Rogers Plan

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Rogers Plan (1969)

The Rogers Plan was a framework proposed by United States Secretary of State William P. Rogers to achieve an end to belligerence in the Arab-Israeli conflict following the Six-Day War. Originally proposed in a December 9, 1969 speech at an Adult Education conference,^[1] the plan was formally announced on 19 June 1970.^[2]

The December 1969 speech followed the failure of the Jarring Mission to negotiate an implementation plan for UN Security Council Resolution 242 among the principals in the Six-Day War. Both Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and Israeli Ambassador to the United States Yitzhak Rabin had conferred with U.S. President Richard Nixon in the last few months of 1969, but Rogers' speech was viewed as a surprise^{[citation needed]}.

Allison Astorino-Courtios writes: "According to the plan, a ninety-day cease-fire would allow for clearing the Suez Canal of ships stuck there since the 1967 war. In addition, Israel, Egypt, and Jordan were to meet to discuss implementation of UN Resolution 242 which calls for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967 and mutual recognition of each state's sovereignty and independence." ^[3]

The plan was formally accepted by both Egypt and Jordan in July 1970 ^[4], with the full support of the Soviet Union ^[5].

1 The War of Attrition
2 References
3 Notes
4 External links

[edit] The War of Attrition

The Israeli response was in context of concurrent military events. While Secretary Rogers pursued his peace plan, Pres. Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, with the assistance of three brigades of Soviet troops, rapidly escalated the War of Attrition against Israeli forces at the Suez Canal in an attempt to inflict maximum casualties on Israeli forces.

According to the August 7, 1970, "in place" cease-fire agreement, both sides were required not to change "the military status quo within zones extending 50 kilometers to the east and west of the cease-fire line." However, Egypt immediately moved anti-aircraft batteries into the zone. By October there were about 100 SAM sites in the zone, and Rogers made no diplomatic effort to secure their removal, setting in motion the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

For this reason, Secretary Rogers had little credibility in Israel. The Israeli interpretation of his plan was that it required Israel to withdraw from areas captured during the Six-Day War without any assurances of a lasting peace from Arab states. As a result, the Israeli government determined that support of the plan would be "irresponsible," and refused overtures from Egypt to enter into discussions aimed at settlement of the conflict called for by the plan.^[6] The Rogers peace plan finally failed due to lack of support from Israel (though an intital decision to accept it had resulted in the right-wing Gahal party leaving Golda Meir's government in August 1970). No breakthrough occurred even after President Sadat in 1972 surprised everyone by suddenly expelling Soviet advisers from Egypt and again signaled to Washington his willingness to negotiate.^[7]

[edit] References

Allison Astorino-Courtois (1998). "Clarifying Decisions: Assessing the Impact of Decision Structures on Foreign Policy Choices During the 1970 Jordanian Civil War". International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 42, pp. 733-753.
Jerome Slater (1991). "The Superpowers and an Arab-Israeli Political Settlement: The Cold War Years". Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 105, No. 4, pp. 557-577.