Abdul Al Salam Al Hilal

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Abdul Al Salam Al Hilal is a citizen of Yemen, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detainment camps, in Cuba.^[1] Al Hilal Guantanamo detainee ID number is 1463. The Department of Defense lists his place of birth as unknown and his date of birth as January 30, 1968.

[edit] CIA detention

Al-Hila was captured, in Cairo, on September 19, 2002, while on a business trip.^[2] John Sifton, of Human Rights Watch, says that Al-Hila disappeared, for eighteen months, before surfacing in American detention in the US naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.^[3]

Since his arrival in Guantanamo Bay he is one of the approximately 200 detainees who has had a writ of habeas corpus filed on his behalf. In recently declassified discussions with his lawyer Al-Hila says that after his capture he was sent to Baku Azerbajan for two months, and then spent 16 months in secret bases in Afghanistan, including "the dark prison".^[4]

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor.^[5][6] Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.^[7]

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Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

Al Hilal chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.^[8]

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Abd Al Salam Al Hilah's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 9 November 2004.^[9][10] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a The detainee is a member of al Qaida.

1. The detainee is a member of al Qaida.
2. The detainee assisted member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad through facilitation of movement out of Yemen and by obtaining them passports.
3. The Egyptian Islamic Jihad is a terrorist organization associated with al Qaida.
4. The detainee assisted members of the Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya,
5. The Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya is a designated foreign terrorist organization associated with al Qaida.
6. The detainee provided false passports to associates of Usama Bin Laden.
7. The detainee is associated with a convicted terrorist and visited him in prison.
8. The detainee has had meetings with representatives of al Haramayn.
9. The detainee arranged the release of imprisoned al Qaida members.

b The detainee supported military operations against the United States and its coalition partners.

1. The detainee’s brother was extremely close to those who conducted the terrorist attack on the U.S.S. Cole.
2. The detainee possessed detailed knowledge of a planned terrorist attack on a U.S. embassy.
3. The detainee possessed detailed knowledge of a terrorist attack against a western oil company.

[edit] Opening dialogue

Al Hilal expressed confusion and distress that he was not going to be allowed the assistance of a civilian lawyer and that his case would depend on secret allegations and secret evidence, that would be withheld from him. He concluded: "I respect the Tribunal but the way it is formed is unjust."

The Tribunal's President said they would note his concerns for the record.

[edit] Testimony

In response to the allegations presented to his Tribunal:

• Al Hilal denied being a member of al Qaida. He assured his Tribunal that everyone in Guantanamo knew he was not a member of al Qaida.
• Al Hilal denied ever assisting any members of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, or any members of Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya. He asked to see the evidence that he had done so, so he could refute it.
• Al Hilal denied providing passports to associates of Osama bin Laden. He denied knowing any associates of Osama bin Laden.
• Al Hilal denied visiting anyone in prison. He denied knowing anyone in prison.
• Al Hilal denied any knowledge of the Al Haramain organization.
• Al Hilal repeated that he didn't know anybody who was a member of al Qaeda. And he questioned how he would have been able to arrange anyone's release from prison, since he was just a private individual, not a sovereign government.
• Al Hilal denied any participation in military operations.
• Al Hilal asked whether his brother was involved in attacking the USS Cole that should then become his responsibility. Al Hilal said:

"If my brother knew these USS Cole bombers when he was a young person, he went to fight in Bosnia; without any of my family’s approval when he was a very young man.^[11] Maybe he knew these guys in Bosnia. Then he came back to Yemen and stayed there for a while. Then went back to Bosnia to live there.^[12] That again was without our approval as well. We don’t what happened ^[sic] until he got arrested and was jailed. He was in six years ^[sic] . He was in prison from 1997^[13] up until the time I got jailed in the year 2002, my brother was still in jail. The meaning of that is that all connections between him and all the people was broken. How can he have any knowledge of all these acts, and the attacks took place ^[sic] in 2001?"

• Al Hilal denied any knowledge on plans to attack any U.S. embassy or any western oil company.

Following the completion of the portion of the session where Al Hilal was asked to respond to the allegations against him, he asked if he could go on.

Al Hilal referred to the definition of "enemy combatant" that had been in the documents he was given prior to his Tribunal -- where it said an enemy combatant was anyone who had aided al Qaida. He repeated he didn't know anyone in Al Qaeda. He said he was a businessman. He denied any prior animosity to America. He said he hated fighting. He said his religion forbid terrorism. He said his country did not support terrorism.

Al Hilal said that, as a businessman 80% of his business depended on International contracts. He asked how many of his foreign business associates would be interested in doing business with him if his country was tied to terrorism?

Al Hilal said that he suspected his capture was due to the CIA's practice of paying excessive amounts for information. Informants had an incentive to make up the kind of information they knew the CIA was searching for, with the result that innocent men, like himself, ended up being captured.

Al Hilal spoke of his family, how much they needed him, and he needed them.

Following the completion of his statement his Personal Representative asked Al Hilal: "I would just like to remind you that you had made a statement earlier when discussing with me, that you were a facilitator for the Yemeni Government?"

This question seemed to trigger distress and confusion in Al Hilal. He said he thought his Personal Representative was supposed to be on his side, so why was he asking him questions like he was an interrogator. Although the Tribunal's President said while she didn't know how the question sounded once translated, in English it didn't sound negative. While Al Hilal said he was still willing to answer specific questions, the Tribunal didn't ask him any, and merely dismissed him and went straight to the closed session.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".^[14]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Abdul Al Hella's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 24 August 2006.^[15] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

a. Commitment

1. The detainee said he was selected to join the Yemeni Political Security Organization in the mid nineties.
2. The detainee said he participated in a Yemeni government deportation operation from approximately 1995 to 1999.
3. The detainee said that he traveled to Germany three times each year since 1996, to procure passports. On each trip the detainee received new and used Portugese passports.
4. The detainee said he was forced to use the cover of deportation to facilitate the transfer of Yemeni extremists to Pakistan and Afghanistan. These deportees were to deploy with al Qaida networks to received training and to prepare for onward assignments.
5. According to a foreign government service, the detainee was responsible for confiscation of Libyan and Algerian student's passports. These passports were give to people whom the Yemeni Political Security wanted to send to Europe from Yemen.
6. Yemeni security authorities arrested a known terrorist facilitator for counterfeiting documents and passports for the Mujahedin in Yemen. The detainee arranged to cancel the deportation of the known terrorist facilitator living in Yemen who was arrested. The detainee also provided the terrorist facilitator a forged Iraqi passport.
7. The detainee said the Yemeni government assigned him to track key members of Aden Abyan Islamic Army and befriend these individuals.
8. The Aden Abyan Islamic Army, emerged publicly in mid-1998 when the group released a series of communications that expressed support for Usama bin Laden and appealed for the overthrow of the Yemeni Government and operations against United States and other Western interests in Yemen.

b. Connections/Associations

1. According to a foreign government service, the detainee met with the director of the Nongovernmental Organization al Haramayn in Zeneca, Bosnia sometime during 3 to 13 July 1999.
2. The al Haramayn Foundation is under sanction by United States Executive Order 13224 blocking property and prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit or support terrorism.
3. The detainee said that he discussed a plan that an acquaintance had developed to attack the British and American Embassies.
4. The detainee said that in April or May 2002, the detainee and the Deputy Chief of the Yemeni Political Service Organization, were paid by the prisoners' family members to release extremists held in Yemeni prisons.
5. According to a Yemeni newspaper, the detainee persuaded an individual to confess the charges against the individual relating to the British Embassy Bombing on 13 October 2000 in Sanaa Yemen. The detainee assured the individual that he would not stay in prison more than six months. The individual said he succumbed because he was with the group and did not want to be branded a coward.
6. The detainee traveled to Italy to participate in the activities of the annual Milan Islamic Cultural Institute summer camp conference.
7. The Islamic Cultural Institute was shut down by Italian authorities for housing the Sami Essid Ben Khemais Network, which is the core for the Tunisian Combat Group ^[sic] in Italy.
8. Sami Essid Ben Khemain is under sanction by United States Executive Orde 13224 blocking property and prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit or support terrorism.
9. The Tunisian Combatant Group ^[sic] , also known as the Jamaa Combattante Tunisienne, reportedly is seeking to establish and Islamic regime in Tunisia and targets United States and western interests. Tunisians associated with the Tunisian Combatant Group ^[sic] are part of the support network of the broader international Jihadist movement. According to European press reports, Tunisian Combatant Group members or affiliates in the past have engaged in trafficking falsified documents and recruiting for terror training camps in Afghanistan. Some Tunisian Combatant Group associates are suspected of planning an attack against the United States', Algerian, and Tunisian diplomatic missions in Rome in January 2001. Some members reportedly maintain ties to the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat.
10. The detainee met with the alleged chief of the Egyptian Network, during the summer of 2000 when the Islamic Institute in Milan, Italy organized a camp for Islamic fundamentalists. Wire taps by Italian Police link the alleged Milan al Qaida cell to the 11 September 2001 massacres in the United States. During the wiretaps the detainee said: "Well, I am studying airplanes! It it is God's will, I hope to bring you a window or a piece of a plane next time I see you... We are focussing on the air alone... It is something terrifying, something that moves from south to north and from east to west: the man who devised hte program is a lunatic, but he is a genius. It will leave them stunned... we can fight any force using candles and planes. They will not be able to halt us, not even with their heaviest weapons. We just have to strike at them, and hold our heads high. Remember, the danger at the airports. If it comes off, it will be reported in all the world's papers. The Americans have come into Europe to weaken us, but our target is now the sky."

c. Other Relevant Data

1. A foreign government reported that the detainee was an al Qaida member who traveled to Afghanistan prior to November 2001.
2. The detainee visited a Yemeni prisoner in July 1999 while in Bosnia.
3. The detainee's brother is serving a six year prison term in Bosnia for involvement in a 1997 car bombing in Mostar, Bosnia.
4. A source reported that the detainee's brother had been extremely close to the USS Cole bomber and the failed USS Sullivans bomber.

a.	The detainee said that he did not work for the Yemeni Political Security Organization.
b.	The detainee said that Italian newspaper article reporting he had foreknowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks in August 2000 was false because the article stated he traveled to Italy using his diplomatic passport. The detainee said that he never traveled anywhere in Europe using his diplomatic passport.
c.	The detainee said that he had no prior knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks and had no desire to participate in or plan any terrorist activity because one day he may be the victim.
d.	The detainee said that he never participated in any terrorist action and had nothing but loathing for terrorism as a whole.
e.	The detainee said that he never acted in any capacity as a travel facilitator for al Qaida or the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.

[edit] See also

• black site
• detainees in CIA custody
• List of Guantanamo Bay detainees

[edit] References

1. ^ OARDEC (May 15, 2006). List of Individuals Detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from January 2002 through May 15, 2006. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
2. ^ Al-Hila: Another 'ghost prisoner' rendered, Al Jazeera
3. ^ Cairo to Kabul to Guantanamo, Human Rights Watch
4. ^ U.S. Operated Secret 'Dark Prison' in Kabul, Reuters, December 19, 2005
5. ^ Guantánamo Prisoners Getting Their Day, but Hardly in Court, New York Times, November 11, 2004 - mirror
6. ^ Inside the Guantánamo Bay hearings: Barbarian "Justice" dispensed by KGB-style "military tribunals", Financial Times, December 11, 2004
7. ^ Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials. United States Department of Defense (March 6, 2007). Retrieved on 2007-09-22.
8. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Abdul Al Salam Al Hilal's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 19-26
9. ^ OARDEC (9 November 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Al Hilah, Abd Al Salam pages 20-21. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-01-05.
10. ^ OARDEC (9 November 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Al Hilah, Abd Al Salam pages 71-72. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-01-05.
11. ^ This would have been prior to Bosnia winning its independence from Yugoslavia in 1995.
12. ^ Following independence Bosnia offered citizenship to any foreigner who had fought on its behalf.
13. ^ The US embassy bombings in Africa were in 1998. The US Cole bombing in late 2000.
14. ^ Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office, Friday March 10, 2006, pp. pg 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-10. 
15. ^ OARDEC (24 August 2006). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Hella, Abdul pages 88-91. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-01-05.