5 Gorkha Rifles
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| 5 Gorkha Rifles | |
|---|---|
 |
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| Active | 1891 - present |
| Country | India |
| Branch | Army |
| Type | Rifles |
| Size | 6 Battalions |
| Regimental Centre | Shillong, Meghalaya |
| Nickname | Frontier Force |
| Motto | Shaurya Evam Nistha (Courage and Determination) |
| War Cry | Ayo Gorkhali (The Gorkhas are here) |
| Decorations | 1 Ashoka Chakra, 8 Maha Vir Chakras, 5 Kirti Chakras, 23 Vir Chakras, 4 Shaurya Chakras, 1 Yudh Seva Medal, 49 Sena Medals and 27 Mentioned-in-Despatches |
| Battle honours | Post Independence Zoji La,Sylhet, Kargil Theatre Honours Jammu & Kashmir 1947-48, Jammu & Kashmir, 1971 and East Pakistan, 1971 |
| Insignia | |
| Regimental Insignia | A pair of crossed Khukris with the numeral 5 in-between |
| Tartan | Government (pipes and drums) |
The 5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) is an infantry regiment of the Indian Army comprising of Gurkha soldiers of Nepalese origin. This regiment was one of the Gorkha regiments that was transferred to the Indian Army following independence. The regiment was formerly known as the 5th Royal Gurkha Rifles (Frontier Force).
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[edit] History
[edit] 19th Century
The regiment was originally raised in 1858 as the 25th Punjab Infantry. The soldiers, called 'Gurkhas' in this regiment origins purely from the Kingdom of Nepal. The regiment's first major action was during the Second Afghan War, with the regiment's first battle honour coming at Peiwar Kotal, at which Captain John Cook was awarded the Victoria Cross. By this time, the regiment had been ranked as the 5th Gurkhas. During the period up to the end of the 19th century, the regiment was based primarily in the Punjab as part of the Punjab Frontier Force, more famous as PFF or Piffers. This was reflected when in 1903, the regiment was renamed the 5th Gurkha Rifles (Frontier Force).
[edit] World War I
During the First World War, the regiment primarily saw service in the Middle East - the 1st Battalion saw extensive service at Gallipoli in 1915 (where 7 officers and 129 men were killed in the first few hours after the battalion landed). Despite the terrible conditions, the Gurkhas remained stoic; indeed, the last troops to leave following the evacuation was a company of the 5th Gurkhas. The 2nd Battalion saw service in Mesopotamia, initially with the 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division and from April 1916 with the 15th Division. The 1st Battalion joined them in March 1917 from the 1st (Peshawar) Division and both battalions fought together at the Action of Khan Baghdadi. A 3rd Battalion was raised for service on the North-West Frontier, before being disbanded in 1921.
[edit] Inter-War
In 1921, the regiment was given the title 5th Royal Gurkha Rifles, in recognition of its service during the war. During the inter-war period, the regiment received three further battle honours, for the Third Afghan War in 1919, and two for service on the North-West Frontier. Of all of the regiments that saw service in this region during the period, only the 5th Gurkhas and the 13th Duke of Connaught's Own Lancers were awarded such honours.
[edit] World War II
During the Second World War, the 5th Gurkhas served in most theatres, with the 1st Battalion in the Middle East and Italy as part of Indian 8th Infantry Division, and the 2nd Battalion in the Far East. The 2nd Battalion was involved in the retreat of the British Indian Army from Burma in the face of the Japanese invasion, and was one of four battalions chosen to fight as the rearguard at the Sittang River, which formed the border with India. In blowing the bridge across the river (and preventing the Japanese forces from entering India), many men were left on the wrong side. The re-entry into Burma in 1943 saw the regiment at the forefront, with three Victoria Crosses won during the campaign. Rifleman Thaman Gurung of the 1st Battalion also won the VC serving in Italy. The Fourth Battalion raised in 1941 by Late Brigadier N Macdonald DSO, fought five epic battles; North Arakan, Buthidaung {Admin Box), Kohima, Pokkoku (Irrawaddy) and Sittang. The Battalion had the unique distinction of getting Four Battle Honours for the Five Battles Fought. It was also one of the few Battalions in the world that one of its officer Major I M Brown, MC** was awarded the Military Cross three times.
[edit] BATTLE OF KOHIMA AND 4/5 ROYAL GURKHA RIFLES {FF} - 30 MAY TO 20 JUNE 1944
Even today Battle of Kohima is discussed world over, for the dogged determination of outnumbered and besieged garrison of Kohima {1 Assam Regt}, who withstood theonslaught of Japanese 31st Division. Another dimension to this epic battle was given by an Indian Battalion {4 Rajput} breaking the siege at a point and reinforced the besieged battalion. The offensive by Japanese called ‘Operation C’ through Central Burma and Central Sector of Assam was launched on 13 March 1944 by Japanese 31st Division and against Tiddim by 33rd Japanese Division and five days later {18th March } against Tamu by 15th Japanese Division. Both Indian Divisions {17th and 20th} defending the area fell back on Imphal. Allies under Lord Mountbatten ordered following measures to counter the Japanese Offensive:- - Moved 2nd British Division to the battle front of Kohima - 5 Indian Infantry Division flown in from Arakan - XXXIII Corps to reinforce Fourteenth Army. - 7 Indian Infantry Division moved from Arakan on the heels of 5th Division. Two of its brigades were to join XXXIII Corps at Dimapur and third one to join IV Corps at Imphal. - Imphal garrison maintained by air.
In early May the headquarter 7th Indian Infantry Division moved to Dimapur {Manipur Road} and then to Zubza, short of Kohima }. The operation in this area by the 7 Indian Division commenced on 5th of May 1944. By 3rd week of May the Japanese were still holding a number of key positions East and South of Kohima. The Japanese were opposed at this stage by 2nd Indian Infantry Division, 161st Brigade of 5 Indian Infantry Division and 33rd Brigade of 7 Indian Infantry Division, when the third brigade of the 7th Division {114th} of which 4/5 Royal Gurkha Rifles {FF} was part of arrived on the scene. 4/5 Royal Gurkha Rifles {FF} after a couple of days at the railhead {Dimapur} moved forward on 24th May 1944 to Mile 5 {Zubza near Kohima} and on the 26th May a party of 30 men, moved up and joined 4/1 Gurkha Rifles to familiarise with the area till the remainder of the Brigade {114th} concentrated in the area. The Japanese organised resistance in Kohima Town came to an end on 31 May 1944 with a daring raid on the remnants of Japanese by the Guerrilla Platoon and assault by B Company {McBride} of 4/5 Royal Gurkha Rifles {FF}. On 1st June the Battalion moved and took over Treasury Hill. On 2nd June the Battalion took over Gun Spur from 4/1st Gurkha Rifles. At this time 2nd British Division was attacking Japanese astride road South of Kohima and the aim of the Corps {XXXIII} was to open the road to Imphal. To speed up the operation of clearing Japanese opposition from the Naga areas, 114th Brigade was tasked to carry out outflanking movement. as there were indications that Japanese were moving along Jessami track {Close to Kohima} and it was essential for the battalion {4/5 Royal Gurkha Rifles {FF}} to remain in contact with the Japanese for development of further operations. C Company of the Battalion {Major P A R Beytagh} moved on 3rd June to reconnoiter next likely position of Japanese, beyond Chedema ridge. During the night it was joined by D Company {Lieutenant E I M Newton} and the ridge was occupied without any opposition. The remainder of the Battalion soon built up on the two companies {C and D}. The next objective was Chakabama Ridge. On 5th June the battalion {4/5 Royal Gurkha Rifles {FF}} moved from Chedema for next objective {Chakabama Ridge}. The ridge was occupied without any interference, which happened to be the limit of eastward advance of the formation. The Battalion therefore turned South to carry out outflanking movement. B Company {Major McBride} moved to reconnoiter Kezoma, which was on the track from Chakabama and joining the main road at Sajouba and gained contact with Japanese Force on 6th June 1944. Soon C Company and A Company joined B Company during the day. Same night B Company moved and occupied Kezoma and the remainder Battalion built up on the objective on the morning of 7th June. During the day a number of JIFC including their senior officer in the area came in and surrendered to the Battalion. During the day a patrol under Lieutenant Newton found a detachment of five Japanese, four of whom were killed and fifth captured. From here the advance of 114th Indian Brigade was led by 1st Lancashire Regiment for the next objective Kedima, though the battalion {4/5 Royal Gurkha Rifles {FF} had to come forward again in the front to lead the brigade {114th} operations.
The Japanese in Kedima put up a spirited fight and repulsed attack by 1st South Lancashire Regiment of the brigade on 12 June. 4/5 Royal Gurkha Rifles {FF} then sedcured Kedima village on 14th June. On 15th the Battalion moved to Kedima, while D Company {Newton} was sent for blocking the escape route of Japanese in the rear of Kedima. 161st Brigade was also operating in the area and D Company was operating under their command till 19th June. The Battalion then advanced further and secured Sajouba on 18th June, as the final stage of the operation of the Brigade. On the same evening {18th} contact was established by the Battalion {4/5 Royal Gurkha Rifles {FF} } with the troops of 2nd British Division. On 17th June arrival of administrative echelons were a welcome force. Since leaving Kohima on 4th June, the Battalion had been on self-contained basis with light scale pack rations. The Battalions last operation in the area was on 20th June. A Company {Jhonge} had been sent to establish a block in the rear of the Japanese at Sajouba and on the evening of 19th a platoon under Jemedar Rudra Bahadur Rana was sent. The platoon in spite of being fired upon and literally outnumbered, the platoon under Rudra Bahadur harassed the Japanese throughout the night and on 20th June attacked them. Japanese with this onslaught suffered casualties and the objective was captured. A machine Gun, several rifles and much equipment were recovered. For this gallant action Jemedar Rudra Bahadur Rana was awarded Military Cross {MC}.
The outflanking movements of 114th Brigade, led by the Battalion, had succeeded in its objective of loosening the grip on the road and their opposition to the 2nd British Division. The Japanese 31st Division was no longer an effective fighting force and had probably lost nearly fifty percent of its strength. The Japanese had been forced to abandon well-prepared positions and heavy equipment and it was proved that they were not invincible. The road from Kohima to Imphal was reopened on 22nd June and the initiative finally passed onto Fourteenth Army. During the next few days’ congratulatory messages were received from the Governor of Assam, The Supreme Commander and the Corps Commander, that were read to the troops of 4/5 Royal Gurkha Rifles {FF}. On 24th June came the news that the 7th Division Troops were to be moved for rest and refit. On 28th the Battalion moved to Kohima and on 2nd July moved to the village of Merema. For ten months at a stretch the Battalion and the Brigade had been on the front and in contact with the Japanese and this rest was welcome. Merema remained the home of the Battalion for the period July to November 1944 and it was from here that leave was opened. It may not be a sheer coincidence that D Company of the Battalion {Major later Brigadier Rattan Kaul}, in the second incarnation, was located in the same village {Merema} from January 70 to July 71 and treaded the area for operations, where its elders had treaded some 26 years back. The village Gaon Burha {GB} Nielhou Chesteso recounted to the Company Commander of Gurkha Troops in the village when he was a young man in 1944 and having run errands for them, little realising that it was the ancestors of the present lot who had treaded the same soil where the later were located.
[edit] BATTLE OF POKOKU AND IRRAWADDY OPERATIONS OF 4/5 ROYAL GURKHA RIFLES (FF)
The 4th battalion of the 5 Royal Gurkha Rifles was the lead element of the Indian 7th Infantry Division which fought in the Battle of Central Burma in the first half of 1945. The battles were small but played a critical role in securing the Irrawaddy River and in allowing the allies to capture Rangoon. The 5 Gurkha Rifles were awarded Irrawaddy as a battle honour.
[edit] Post Independence
On Indian independence, the 5th Royal Gurkha Rifles was one of six Gurkha regiments that remained part of the new Indian Army, being renamed in 1950 as the 5th Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force). Since then, the regiment has participated in virtually every major action the Indian Army has undertaken in its four wars with Pakistan, including the first airborne operations undertaken by the army during the 1971 war. Today, the regiment has a total of six battalions. The youngest Battalion, Fourth Battalion The Fifth Gorkhas (FF) of the Regiment has crowned itself with glory. Reraised in 1963 by Late Lt Col S S Jog, it fought 65 War under late Col M L Bhatia in Jammu & Kashmir (Mendhar Sector). Notable was the Khukri assault by D Company {Capt Bikram Chand} on Topa Feature on 27 Aug 65.In 1971 War it first annihilated Pakistan Army B Coy of 31 Punjab at Atgram by a gallant and heroic Khukri attack by A Company {Major Rana} and D Coy {Major Kaul} under CO, Lt Col {Later Brigadier} A B Harolikar, MVC. This was followed by another attack on 22 Baluch at Gazipur on 4/5 Dec 71, where an earlier attack by a different Battalion had failed. The capture of Gazipur defences, based on a tea state, was a mix of clearance of strong elements in the tea garden led by Major (Later Colonel) Yashwant Rawat and finally stiff resiistance at the Factory Complex led by the Commanding Officer (Harolikar) himself. The Second-in-Command, Late Major S G Kelkar led one of the assaults and was killed in the battle. The blow was so strong that 22 Baluch of Pakistan Army just disintegrated. The Battalion made epoch and first ever heliborne operations of Indian Army on 7 Dec 71 when the troops landed at outskirts of Sylhet Town (Mirpara) to trap Pakistan's two Brigades defending Sylhet. Led by Major (Later Colonel) Malik (C Company) CO Lt Col (Later Brigadier) A B Harolikar MVC, followed by B Coy (V K Sharma), A Coy (Major Rana) and D Coy (Major (Later Brigadier) Rattan Kaul). It was the grit of the Battalion they withstood the assaults of Pakistani Troops for next nine days and ultimately obtained the surrender of the garrison of two brigades on 16 Dec 71, a day before the Pakistani's surrendered at Dacca. In these battles the Battalion lost 4 Officers and 7 other officers were wounded. The Battalion was awarded 2 MVC's (including the CO, Lt Col A B Harolikar, MVC), 3 VrC's and 2 Sena Medals. The Battalion again blazed trail to glory in IPKF Operations from October 87 to December 88 and was awarded 1 MVC (CO ; Lt Col I B S Bawa Posthumously), 2 Vrc's, 1 UYSM and many more awards.
[edit] BATTLE OF TOPA (JAMMU & KASHMIR) - INDIA - PAKISTAN WAR 1965
From anti infiltration operations conducted by the battalion from 5 August 1965 onwards in Rajouri and Mendhar Sectors of Jammu and Kashmir, it was evident that many strong infiltrating columns of Pakistani Army had been sent into our territory as part of Pakistan’s ‘Operation Gibraltar’. By third week of August 65, Headquarter 52 Mountain Brigade (Brigadier later Lieutenant General R D Hira, MVC) had been inducted into the sector for clearance of infiltrators from Mendhar, Surankot and Krishna Ghati area. For the operations 4/5 GR (FF), 14 Kumaon and 3/11 GR were put under command of the brigade and made responsible for anti infiltration operations in Mendhar in the South and Krishna Gati (KG) area of 93 Infantry Brigade Sector. Reports of major infiltration in Mendhar and Balnoi had been received and some of the roads had been blocked by Paki troops. Closer to Mendhar, Paki's had occupied Topa feature, which effectively dominated fair weather road Mendhar - Balnoi, thus cutting off Balnoi and Krishna Ghati (93 Infantry Brigade). They had also established defences at a place called OP Hill, on the ridgeline across Mendhar River. The first priority of the brigade was to cut off maintenance routes of these Paki troops and clearance of road to Balnoi and KG. Alfa Company of 21 AK Battalion Pakistan Army, with additional troops and Razakars were reported to be occupying Topa Height (Pt 4571) and had effectively interdicted road communications in the area.
Topa feature, Pt 4571, a dominating hill, was about 1.5 kilometres away from the Mendhar – Balnoi Road. The position had three hubs; Point 4571 (Topa Top); Gujar Kotha, feature on its southern slopes; and a Ring Contour further to the south, called Jungle Tekri overlooking the road. It was, therefore, decided to launch a deliberate attack to capture these positions and open the road. The task of capturing Topa was given to 4/5 GR (FF). The battalion concentrated on 25 August 1965 at Mendhar for the task.
On 26 August, after having concentrated in area, own troops were fired upon from Jungle Tekri and Gujar Kotha. In the initial operations, launched the same day, area of Jungle Tekri was captured by B Coy lead by Major (later Colonel) Sunit Singh, and 2 POWs, apart from recovery of weapons and ammunition. This position, apparently, was forward element of Topa defences. It was decided to launch a deliberate attack next day, 27 August, to capture the feature. The task of capture of Topa Top was given to Delta Company (Captain (later Colonel) Bikram Katoch) with Bravo Company (Sunit Singh) and Charlie Company (Major later Major General Ashok Mehta, AVSM, FRGS) as firm base and reserve company respectively. The orders to Bikram Katoch by Commanding Officer (CO) late Lieutenant Colonel ( Later Colonel) M L Bhatia were; “'Topa lai capture Gariyo Bhane kasto Hola'” followed by brief orders (Translated from Gorkhali: ‘How about capturing Topa?’). Colonel Bhatia did not restrict himself with brief orders for the attack but was all along with the leading Company, just behind the leading Platoon.
On 27th, Captain Bikram Katoch led the assault of his company. CO, Lieutenant Colonel (Later Colonel) M L Bhatia, followed the leading platoon of D Company. As soon as the troops reached closer to the Gujar Kotha, they were fired upon. They unsheathed their Khukri’s and amidst war cry of Ayo Gorkhali assaulted the position. By about by 27th afternoon area Gujar Kotha, position below Pt 4571 (Topa Top) was captured. The defences had mostly been captured but Pt 4571 (Topa Top) was still held. D Company pressed on and by evening Topa Top was also captured. Battalion thereafter firmed in, reorganised on the objective and road communication was opened. Two more POWs, many dead bodies of Paki soldiers and lot of arms and ammunition were found. On 28 August 1965, during further combing operations towards north of the ridge, Senior Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO - Subedar) of the Pak Company (JC 824 Subedar Abdul Rahman of A Coy 21 AK Battalion) was captured from a Gujjar Hut, with an injury to his right arm. He revealed that the injury was by direct hit of a 2 inch mortar bomb, fired by mortar detachment of D Company under Naik Bir Bahadur Pun. However, Naik Bir Bahadur Pun had gallantly laid down his life, when he was hit by a bullet in the head. C Company was thereafter tasked to hold the area as the battalion less C Company moved out of the area, for further operations in the sector, which continued till the ceasefire on 22 September 1965.
[edit] BATTLE OF ATGRAM - 20/21 NOVEMBER 1971 [East Pakistan]
Atgram Complex, based on a border village Atgram of Sylhet District of then East Pakistan, nearly 35 Kilometres from East Pakistan’s important town of Sylhet. The village was across Surma Ruiver, which also was approximately the border between then East Pakistan and Cachar District of Assam (India). The complex comprised Amalsid Border outpost of Pakistani’s (BOP) on river Surma, Masjid close to this BOP, and Atgram Village. Atgram was road communication centre at eastern edge of Sylhet Division (East Pakistan), two kilometres inside the International Border (IB) across River Surma and connecting it with Zakiganj, 7 kilometres to its south, opposite Indian Border town of Karimganj. Pakistan Army’s B Company 31 Punjab was defending Atgram Complex with additional elements of Mujahids, Thal/Tochi Scouts, Rangers under Major Azhar Alvi, supported by Medium Machine Guns (MMGs), Recoiless Guns (RCL’s), Chinese Rocket Launchers and 81 mililmetre mortars. Atgram was located on a higher ground but the area around was low lying and marshy; nearly knee deep. The Battalion Headquarter of 31 Punjab was reported to be located at Charkhai with some troops 10 Kilometres West of Atgram. 59 Mountain Brigade (Commander Brigadier C A Quinn) was tasked to capture Atgram-Zakiganj Salient by 21 November 1971 and on orders progress operations further.
4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) was given the task of capturing Atgram Salient by first light 21 November 1971 and advance further towards Charkhai and secure Sarkar Bazar, 3-4 Kilometres West of Atgram. The best option was to capture Atgram first and then develop operations towards front localities. This meant that to reach the Atgram, battalion had to cross River Surma, infiltrate in between Pakistani defended localities of Raigram and Amalsid, traverse four kilometres of marsh, assault Atgram from the rear and then clear the BOPs. 9 Guards of our brigade (59 Mountain Brigade) were given the task of capturing Zakiganj. Lieutenant Colonel (later Brigadier) A B Harolikar, MVC formulated the attack plan, primarily based on achieving surprise by infiltrating, establishing of road blocks to prevent reinforcements from Sarkar Bazar (B Company) and South of Atgram towards Zakiganj (C Company and an Adhoc Force created for the purpose), main attack on Atgram with two Companies (A and D) from the rear and use of Khukri; the world known Gurkha weapon. The Battalion crossed River Surma in the earlier part of the night of 20 November 1971. C Company, headed by Major (Later Colonel) Maney Malik, accompanied by the Commanding Officers Group were the first to cross River Surma with the help of pneumatic boats, established firm base across the river for battalion to pass through and move in between Pakistani BOPs. This involved securing of far bank of the River and masking Pakistani localities of Amalsid, Kelagram and Raygram. Firm base was accordingly established as per the plan. This was followed by crossing of the river by B Company, under Major (Later Lt Col) VS Rawat, under Second-in Command Late Major Kelkar. B Company was tasked to establish a Road Block at Sarkar Bazar (West of Atgram). A Company ( Late Major Dinesh Rana); D Coy (Major (Later Brigadier) Rattan Kaul) and an Adhoc Force under Major (Later Colonel) Yashwant Rawat crossed thereafter. After the battalion had passed through, C Company reeled up for move to establish road block on road Atgram - Zakiganj.
Initial progress of the troops was slow due to firing by Pakistani posts and movement through the marshy stretch. The troops of the battalion neared the objective from the rear in the later part of the night; undetected. C Company and Adhoc Force established road block on the road Atgram – Zakiganj, while B Coy established road block at Sarkar Bazar. A Coy (Major Dinesh Rana) and D Coy, under Major (Later Brigadier) Rattan Kaul, were left and right assault company’s respectively, with Battalion Headquarter (CO, Lt Col (Later Brigadier) Harolikar, MVC) in the centre. At about 0430 Hours 21 November 1971, A Company and D Company led by their commanders with CO in the centre, launched fierce Khukri assault and as dawn broke captured Atgram. The Pakistanis were caught by surprise and met their end with dazzling Khukri's. In the battle Major Azhar Alvi tried to kill the CO Brigadier Harolikar, MVC, D Company Commander and others but was killed. After capture of Atgram, A Company secured area of Chargram, West of Atgram. D Company secured Amalsid Masjid and Amalsid BOP (IB). 31 bodies of Pakistanis including Major Azhar Alvi were counted and scores injured reported. The assault was classical operations of attack by infiltration, silent attack personally led by Commanding Officer (Lt Col (Later Brigadier) Harolikar, MVC), Company Commander's, junior leader's (Late Captain Johri, Late 2/Lt Hawa Singh, Subedar Ran Bahadur Thapa (A Company); 2/Lt (Later Lt Col) Yang Bharat, Subedar & Hony Capatain Bal Bahadur Thapa and Subedar & Hony Captain Tirtha Bahadur Gurung) and use of Khukri as the weapon of decision. We lost two officers (Captain Johri, Second Lieutenant Hawa Singh; both Platoon Commanders), One JCO (Subedar Bobi Lal Pun, MFC), Two Other Rank’s and few injured. After the capture of Chargram, A Company moved to Sarkar Bazar to reinforce road block established by B Company under Second-in-Command Late Major Shyam Kelkar. After securing of Amalsid D Company was also moved to Sarkar Baazar and built up on the other two Companies (B and A). Next day the road block force, battalion less a company (CO's Group, A, B and D Company), moved further towards Charkhai.
It was this Khukri assault blazing trail of terror amongst the Paki’s; B Company 31 Punjab disintegrated and ceased to exist. Rifleman Dil Bahadur Chettri was awarded Mahavir Chakra (MVC) for single handedly killing eight Pakistanis with his Khukri. Rifleman Phas Bahadur Pun and Second Lieutenant Hawa Singh were awarded Vir Chakra; both posthumously, for their exemplary bravery during the assault. The Battalion won one Maha Vir Chakra (MVC), two Vir Chakra’s (Vr C’s) and two Sena Medal’s (SM’s; Captain Praveen Johri (Posthumously) and Subedar Tirtha Bahadur)) for this action.
Lieutenant Colonel (Later Brigadier) A B Harolikar was awarded Maha Vir Chakra (MVC) for his exemplary leadership, command, personal bravery during the Battles of Atgram and Gazipur (4/5 December 1971) and for the successful conduct of first ever heliborne operation of Indian Army conducted by the Battalion from 7 to 16 December 1971, under his leadership, resulting in the formal surrender of Sylhet Garison of two Pakistani brigades on the morning of 16 December much before the surrender at Dacca.
The surprise achieved at Atgram was so that a surviving officer of 31 Punjab Pakistan Army, who was also in the area, had this to reminense about the 4/5 GR {FF} attack on Atgram: “The second prong (4/5 GR (FF)) assault; first prong he refers to 9 Guards attack at Zakiganj on Major Azhar Alvi’s B Coy was more lethal. B Coy was mauled completely. Major Alvi and his men laid their lives. Only few stragglers could reach the Battalion Headquarters at Charkhai to tell the tale”.
The Flash of Khukri's, created so much of terror in the minds of Pakistani troops in the area that their another company of 22 Baluch buckled on 4/5 December 71 at Gazipur, further South.
Finally this terror helped the battalion when it landed at Sylhet on 7 December 1971 in Indian Army’s first ever heliborne operation. It stuck to the ground, tied down two Pakistani Brigades (313 and 202) culminating in the process of surrender of Sylhet Garrison to the Battalion (4/5 GR (FF)) starting on the morning of 15 December 1971 and formal surrender on 16 December 1971; nearly 24 hours earlier than their surrender at Dacca on 16th December evening.
[edit] BATTLE OF SYLHET - 7 TO 16 DECEMBER 1971 (East Pakistan)
4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) had fought two battles with Khukri as the decisive weapon; wiped out Pakistani B Company 31 Punjab at Atgram (Sylhet District – East Pakistan) on 20/21 November 1971 and caused disintegration of Company plus of Pakistani 22 Baluch at Gazipur, again Sylhet District, on night 4/5 December 1971. Battalion had suffered 7 officers, 3 Junior Commissioned Officers (JCO) and 92 Other Ranks (OR) killed/wounded in these two battles. By afternoon of 5 December the battalion had secured Kalaura, rail and road head leading to Sylhet, one of the biggest North-eastern district of then East Pakistan (Now Bangladesh). Sylhet was a communication centre approachable from four directions from India, important from military and geographical point of view and its fall would be a severe set back to the Pakistani’s, with international repercussions. Available intelligence information had interpreted that Sylhet was lightly held as Garrison Brigade had been moved out in the beginning of December 1971. Sylhet was thus selected as the next objective of 8 Mountain Division, capture of which would give a large chunk of territory. Sylhet Garrison, however, was defended by Pakistan’s 202 Infantry Brigade with its Headquarter at Sylhet with two battalions (31 Punjab, 91 Mujahid) Company 12 Azad Kashmir Battalion, two Companies of EPCAF and half Wing Frontier Corps supported by regiment of 105 millimetre guns, a battery of 120 millimetre mortars. This brigade was subsequently reinforced by Pakistani 313 Infantry Brigade (22 Baluch, 30 Frontier Force, Wing Frontier Corps less two companies) on 7/8 December 1971. This brigade was initially covering/defending axis Shamsher Nagar - Maulvi Bazar. Both the brigades had been deployed to cover all the major axes and make Sylhet a fortress. By first week of December 1971, Brigadier S A Hassan was sent to Sylhet and coordinate the defensive battle of the two Pakistani Brigades.
On the evening of 6 December GOC IV Corps gave out plan of a heliborne landing of a battalion of 59 Mountain Brigade (Brigadier CA Quinn) to ‘occupy’ Sylhet. Major General (later General and COAS) K V Krishna Rao, GOC 8 Mountain Division was also informed of the plans. On the morning of 7 December Brigadier Quinn, Brigade Commander, visited 4/5 GR (FF) at Kalaura and informed Commanding Officer (CO), Lieutenant Colonel (Later Brigadier) A B Harolikar, MVC that on the same afternoon the battalion is planned to be helilanded at Sylhet, with ground link up within 12-24 hours. CO though felt Sylhet was possibly strongly held, link up with 12-24 hours was difficult in view of Pakistani defence’s en-route and distances to be traversed. By about 10 a.m., 7 December, Brigadier Quinn, CO (Harolikar), Group Captain (later Air Marshal) Chandan Singh, in charge helicopter unit flew over Sylhet in a helicopter and selected suitable landing site near Mirpara on Northern bank of the Surma River, about 2 kilometres east of the railway bridge. No military activity was noticed thus somewhat ‘confirming’ Pak 202 Infantry Brigade had vacated Sylhet. After the reconnaissance CO also felt that his apprehensions ‘may’ have been unfounded. However, he was to prove right in the time to come. On CO’s return the plan of the operations was given out. Landing zone at Mirpara, outskirts of Sylhet, close to railroad bridge; flight of MI – 4 Helicopters available with a flight time of 25 to 30 minutes and approximately 50 persons per wave. Charlie Company under Major (later Colonel) Malik (Maney Malik) was to be first wave with Commanding Officer's Group Lieutenant Colonel (later Brigadier) A B Harolikar, MVC followed by Bravo (Captain Sharma), Alfa (Major Dinesh Rana) and Delta (Captain Salgotra). First to take off between 1400-1430 Hours and complete landing before last light. First to land at 1500 hours was major portion of Charlie (C) Company and were fired upon by Pakistani troops with mounted machine guns. They went charging in the direction of firing with war cry of 'Ayo Gorkhali'. In the second wave, 40-45 minutes later, CO's party and balance of C Company and part of B Company landed. The total force at this stage consisted of 90-100 persons, 15 Light Machine Guns (LMG’s) and 4 Medium Machine Guns (MMG’s). No further flights arrived for crucial next 12 hours, leaving already landed troops to fight throughout the night, to retain the toe hold Major Mumtaz Hussain Shah of 31 Punjab, Pakistan Army responsible for the local defence around this portion of Sylhet Town reported landing of 400-500 men to his headquarters and deny 31 Punjab and 313 Brigade entry to the town for eventual Sylhet Fortress battle At the beginning of dawn Alfa and Delta Company landed amidst artillery fire. Pakistanis interpreted this additional flight of helicopters as landing of remainder part of the brigade. In the twilight hours of 8 December came two mountain guns (75/24mm) and B Company 9 Guards. The dilemma now was to either go for compact defended area or a wider aggressive one. The CO opted for later; occupy offensive defence positions around landing site, lay ambushes, establish roadblocks and raid and harass Pakistanis. After last light Pakistani’s launched a counter attack on Alfa and Delta Company’s which was repulsed. On 9 December Major (Later Major General) Ian Cardozo, AVSM, SM on posting arrived at Sylhet and took over responsibilities of Second-in-Command. Major (Later Brigadier) Rattan Kaul too arrived in the same flight and straightaway went forward to his company (Delta). During the day a composite patrol led by Malik ambushed Pakistani Convoy on road Sylhet - Khadim Nagar creating chaos as drivers abandoned vehicles and ran away. During a chance wireless interception by Major Kaul it was clear that 313 Infantry Brigade had arrived in Sylhet on 7 December and along with 202 Infantry Brigade were planning an attack with five companies on Alfa (Rana) and Delta (Kaul) Company’s. Half an hour after last light the counter attack came with artillery support, which was also repulsed. There was no replenishment other than that of artillery ammunition.
On 11 December morning three Hunters engaged the enemy positions in front of Alfa and Delta Company’s. With no ground link up, mounting casualties, adjustment for compact deployment, after last light, were given. Before the adjustment could be made, Pakistanis launched counter attack on A and D Company’s which was beaten back, in which Major Kaul, Company Commander D Company was seriously injured. The readjustment, put on hold due to Paki counterattack, took place only after the situation stabilised. After last light On 14 December, a weak section of 6 Rajput reached the battalion, though the battalion was still away. However, our guns could now support us and replenishment by air had improved our ammunition state.
Unknown to us the Pakistanis realising their predicament had its effect. The events that unfolded on 15 December morning were history in making. A large group of 1000-1500 Paki troops couple of white flags with two officers came and handed over a note, which stated that the Garrison Commander Sylhet wanted to surrender the entire garrison of Sylhet. They were informed that their Brigadier is required to discuss further details. At around 3 p.m. 15 December, Pakistani River. Garrison Commander (Brigadier Hassan) met own Brigade Commander, Brigadier Quinn at the rail road bridge and worked out the details of the surrender. It happened 24 hours earlier than the official acceptance of surrender of Pakistani forces on 16 December at 1655 hours at Dacca and even prior to the temporary cease fire. The battalion had endured and entered 9th day and 8th night, four counter attacks repulsed, a determined Commanding Officer, Khukri yielding troops transforming CO’s vision into reality with no link up except few elements of 6 Rajput having reached South Bank of River Surma.
The modalities of surrender completed it was decided to have proper surrender next morning (16 December) when entire Sylhet Garrison comprising of 3 Brigadiers, 1 Colonel, 107 officers, 219 JCO's and 6190 Pakistani soldiers and 39 non-combatants surrendered. During the battle of Sylhet (between 7 and 16 December, one officer (Major Karan Puri, the Adjutant) 2 JCO's and 11 other ranks killed, 3 officers (Cardozo, Kaul and Malik) and 36 other ranks were wounded. At the time of surrender by Sylhet Garrison battalion strength consisted of about 6- 7 officers, 10-15 JCO's and about 300-350 soldiers. After the surrender Brigadier S A Hassan, Pakistani Garrison Commander had this to say; "If this battalion (4/5 GR (FF)) was not there we would have fought for at least another 10 days". After the surrender troops entered the town and saw heaps of weapons thrown all along the road. It is during this move Major (Later Major General) Ian Cardozo was injured by a mine blast and lost his left lower leg.
For this outstanding first ever heliborne operation of Indian Army by 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force), Sylhet was awarded as Battle Honour and East Pakistan, 1971 as Theatre Honour to 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force).
[edit] BATTLE OF GAZIPUR (EAST PAKISTANIISTAN – BANGLADESH) 4/5 DECEMBER 1971
By 27th November 1971 evening 4/5 Gorkha Rifles {Frontier Force} had firmed at Kadamtal, a place closer to the border opposite Kalaura / Maulvi Bazar Sector of Sylhet Division {East Pakistan}. ‘Nibbling attacks’ were to be employed to capture territory and it was clear that 59 Mountain Brigade was to operate, as part of the 8th Mountain Division plan, in tandem, possibly for thrust to Sylhet. The area had typical rolling hills with tea gardens dotting the area along the border. Further West, inside East Pakistan, low hills propped up like a wall and obscured any observations beyond these, had good defence potential and observation into Indian side of the border. The hills tapered just East of Kalaura and the plains of Sylhet division started from here. Kalaura, a communication centre and rail head ten kilometres in depth, was connected to Maulvi Bazar; along the axis Dharmanagar - Gazipur- Maulvi Bazar-Sylhet..
The task given to the 8 Mountain Division was at this stage was:- - Capture of Border Out Posts along axes Dharmanagar - Gazipur-Kalaura, Dharmanagar- Juri by 59 Mountain Brigade. 81 Mountain Brigade to operate along axis Shamshernagar- Fenchuganj- Maulvi Bazar. - Capture of Sylhet by multi-pronged attacks by the complete divisional force. Pakistan’s
313 Infantry Brigade, part of Pakistan 14 Infantry Division, was located at Maulvi Bazar. Its 202 Infantry Brigade had moved to Sylhet, while its third brigade was covering Bhairab Bazar and Ashuganj area; further South. As far ground reality was concerned 22 Baluch was defending the area Sagarnal, Gazipur, Kalaura, Juri with additional company each of Scouts and EPCAF. It was appreciated that about a company of this battalion was deployed along axis Dharmanagar- Juri with couple of Border Out Posts. Border Out Post of a platoon plus strength of regular troops and EPCAF at Sagarnal, a company at Gazipur with about a platoon each of Scouts and EPCAF, battalion headquarter at Kalaura and remainder troops at Maulvi Bazar. Thing not known at that time was that 22 Baluch had additional Reconnaissance and Support elements which had tremendously augmented fire power of their defences.
Indian 59 Mountain Brigade Plan envisaged capture of Sagarnal Border Out Post by 4/5 Gorkha Rifles {Frontier Force} as preliminary operations. 9 Guards to capture Juri, 6 Rajput to capture Gazipur and advance up to Kalaura. 4/5 Gorkha Rifles {Frontier Force} as reserve for 6 Rajput operation and further task to be given as the battle progressed. It was planned that once Kalaura was secured/captured, operations of both brigades of the division will be coordinated.
At Gazipur, Dharmanagar - Kadamtal – Sagarnal – Gazipur – Kalaura road passed through the area dominated by Gazipur Tea Factory Manager’s Bungalow and heights to the Southeast. The row of tea plantation created a maze and these alleys were covered by automatic fire. To its North was high ground with good observation of the area, bunkers around it and characterized by Banana Plantation and called Kela-Ka-Bagicha. On 3 December 1971 around 2100 hours, 6 Rajput attacked Gazipur but met with stiff resistance. An odd hour before first light it was apparent that the attack had failed and it was too late to employ reserves. At this stage 4/5 Gorkha Rifles {Frontier Force} was warned for task for the capture of Gazipur next night; 4/5 December 1971. Day of 4th was utilized for reconnaissance. With the attack launched previous night, Pakistani’s were sensitive in the area, had reorganized their defences to cater for any direction of attack and were supported by artillery guns. The appreciated deployment of Pakistan’s 22 Baluch Company plus at Gazipur was; Kela-Ka-Bagicha; Platoon with section of Scouts; Manager’s Bungalow, Platoon with section Scouts and MMG’s; Factory, Company Headquarter with a platoon, Scouts and Reconnaissance and Support elements. The Pakistani defences were based on built up area and well prepared bunkers. 4/5 Gorkha Rifles {Frontier Force}planned capture of localities in phases; Kela-Ka-Bagicha by Delta Company; Manager’s Bungalow by Alfa Company; Factory by Bravo and Charlie Company; CO 2 {Shyam Kelkar} was made overall commander of Factory assault by B and C Company.
Delta Company led the move to the objective. By about 2030 hours the advancing column reached the height immediately North of Kela-Ka-Bagicha and Pakistani’s opened up with artillery, MMG and LMG’s. It was almost simultaneously that the company charged at about 2045 hours. Apparently Pakistani’s had got wind of the attack at the last minute and their reaction was violent. During the hand to hand fighting casualties occurred. Delta did its bit, captured Kela-ka- Bagicha. However, Company commander was injured during the attack. The next objective Manager’s Bungalow had literary been turned into a fortress with bunkers strewn around the area. The firing was on fixed lines, covering available gaps in the tea plantation rows and the approach from Kela-Ka-Bagicha. Because of loss of radio contact Alfa Company progress was not known and as such Bravo Company was tasked to capture Manager’s Bungalow. Alfa Company didn’t know about Bravo Company being employed in its place from the planned direction. Luckily Alfa’s had taken a slight detour and angled with thrust on the rear side while Bravo targeted it from Kela-Ka-Bagicha side. Casualties were suffered which included Coy Commander of Bravo Company but not before Manager’s Bungalow had been captured. There, however, was one outstation silent; that of CO 2 {Major Shyam Kelkar}. Well along the direction and path of attack CO 2 {Major Shyam Kelkar} had led the attack, was struck with a bullet and had died on the spot.
The last and decisive phase of attack on the Tea Factory can best be narrated in the words of Commanding Officer {Late Brigadier A B Harolikar MVC}; “At this stage I found myself along with my Reconnaissance Group between Manager’s Bungalow and the Factory Gate. The Factory gate was hardly 100 metres in front of me. But an MMG had covered this gate effectively by fire. I noticed a Group of 5-6 jawans {Soldiers}in front of me and some jawans{Soldiers} behind me. We had all automatically taken cover in a longish {but narrow in width, like a drain} nullah, which seemed to be dry and shallow. But its shallow was adequate to protect us from flying splinters of bursting artillery shells and whizzing small arms fire....... Only Charlie company under its company commander had so far not been committed by me in an assault. But I was not aware of what casualties it may have suffered in the relentless artillery pounding and the MMG firing continuously. ......Any further delay in assaulting Factory area would tilt the balance in favour of the enemy. .......I knew that I may not survive the next moment, but I was certain that the Factory area would be ours; for hardly I had rushed forward a few yards when I found that the soldiers who had taken cover in front of me, were now rushing ahead of me, joined by others from behind and those emerging from the darkness. Before I knew what was happening, the small group in front of me had rushed through the gate- through the jaws of death. Who were they? The daredevils? To this day I do not know. It was dark and I could not see the faces. Having rushed inside the factory area we were all dispersed inside in different directions to face any unforeseen circumstances. Enemy soldiers manning the MMG’s and other defences fled leaving some of their dead and wounded besides weapons, ammunition and equipment.” Finally Gazipur Tea Estate location had been captured and with this attack the command and control of 22 Baluch was split, the battalion headquarter slipped away from Kalaura, as 4/5 Gorkha Rifles {Frontier Force} advanced to Kalaura and occupied it on 6 December 1971. Pakistani’s had suffered heavy casualties; 15 dead bodies of the enemy were found on the objective at Gazipur and they must have carried at least 15 bodies and approximately 40 wounded. We too had paid a heavy price; one officer- CO 2 {Major SG Kelkar} and 10 other ranks killed, 4 officers {Jassi Rawat, Viru Rawat, Sahrawat and YB}}, two JCOs {Including Delta Senior JCO Subedar Bal Bahadur Thapa} and 57 other ranks injured.
To the battalion this may have been last of the actions for march to glory but who knows; yes the history at Sylhet was in the making in another few days.!!
[edit] Battle honours
- Peiwar Kotal, Charasiah, Kabul 1879, Kandahar 1880, Afghanistan 1878-80, Punjab Frontier
- The Great War: Suez Canal, Egypt 1915-16, Khan Baghdadi, Mesopotamia 1916-18, Helles, Krithia, Suvla, Sari Bair, Gallipoli 1915, N.W. Frontier India 1917
- Afghanistan 1919, North-West Frontier 1930, North-West Frontier 1936-39
- The Second World War: The Sangro, Caldari, Cassino II, San Angelo in Teodice, Rocca d'Arce, Ripa Ridge, Femmina Morta, Monte San Bartolo, The Senio, Italy 1943-45, Sittang 1942, Yenangyaung 1942, Buthidaung, Stockades, North Arakan, Chindits 1944, Mogaung, Imphal, Sakawng, Shenam Pass, Bishenpur, The Irrawaddy, Sittang 1945, Burma 1942-45
- Zoji La, Kargil, Jammu and Kashmir 1947-48, Charwa, Punjab 1965, Sylhet, East Pakistan 1971, Jammu and Kashmir 1971, Shehjra, Punjab 1971
[edit] Victoria Cross recipients
[edit] Maha Vir Chakra Receipients of 4/5 GR {FF}
- Lieutenant Colonel [Later Brigadier} Arun Bhimrao Harolikar
- Rifleman {Later Havildar} Dil Bahadur Chettri
- Lieutenant Colonel Inder Bal Singh Bawa {Posthumous}
[edit] See also
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