings and basis for Administrative Review Board decision for ISN 940 pages 44-49. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-10-09.
22. ^ ^{a b} William Teesdale. "Representing Adel: The Case of Guantanamo Detainee 940", The Jurist, January 11, 2007. Retrieved on February 5. 
23. ^ Ben Fox. "Second Army Officer Faults Gitmo Panels", The Guardian, Saturday October 6, 2007. Retrieved on 2007-10-08. 
24. ^ ^{a b} "Freed Gitmo Detainee Tells Of Desecration", CBS News, October 6, 2007. 
25. ^ The preponderance of the evidence standard my be simply stated as "more likely than not."
26. ^ Ismail Kamal Kushkush. "Two men speak of their lost years at Gitmo", Southern California InFocus, March 2008. Retrieved on 2008-03-26. 
27. ^ Akhtar Amin. "Two ex-Guantanamo detainees to sue US", Daily Times (Pakistan), Wednesday, May 14, 2008. Retrieved on 2008-05-13. "In 2004, Hamad and Adam said they appeared before a Combatant Status Review Tribunal that cleared them of charges of being enemy combatants. However, it was not until September 2007 that a military court finally cleared them of charges of posing a threat to the United States." 

[edit] External links

• projecthamad.org -The story of Adel Hamad with an emphasis on the Habeas Corpus
• Guantanamo Unclassified - Hamad's Lawyer's video featuring interviews with Adel Hamad's co-workers (youtube)