Abu Faraj al-Libbi

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Abu Faraj al-Libi (Arabic: أبو فرج الليبي ‎) (also transliterated al-Libbi ) is an assumed name or nom de guerre of a Libyan alleged to be a senior member of the al-Qaeda terror organization. His real name is thought to be Mustafa al-'Uzayti^[1]. He was arrested by Pakistan's ISI on May 2, 2005, in Mardan (30 miles north of Peshawar). Finding al-Libi was a joint effort of the United States and Pakistan. He is now in American military custody in the Guantanamo Bay detention camp^[1], having previously been held at some secret location^[2].

In August 2004 Pakistani officials stated that al-Libbi (also known as Abu Faraj Farj) had become "number three" in al-Qaeda as "director of operations", a rôle once filled by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed^[3][4]. Upon al-Libbi's arrest U.S. and Pakistani authorities continued to claim him as the third most important figure in al-Qaeda.

According to a BBC report, he was riding pillion on a motorbike when he and his driver were ambushed by Pakistani agents, some of whom were wearing burqas ^[5]. While being apprehended, al-Libbi tried to destroy a notebook, which U.S. officials are now trying to decode. The events leading up to the ambush began with US agents intercepting a mobile phone call made by al-Libbi. They zeroed in his location to a busy road a quarter of a mile away on the outskirts of Mardan, about 75 miles northwest of Islamabad, and tipped-off Pakistani authorities. Plainclothes Pakistani agents arrived in Mardan and hung out, waiting for him to arrive.

Abi Faraj al-Libbi was named by Pakistani authorities as the main planner of the 2006 transatlantic aircraft plot^[6]. He is also a suspect in two assassination attempts against Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf^[1]. According to the New York Times, "Mr. Libbi's suspected accomplice in those attacks was a well-known Pakistani militant named Amjad Hussain Farooqi, who was also implicated in the murder of the Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl in February 2002. Mr. Farooqi was killed last September in a shootout with security forces in southern Pakistan."^[7]

Wikinews has related news:

Pakistan captures al Qaeda suspect

In the early reporting of this capture, there was some confusion between Abu Faraj al-Libbi and another wanted al-Qaeda fugitive Anas al-Liby^[8]. Al-Libi is not a surname, but an adjective, meaning the Libyan. Such adjectives of nationality are used in nicknames, and sometimes to resolve ambiguity; they often admit several alternative English transliterations.

[edit] Combatant Status Review

CSRT notice read to a Guantanamo captive.

Initially the Bush administration asserted they could withhold the protections of the Geneva Conventions from captives in the War on Terror, while critics argued the Conventions obligated the United States to conduct competent tribunals to determine the status of prisoners. Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted Combatant Status Review Tribunals, to determine whether the captives met the new definition of an "enemy combatant".

The trailer where CSRTs were convened.

From July 2004 through March 2005, a CSRT was convened to make a determination whether each captive had been correctly classified as an "enemy combatant". Abu Faraj al-Libbi was among the one-third of prisoners for whom there was no indication they chose to participate in their tribunals.^[9]

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for the tribunal, listing the alleged facts that led to his detainment. Abu Faraj al-Libbi's memo accused him of the following: ^[10] His Summary of Evidence memo was dated February 8, 2007.^[11]

The following facts support the determination that the detainee is an enemy combatant.

a.	The detainee was a supervisor at the al Qaida training camp in Khowst, Afghanistan.
b.	The detainee assisted in the creation of an urban warfare training camp in Kabul, Afghanistan.
c.	A Federal Bureau of Investigation source stated he met the detainee in July-August 2001 at the al Qaida guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan. The same source also stated the detainee managed the guest house, and the guest house also served as the Kabul communications hub for Al-Qaida.
d.	The detainee was the supervisor of an al Qaida communications site in Afghanistan, in 2002.
e.	The detainee was a senior al Qaida facilitator. His primary duty was the care of al Qaida families residing in Pakistan. Additionally, the detainee was involved in vetting and transporting al Qaida fighters to Afghanistan.
f.	Individuals wanting to fight in Afghanistan were required to be sponsored by an al Qaida member and be interviewed by the detainee to verify their bona fides. Once the detainee, a former commander in Afghanistan, was comfortable with the individual's background, the detainee would arrange travel to Afghanistan for the individual.
g.	The detainee was the deputy to al Qaida's third in command and was responsible for al Qaida activities and logistics throughout Pakistan.
h.	In December 2003, a large group of Islamic extremists; including the detainee, representatives of Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin [sic] and Taliban officials met in Raiwand, Pakistan and discussed operations against the United States and coalition forces in Afghanistan.
i.	In September 2004 [sic] , several members of al Qaida involved in terrorist operations, including the detainee, met in Syria to discuss a variety of terrorist operations, including planned operations in the United States, Europe and Australia.
j.	A computer seized during the capture of the detainee contained manuals related to explosives, detonator circuits, chemicals, military tactics, missiles and tanks.
k.	A computer seized during the capture of the detainee contained a detailed manual on fabricating and using circuitry for detonators.
l.	An al Qaida and Libyan Islamic Fighting Group associate requested assistance from the detainee in acquiring explosives and weapons according to seized letters found on the associate's computer.

The transcript for al-Libbi was eight pages long. It said that he did not choose to attend his Tribunal. The first two pages of the transcript were consumed with Tribunal's officers swearing oaths, and the reading out of the Tribunals mandate and authority. He did dictate a statement to be read to his Tribunal.

After discussing the nature of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal with his Personal Representative Al Libbi decided not to attend his Tribunal. According to Al Libbi's Personal Representatitive Al Libbi: "...decided that his freedom is far too important to be decided by an administrative process and is waiting for legal proceedings." — When asked to explain, his Personal Representative paraphrased Al Libbi: "Uh once questions were answered in regards to what was taking place and his representation; he decided to abstain from attending."

[edit] Statement

Abu Faraj al-Libbi asked his Personal Representative to read the following statement to his Tribunal:

Mr. President and board ^[sic] members of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal; I Mustafa Al Libi thank you for your time. It is my opinion the forming of this Tribunal is a good initial step towards justice and righteousness. I was informed by my Personal Representative that this Tribunal is purely a military administrative procedure and is not based on the Judicial Procedure of the United States. In regards to this issue I offer the following:

• This Tribunal should have been a procedure in accordance with the Judicial Procedure of the United States. I have been held by the United States for over two years without any indication of how the judicial system is going to deal with my situation. This is a very long period of time without being subject to a court of justice.
• The handling and reviewing or determining of my Enemy Combatant status and legality of my detainment by the United States is a judicial matter and not administrative as described in the Combatant Status Review Tribunal are incomplete for the following reasons:
  • No lawyer, either assigned to the detainee or by the detainee's choosing, has been made available to the detainee to assist in determining the nature of the evidence against him, its legality and its validity as evidence. The detainee needs legal guidance as to what kind of testimonies and statements are enough to refute the evidence presented against him.
  • The lack of protections against detention or other legal or administrative actions make it impossible for me to produce any witnesses in my defense. For example the definition of Enemy Combatant includes the verbiage "supporting the Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces". If I am classified as an Enemy Combatant, it is possible that the United States will deem my witnesses are Enemy Combatants and judicial or administrative action may be taken against them. It is my opinion the detainee is in a lose-lose situation.
  • If not classified as an Enemy Combatant the detainee may not get released immediately. I was informed by my Personal Representative that the detainee would be released once arrangements could be made. This means from military custody. It is possible the detainee would still be retained by the United States.
  • If the detainee is classified as an Enemy Combatant, he won't be transferred directly to the United States Judicial System but will remain under supervision of the Military. He will then meet the Annual Review Board indefinitedly to review the detention status.

Mr. President and members of the board ^[sic] , to summarize, I don't find myself attending the Tribunal unless the above mentioned factors are resolved such as being represented by a lawyer and legal protection for myself or my witnesses. I am extremely keen to exercise my rights fully according to the law of the United States.

This process, the processes associated with my detention are extremely important to me and my family and could prove detrimental to our well being. I am not prepared to have this matter linked to a mere "administrative procedure" where I don't fully understand the ramifications and extent of the process.

Finally, I do not believe the Combatant Status Review Tribunal process is a complete process. The United States Government is fully represented while I have not been given the same opportunities. Mr President and members of the board ^[sic] , thank you for your attention and consideration during my statement.

I affirm that these words are my words and truth as I know it, signed and dated.

The Department of Defense announced on August 9, 2007 that all fourteen of the "high-value detainees" who had been transferred to Guantanamo from the CIA's black sites, had been officially classified as "enemy combatants".^[12] Although judges Peter Brownback and Keith J. Allred had ruled two months earlier that only "illegal enemy combatants" could face military commissions, the Department of Defense waived the qualifier and said that all fourteen men could now face charges before Guantanamo military commissions.^[13][14]

[edit] References

[edit] External links

• Al Qa'eda third in command 'is running terror cells in the UK', Daily Telegraph, September 19, 2004
• Pakistan 'catches al-Qaeda chief, BBC News, May 4, 2005
• Who's who in al-Qaeda, BBC news, August 19, 2005
• Press handout photo of Abu Faraj al-Libbi shortly after his capture, from the Pakistan Interior Ministry; photo at MSNBC