Fictionalism
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Fictionalism is a methodological theory in philosophy that suggests that statements of a certain sort should not be taken to be literally true, but merely a useful fiction. Two important strands of fictionalism are modal fictionalism (which states that facts about what might have been the case or what must necessarily be the case are merely fictions) and mathematical fictionalism, which states that talk of numbers and other mathematical objects is nothing more than a convenience for doing science.
Fictionalism consists in at least the following three theses:
- Claims made within the domain of discourse are taken to be truth-apt; that is, true or false.
- The domain of discourse is to be interpreted at face value--not reduced to meaning something else.
- The aim of discourse in any given domain is not truth, but some other virtue(s)(e.g., simplicity, explanatory scope).
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[edit] Further reading
- Balaguer, Mark (1998). Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics. Oxford Oxfordshire: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780195143980.
- Kalderon, Mark (2005). Moral Fictionalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ISBN 9780199275977.
[edit] See also
[edit] References
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This article does not cite any references or sources. (July 2007) Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unverifiable material may be challenged and removed. |
[edit] External links
- Modal Fictionalism entry at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy by Daniel Nolan, 2007-12-11
- Fictionalism entry at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy by Matti Eklund, 2007-03-30
- Mathematical fictionalism entry at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy by Mark Balaguer, 2008-04-22
