Mani Shaman Turki al-Habardi Al-Utaybi
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| Mani Shaman Turki al-Habardi Al-Utaybi | |
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| Born: | May 16, 1981 Al Qarara, Saudi Arabia |
| Died | June 10, 2006 Guantanamo |
| Detained at: | Guantanamo |
| ID number: | 588 |
| Conviction(s): | no charge, held in extrajudicial detention |
| Status | Died in custody, Bush Presidency claims of suicide. |
Mani Shaman Turki al-Habardi Al-Utaybi (May 16, 1981 – June 10, 2006) was a citizen of Saudi Arabia, who was held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detainment camps, in Cuba.[1][2] Al-Utaybi's Guantanamo ID number is 588.[3] The Department of Defense estimates he was born in 1976, in Al Qarara, Saudi Arabia.
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[edit] Timeline
On June 10, 2006 the Department of Defense reported that three Guantanamo detainees, two Saudis, and one Yemeni committed suicide.[4] DoD spokesmen refrained from releasing the dead men's identities.
On June 11, 2006 Saudi authorities released the names of the two Saudi men.[1] Some reports identified one of the dead Saudis as Maniy bin Shaman al-Otaibi. Other reports identified that man as Mani bin Shaman bin Turki al Habradi.[5]
On June 16, 2006 the Miami Herald reported that Al-Utaybi had been issued ID number 588, and had been identified in earlier documents as Mazi Salih al Harbi.[6] On the two official lists of detainee's names, published on April 20, 2006 and May 15, 2006, detainee 588 is named Mana Shaman Allabardi Al Tabi.[7][3]
[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal
Initially the Bush Presidency asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.
Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush Presidency's definition of an enemy combatant.
[edit] Summary of Evidence memo
A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Mana Shaman Allabardi Al Tabi's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 7 October 2004.[10] The memo listed the following allegations against him:
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- The detainee is associated with al Qaida:
- The detainee is a member of Jamaat al-Tabligh [sic] (JAT).
- JAT, a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization is being used as a cover to mask travel and other activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.
- The detainee was arrested with a stolen passport.
- The detainee was arrested wearing women's clothing in order to get around Pakistani checkpoints.
- The detainee's family and friends reportedly stated he was traveling to Afghanistan.
- The detainee was drafted by the Saudi Arabian military and went Absent Without Leave.
- The detainee met with suspicious individuals prior to traveling to Bahrain on 25 August 2001.
- The detainee was identified at the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan when the identifier was fleeing Afghanistan following the fall of Kabul.
- The detainee is associated with al Qaida:
[edit] Transcript
There is no record that Mana Shaman Allabardi Al Tabi participated in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.
[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing
Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".
They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.
[edit] Summary of Evidence memo
A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Mana Shaman Allabardi Al Tabi's Administrative Review Board, on 18 July 2005.[12] The memo listed eleven factors favoring his continued detention, and three factors favoring his release or transfer.
[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:
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- a. Commitment
- According to a foreign government service, during his teenage years the detainee was involved in criminal activity to include armed robberies of a private residence and a bank.
- Detainee entered the Saudi Arabian Army, and worked as a driver for three months. Detainee was released because the physical training was too intense.
- According to a foreign government service, the detainee went absent without leave from the military.
- Detainee went to a Jami'at al-Tabligh [sic] missionary school in Qatar to perform 40 days of missionary work. While there, he met Hamad Al-Ali, an emirati, who convinced the detainee to travel to Pakistan to do a five-month mission there.
- Detainee's travel from Abu Dhabi to Karachi, Pakistan was paid for and facilitated by the Tabligh.
- Jama'at Al-Tabligh [sic] is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization believed to be used as a cover for action by Islamic extremists, including members of al Qaida.
- Detainee used a false passport and donned women's clothing in order to circumvent the Pakistani checkpoints.
- b. Connections/Associations
- One of the individuals the detainee was arrested with was named Ibrahim Bin Shakaran.
- Ibrahim Bin Shakran trained at the al Farouk training camp and fought on the Taliban front lines.
- c. Other Relevant Data
- Detainee was alleged to have met with suspicious individuals (NFI) and disappeared from Saudi Arabia, traveling to Bahrain on 25 August 2001.
- Detainee has repeatedly harassed and assaulted Guantanamo military police (spitting, throwing plates, water, rocks, and toilet water; slapping a plate of food; and pulling an MP's arms through the bean hold (food slot).
- a. Commitment
[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
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a. Detainee denied having ever been involved with any terrorist organization. b. Detainee hopes someday to become an Imam, get married and have a family. c. Detainee wants to return to Saudi Arabia and continue schooling and religious education.
[edit] Transcript
There is no record that Mana Shaman Allabardi Al Tabi chose to participate in his Board hearing.
[edit] Board recommendations
In early September 2007 the Department of Defense released two heavily redacted memos, from his Board, to Gordon England, the Designated Civilian Official.[13][14] The Board's recommendation was unanimous. The Board's recommendation as to whether he should be released or transferred was redacted. The Board's conclusion that he continued to pose a threat to the USA was not redacted.
The Board relied on intelligence assessments from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs, the FBI, the CIA, and the State Department.[14]
The Washington Post reported that Al Utaybi had been recommended for transfer to another country. [15][16] The DoD did not state to which country he would have been transferred. But they said he would have been held in detention there.
The Washington Post reported: "Lieutenant Commander. Robert Durand, a spokesman for the Guantanamo detention center, said he did not know whether al-Utaybi had been informed about the transfer recommendation before he killed himself."[17]
On June 13, 2006 various sources quoted human rights lawyer Mark Denbeaux, one of the principal authors of the first Denbeaux study, saying Al Utaybi had not been informed he had been recommended for transfer.[18]
[edit] Legal representation
The DoD had initially informed the press that none of the three men who killed themselves had legal representation, or had filed habeas applications. [19] Jeff Davis, one of the lawyers who volunteered to be part of Al Utaybi's legal team, said their efforts had been "thwarted at every turn".
Davis said the legal team had filed a writ of habeas corpus on Al Utaybi's behalf in September 2005.[19] He said that the DoD claimed their write was invalid because they had spelled his name wrong. He said that the DoD had thrown up roadblocks in granting them the security clearances necessary to visit Al Utaybi, so they had never visited him. Davis said that the DoD would not deliver their mail to Al Utaybi.
On March 27, 2005 Lieutenant Wade M. Brown submitted an affidavit that stated that[20]:
"Detainees cannot lose mail privileges for any reason, including as part of disciplinary action or interrogation."
[edit] Missing organs
The Department of Defense returned the dead men's bodies in mid-June, after al-Utaybi's family openly questioned the claims he'd committed suicide and requested his body for a second autopsy.[21] Utaybi's family reported that the Saudi post-mortem had found that the DoD had retained his brain, heart, liver and kidneys.[22]
[edit] References
- ^ a b Riydadh names Guantanamo suicide victims, wants bodies, Daily News & Analysis, June 11, 2006
- ^ Sergeant Sara Wood. "DoD Identifies Guantanamo Detainee Suicides", American Forces Press Service, June 12, 2006.
- ^ a b list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
- ^ Three Guantanamo detainees die in suicides, Reuters, June 10, 2006
- ^ Saudis allege torture in Guantanamo deaths, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, June 11, 2006
- ^ Guantanamo detainees unaware of defense lawyers, Miami Herald, June 16, 2006
- ^ list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, April 20, 2006
- ^ Inside the Guantánamo Bay hearings: Barbarian "Justice" dispensed by KGB-style "military tribunals", Financial Times, December 11, 2004
- ^ Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials. United States Department of Defense (March 6, 2007). Retrieved on 2007-09-22.
- ^ OARDEC (07 October 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Al Tabi, Mana Shaman Allabardi page 6. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-11-06.
- ^ Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office, Friday March 10, 2006, pp. pg 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-10.
- ^ OARDEC (18 July 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Tabi, Mana Shaman Allabardi pages 55-56. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-11-06.
- ^ OARDEC (August 16, 2005). Administrative Review Board assessment and recommendation ICO ISN 588 pages 56-57. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-11-22.
- ^ a b OARDEC (29 July 2005). Classified Record of Proceedings and basis of Administrative Review Board recommendation for ISN 588 58-63. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-11-22.
- ^ DOD Identifies 3 Guantanamo Suicides, Washington Post, June 11, 2006
- ^ Guantanamo inmate was to be moved, Al Jazeera, June 12, 2006
- ^ DOD Identifies 3 Guantanamo Suicides, Washington Post, June 11, 2006
- ^ Guantanamo inmate killed himself 'unaware he was due to be freed', The Scotsman, June 13, 2006
- ^ a b Lawyers say defense of Guantanamo suicide victim was thwarted, Mainichi Daily News, June 13, 2006
- ^ Wade M. Brown. "Declaration of 1LT Wade M. Brown", Joint Task Force Guantanamo, March 25, 2005, pp. pages 77-78. Retrieved on 2008-06-12.
- ^ Family of Guantanamo Inmate Doubts Suicide - Kavkazcenter.com
- ^ Vital organs missing from repatriated body: family, Gulf News, June 21, 2006
