Talk:Battle of the Kasserine Pass
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[edit] US Terminology
In US usage the term "Nth Infantry" or "Nth Armored" refers to a regiment, not a division. So "9th Infantry" would be the 9th Infantry Regiment, not the 9th Infantry Division. This can cause some confusion so I added the term 'Division' where appropriate.
- Please sign your comments with four Tildes after your comments.SSG Cornelius Seon (Retired) 23:02, 8 March 2006 (UTC)
[edit] North African Campaign
There is no such campaign as the North African Campaign. North Africa was a Sub-Theater of the europe-Africa-Middle East Theater of war in World War II. The Tunisian Campaign was just that. SSG Cornelius Seon (Retired) 23:02, 8 March 2006 (UTC)
- May be true from a strict sense in the language you are used to, but I would hate to throw away the North African Campaign article. Perhaps that should be renamed, but I'd like to keep a link. John (Jwy) 23:12, 8 March 2006 (UTC)
- I would disagree. We don't always go by official campaign names here (otherwise we'd be in a heap of problems with conflicting terms, overlap, country-specific names etc.). The NAC is certainly a prevelant enough name for the actions that the article describes. Oberiko 23:35, 8 March 2006 (UTC)
[edit] Correction: North Africa
1935 Hours, 12 April 2006
Corneliusseon is mistaken. Here are the US Army's relevant campaigns.
Egypt-Libya 11 June 1942-12 February 1943
Algeria-French Morocco 8-11 November 1942
Tunisia 17 November 1942-13 May 1943
During the fighting the theater was officially termed the North African Theater of Operations (NATO). It was subordinated to the Mediterranean Theater of Operation (MTO), but never repeat never was a subordinate theater of war to the European Theater of Operations (ETO). After the war, the Army found it more convenient to issue a single campaign ribbon to cover the ETO, MTO, NATO, etc.
[edit] "Aftermath"
I think the changes just reverted are not questionable - what is the specific issue? John (Jwy) 03:40, 11 April 2006 (UTC)
- There being no explanation, I plan to re-insert this information later in the week. Please let me know if I should not (and why not). Let's collaborate here. John (Jwy) 22:21, 11 April 2006 (UTC)
Here's what the West Point Military History Series: Europe and the Mediterranian. has to say in support of the (currently removed) edit:
1. "American armor was employed piecemeal, not in mass..."
2. "The II Corps commander....had proved to be indecisive in crisis."
3. "Initial dispositions had been too dispersed, thereby sacrificing an entire RCT."
4. "The Army Air Force had been ineffectively coordinated."
5. "Units had been haphazardly mixed."
6. "Patton had assumed command of the II Corps after Kasserine, and had immediately begun to rebuild its confidence and strength."
7. "Patton turned the II Corps over to...Bradley".
And here is Johnathan House in Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century:
1. "...a variety of factors, including inexperience, led American commanders to scatter their forces in regimental or smaller units, thereby depriving them of the advantages of the U.S. centralized fire-control system."
2. "In the crisis of Kasserine Pass, however, the artillery of the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions was finally able to operate on an organized basis, with devastating effects on the Germans."
3. "Similar problems arose in the Southwest Pacific, where the ...32nd Division learned at great cost the need to coordinate artillery and air support with the infantry."
4. "Six months before the Normandy invasion, for example, thirty-three U.S. Divisions in England had experienced no joint air-ground training..."
5. "In 1943 the AAF changed the radios in fighter-bombers to a frequency that was incompatible with ground radios."
6. "In short, air and ground units went overseas with little understanding of the tactics and capabilites of their counterparts."
7. "...by early 1944 [in Italy] the British and Americans had improvised a close air support system."
This backs up much of the original edit. The Fredendall quotes were correct also. DMorpheus 01:19, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
On Fredendall, here is Army magazine from March 2003:
1. "He was not a man who worked easily with others, either senior or junior to him."
2. "After several visits, Maj. Gen. Lucian Truscott, Deputy Chief of Staff and Eisenhower's personal representative in Tunisia, painted an unflattering portrait: Small in stature, loud and rough in speech, he was outspoken in his opinions and critical of superiors and subordinates alike. He was inclined to jump to conclusions which were not always well founded. He rarely left his command post for personal visits and reconnaissance, yet he was impatient with the recommendations of subordinates more familiar with the terrain and other conditions than he.
3. "His outspoken antipathy for our allies, especially the British, was more than reciprocated. Anderson, his immediate superior, thought him incompetent."
4. "In a coalition command where allied cooperation was viewed as crucial to victory, Fredendall's open antagonism to the British was a serious management problem for Eisenhower. "
5. "Complicating his command relationships was his habit of speaking in a kind of shorthand slang, giving rise to confusion about what he actually meant. This sloppiness of speech and use of obscure, barely decipherable phrases occasionally caused serious problems, especially when he was issuing orders during battle."
6. "He had an openly hostile relationship with Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward, commanding general, 1st Armored Division, described by Truscott as "an antipathy most unusual." Ward was a quiet, intelligent, decorated combat veteran of World War I, respected throughout the Army. "
7. "The other division commanders, Maj. Gen. Terry Alien of the 1st Infantry, Maj. Gen. Charles (Doc) Ryder of the 34th, and Maj. Gen. Troy Middleton of the 9th, as well as many staff members, were also dissatisfied with Fredendall's leadership. Lt. Col. Hamilton Howze, Ward's operations officer (G-3) and later a four-star general, developed "such a detestation for Fredendall that it was hard to control, simply because of the way he treated Gen. Ward.""
8. "...his disposition of forces appeared piecemeal and sloppy. "
9. "Ike was especially shocked by the dug-in, well-fortified and inaccessible command post (CP) so far from the front -more than 70 miles-and Fredendall's unwillingness to leave it for front-line visits. Located deep in a ravine that was accessible by a narrow road constructed by II Corps engineers, Speedy Valley as it was called, took three weeks to build and absorbed the efforts of a full company of men working day and night blasting elaborate shelters for the headquarters. It was, in Omar Bradley's words, "an embarrassment to every American soldier" and was contemptuouslytuously referred to as "Lloyd's very last resort" and "Shangri-la, a million miles from nowhere."" (Note: my edit had wrongly said an engineer battalion was committed to this effort. My bad.)
10. "The troop dispositions were disappointing, with infantry, tank and artillery units intermixed and based on widely separated hills unable to support each other. It was exactly the "penny packet" formations that had led to British defeats in the early phase of the Desert War. Eisenhower's original idea was to maintain the 1st Armored as a fully massed and mobile reaction force able to intervene decisively wherever needed. Now it was scattered all over the field. Even more troubling, Ike learned that Fredendall had never visited the front and that the deployments were based on maps hanging in his underground headquarters."
11. "Eisenhower: "What do you think of the command here?" Bradley: "It's pretty bad. I've talked to all the division commanders. To a man they've lost confidence in Fredendall as the corps commander."" March 5 1943 at II Corps HQ.
Eisenhower then relieved Frednedall. On Mar 6 Patton took command.
12. "The institutional politics that kept him in a position for which he was totally unsuited-long after it was painfully obvious-were never openly subjected to examination or criticism. " DMorpheus 01:46, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
2140 Hours 13 April, 2006
It looks like you have done your homework, but I question why you left out the most significant observation made about the subject on page 175 of The West Point Military History Series: Europe and the Mediterranian. I have no objection to the material in question being restored, although I reserve the possiblity that it might require some minor editing.
Now that we have this out of the way, it would be very nice if you would go to the Sherman page and restore, not revert, the material you reverted previously. (Remember, I provided the sources you requested.)
- Thank you, Philippsbourg. If I had known it was citations you were looking for, I could have done the same. John (Jwy) 05:45, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
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- Well call me puzzled. Phillipsbourg already had this reference and now has no problem with the edit he reverted. Why then was it ever reverted if he knew it was a valid edit? Why was the edit labeled "questionable"?
P.S. The after-action reports from 1st Armored Div, as well as Harmon's report on "Lessons Learned" lend further support and additional detail to the original edit. DMorpheus 13:50, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
1010 Hours 13 April 2006
YOUR ANSWER
It would be very nice if you would go to the Sherman page and restore, not revert, the material you reverted previously. (Remember, I provided the sources you requested.) You made a mistake, and you should correct it.
- I don't know the details, but would suggest that it might be more of a disagreement over appropriate content than a "mistake." In any event, the information you entered is available by selecting the appropriate entry on the history tab of the page in question. I encourage you to recover what you think appropriate, just as we will "recover" what information we can from the history here. John (Jwy) 18:05, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
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- I am puzzled as well, but at this point it is a moot point (or will be when we properly incorporate the changes). I would be interested in the answer, but let's let this one go and deal any issues that might come up in the future. John (Jwy) 14:43, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
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[edit] Commander reorganization
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- Who did the reorganization of the commanders? Eisenhower, Alexander ?GraemeLeggett 09:04, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
- The relief of Fredendall was Eisenhower's decision. The appointment of Alexander was a decision that had been made earlier at Casablanca. Source is the West Point Military History Series: Europe and the Mediterranian. DMorpheus 00:56, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
- Who did the reorganization of the commanders? Eisenhower, Alexander ?GraemeLeggett 09:04, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
[edit] USACMH AME THEATER MAP
I added the USACMH's map of the Africa, Mdit, European Theater SSG Cornelius Seon (Retired) 04:08, 11 April 2006 (UTC)
[edit] REsult
The result says German victory, which is true of the first stage but the pass is then retaken - so how come "German victory"? GraemeLeggett 11:11, 16 April 2006 (UTC)
The battle box's "DECISIVE German victory" certainly makes no sense. Also, please see the casualty question below.Wikist 13:43, 16 April 2006 (UTC)
[edit] Casualties
The casualty figures look questionable; perhaps people mixed different geographic or time scales. Compare the battle box to this forum post (the poster identifies himself as from the Dupuy Institute which specializes in statistical analysis of casualties):
- "Actual US tank losses from 14 to 20 February were 98 medium and 2 light tanks. Of those, 46 medium and 2 light tanks were lost 14 February at Sidi Bou Zid and 48 medium tanks were lost in the US counterattack at Sidi Bou Zid on 15 February. The remaining 4 medium tanks were lost 16-20 February, most likely in the operations near Kasserine Pass itself.
- "The battle casualties are somewhat more confused, but hardly approached the levels suggested, especially in killed. Total battle casualties to US Army forces engaged in the battle (1st AD and elements of the 1st and 34th ID), for the entire campaign (8 November 1942-13 May 1943) included just 1,625 KIA, 5,757 WIA and 3,990 MIA and CAP. And for February, total theater casualties to the US Army, including Air Corps, were 431 KIA, 1,014 WIA and 3,355 MIA and CAP.
- "As far as the fragmentary battle casualty reports for the engagements go, it may be estimated that from 14-20 February losses were 45-46 KIA, 130-176 WIA and 2,138-2,378 MIA."
I suggest that the casualty figures be confirmed or amended or removed. Thank you. Wikist 13:36, 16 April 2006 (UTC)
- If you go look at the external resource list on the task force page, you will find a link to the official list of casualties that are posted over on the CMH website. This list has official casualties from every US Conflict from the Revolution to the modern day. These are based on the records created at the time the bodies were discovered and interred. SSG Cornelius Seon (Retired) 14:11, 16 April 2006 (UTC)
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- I didn't see anything that provides Kasserine Pass figures.Wikist 14:28, 16 April 2006 (UTC)
A month has passed with no corroboration so I removed the losses numbers from the battle box. The box dated 2/19-25 combined with the text on Faid 2/14-19 claimed that the US lost 418 tanks and 986 vehicles in 12 days. Sources seem to agree that most losses occurred before 2/21 and the Army lists II Corp's entire losses for the entire month 1/21-2/21 at 183 tanks and 828 other vehicles (Mayo 1991 p. 138). Wikist 20:32, 18 May 2006 (UTC)
Someone posted new anonymous figures in the battle box that claim that Fredendall's troops lost 10,000 dead and wounded in 12 days, while another source claims that the primary US units lost only 7,400 dead and wounded in all the entire 6 months of North African combat.Wikist 18:03, 20 May 2006 (UTC)
iI guess americansAmericans cantcan't addmitadmit a defeat.strange Strange peapolpeople.—The preceding unsigned comment was added by 205.188.116.195 (talk • contribs) . and spelling, etc. corrected by John (Jwy) 18:12, 30 May 2006 (UTC)
- Hello. Please post in a relevant topic. This topic is not about victory or defeat, it is about accurate casualty figures. You might have meant to put this comment in the "Result" topic above, where, by the way, the person who questioned German victory is NOT American. Thank you.Wikist 18:06, 30 May 2006 (UTC)
Is British!! lol
[edit] THIS ARTICLE START TO STINK!! YES !!!
ALl day navigating throught the wikipedia gives me a big headache.Is really bad and shamefull to see all military articles with rampaging vandalism. Especially because it have info that doesnt fit in some retarded people. It really makes me get angry. PEOPLE LOVE TO CHANGE TITLES AND CASUALTIES TO PRO AMERICAN ENDS!!! Is everywhere. But i must recognise there are many German vandalisers in this pages. Use sources ,and good sources not especulations of famous personalities. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 201.230.138.210 (talk • contribs) .
- I would suggest you remove the all but the last sentence of this post, the rest is not useful and steps on several Wikipedia policies. Perhaps add more specifics about what you are upset about, sign up with a Wikipedia id and cooperate in trying to make things better. Otherwise, save yourself some headaches and stop navigating through wikipedia. (John User:Jwy talk) 16:00, 12 August 2006 (UTC)
- I'm sorry that this article bothers you 201.230.138.210, but throwing a tantrum like an angry child about it isn't going to solve anything. Please specify where you see these so-called inaccuracies and provide your sources which present differently. Oberiko 17:58, 13 August 2006 (UTC)
Here are some: Regarding the German Casualties:
http://www.feldgrau.net/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?p=81776&sid=569b9b7a5011b452e52f163a4a67d5fa That can be checked by this website:
http://www.europa1939.com/ww2/1943/kasserine.html Other source:
http://www.worldwar2database.com/html/kasserine.htm
http://www.olive-drab.com/od_history_ww2_ops_battles_1943tunisia.php
For more complete information buy the book:
Kasserine Pass 1943: Rommel's last victory
- AFAIK, we don't accept forum postings as official sources, as the poster is almost always anonymous and not properly verified. Published materials, on the other hand, are quite acceptable.
- If you have casualty figures with sources to back them up, there's no problem with changing them. Just be sure to make note of your source (and page if possible) in a reference beside the figures. Should someone else have other published materials which list different figures, then both will be expressed as a range. Oberiko 18:38, 13 August 2006 (UTC)
I will post the info of the book, try to buy it so you can check it personaly, if i post the spanish information some people will not believe it and the other source have a sourced aproximation. so it will tak e some time.Thanks.
Sorry for the bad mood. bye
[edit] Strange placement of [Edit] link for "Background" section
For me, using Firefox 2 on Win XP, the [Edit] link for the "Background" section is in a strange place, overlapping some of the body text in that section. Who knows how to fix this problem? Andrew Moylan 12:48, 18 April 2007 (UTC)