Talk:Battle of Britain/Archive 5
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Addition to External References
What do you think of Shoreham Aircraft Museaum http://www.shoreham-aircraft-museum.co.uk as an additional external reference, unfortunately I can't add it myself as am unable to edit this article. Wikimsd 13:56, 16 September 2007 (UTC)
Done. Wikimsd (talk) 17:12, 14 January 2008 (UTC)
Strategy & tactics
I can't source it (I think it was a TV doc), but I've heard Fighter Command attacked in a line astern formation, one at a time, which would explain the Idiotenreihen ("rows of idiots") ref. Also, I deleted "lacking the heavy bombers and long-range fighters it needed to take up a strategic role", because I'm far from convinced strategic bombing had anything to do with the battle; it was a tactical battle for superiority over the beachhead, not a campaign to defeat Britain proper. And it wasn't a fight to defeat all the RAF, tho it's often framed as such, but to defeat Fighter Command & thus achieve local superiority. Trekphiler (talk) 08:19, 5 January 2008 (UTC)
Isn't the aim to "defeat Fighter Command" total? Defeating Fighter Command defeats Bomber Command, as the latter cannot operate without protection from the former - the losses in France support that. It should be noted that the Luftwaffe tried strategic bombing on 15 September which is in the time-frame of the battle (31 October), as German strategy shifted to civilian targets. I'm sure it had everything to do with the battle :). Dapi89 (talk) 22:41, 23 January 2008 (UTC)
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- Maybe it's semantics. The target is FC, not the whole RAF, nor BC; there were no attacks on BC or CC bases. Whether defeat of FC =defeat RAF is in question; wouldn't necessarily prevent (suicidal) attacks by BC Battles, Blenheims, &c, or night attacks on Germany by Stirlings. K? Trekphiler (talk) 14:39, 24 January 2008 (UTC)
I agree FC was the target. But I believe, as you have pointed out, the rest of the RAF would be ineffective. BC would only be a nuisance and cause the Jagdwaffe to use up ammo unitil it was spent. So we could say FC was the vital link holding everything together, it's elimination meant destruction for the RAF. I believe also a number of BC bases were targeted as a result of RAF raids over Ostend (to nail German invasion craft).
With regard to your earlier point, I agree this is why the Germans refered to them this way. Several RAF pilots complained about the formation and the RAF was relatively slow at adapting its formation techniques. They called the patrol formations "the grape formation" as each aircraft were packed close together. Some refused to be "arse-end charlie" because of danger posed by the German fighters who couldn't miss a sitting duck at the end. Dapi89 (talk) 17:39, 24 January 2008 (UTC)
- I don't disagree with the "lynchpin" argument, but what's being said (or very strongly suggested) is all RAF had to be destroyed, clearly not so; the effect might be all RAF would be (or at least neutralized), but that's not what's being claimed. As for attacking BC bases, IIRC it was a handful of attacks, nothing like the scale of those against FC, so I don't count them.
- About Idiotenreihen, if you could source it...? Trekphiler (talk) 02:34, 28 January 2008 (UTC)
Perhaps this should be adjusted then to this line of argument? I just was just pointing out that "no attacks" on BC bases was incorrect. Sure, when I can I'll add this soon. Dapi89 (talk) 14:51, 28 January 2008 (UTC)
Done. Dapi89 (talk) 15:56, 28 January 2008 (UTC)
- Thanks. After jumping in on other sensitive pages (Attack on Pearl Harbor, for instance), I'm a bit leery of making bigger changes without at least some consensus, first.
- Any thoughts on a link out on mistakes made by both sides & potential consequences? Chances of Ger victory, RAF attacking German bases (per Allan), that like. Trekphiler (talk) 19:13, 28 January 2008 (UTC)
I'm not sure about this. This would be rather speculative, perhaps branching into Alternate history (of which I am a fan!). I mean, the consequences of various mistakes made were realised on the German side, as for the British it would seem quite obvious consequences of continued mistakes would have led to defeat - but it would be debatable if this would have enabled a successful Op. Sealion. You probably wouldn't be able to satisfy everyone, and it could turn into an problematic article with editors squabbling over the unprovable. My own "2 cent" would be that RAF attacks on German bases would have been a waste of resources - precious fighter pilots would have been lost that were needed for defence. I suppose even if they bailed out they would be lost - perhaps experienced leaders like Bader and Tuck would have been lost at a crucial time unlike the relatively "safe" period of 1941-42.
I tend to believe that even with total German air-superiority it would have been close run. Much has been said about the lack of anti-shipping experiences and training in the Luftwaffe, but it effectiveness over Scandinavia, and Dunkerque proved its potential. Ships did not have to be sunk to be removed from the battle. A relatively small operational area would have benefited the Germans interception rate against R.N forces.
Having said all that, I suppose I could conjure up some good references of prominent aviation historians view points on this subject. I think I can find some material on Overy, Macksey, Price and I think Bungay's opinions on this. This will avoid too much heated debate in such an article. Would this help? Dapi89 (talk) 21:34, 28 January 2008 (UTC)
- Ditto on alternate history. SS-GB is a masterpiece.
- I do think it's possible to offer unbiased thoughts on the possible effects. I think of Allen in Who Won?, Macksey's Hitler's Mistakes, & Quarrie's Hitler: The Victory that Nearly Was (some points of which I disagree with...). (In a similar vein, but OT, John Hughes-Wilson's Military Intelligence Blunders and Cover-Ups looks at failures.) Further off are the Cowley What If? 1 & 2, & Deutsch & Showalter's What If. Maybe it's speculative, but without knowing what didn't happen, it's hard to appreciate what did. I'm not suggesting going as far as Macksey did in Invasion, let alone SS-GB (& certainly not that laughable garbage in Harris' Fatherland), but what Allen did: the Germans didn't do a systematic analysis of British targets, didn't hit a/c mfg, didn't concentrate on any 1 target, ignored commo (which would've paralyzed the Sector Control/GCI system as surely as KOing radar towers, & more EZly), that like.
- On attacking German bases, I'm with Allen, again. He suggests (& I agree) a handful of dawn/dusk strikes, in the fashion of German intruder missions (or what the Brits called Rhubarbs, if I understand correctly) could have gone off with slim chance of German interception (even FC had trouble against intruders, & that was with CH/CHL, Observer Corps, & a well-prepared organization to deal with them) & the potential to do crushing damage. This also falls under the "what if" I'm talking about: what might the effects have been had FC used its Blenheims for this? Allen makes some suggestions; is there evidence for it? Not just "I say so", but actual evidence. I'm not sufficiently aware, but I'd guess there's a pretty extensive literature on the effects, in Britain, just judging from Allen & Macksey.
- I've a hunch it won't pass some "What WP's not" guideline, tho... Trekphiler (talk) 02:18, 29 January 2008 (UTC)
Acthtung, Spitfire
I get the feeling the sources (or editors) are biased against the 109, since there's significant praise of the Spit, & little of the 109; moreover, I've always had the impression the 109 was the better aircraft. I'm not sure how to address this, since so much of "superior performance" is subjective (based on pilot skill); I have to ask if British sources don't have an inherent bias. Can somebody with better sources than me have a look? Trekphiler (talk) 10:57, 21 January 2008 (UTC)
Agree. I'll add some more tech. info soon. Dapi89 (talk) 23:00, 23 January 2008 (UTC)
Half Lützow
While I don't mean to deny Lützow's contribution, by precedence, Boelcke should get the credit, since Lützow was going over well-tilled ground, no? Or is his contribution more substantial? Trekphiler (talk) 02:29, 28 January 2008 (UTC)
? Not sure I follow. Boelcke is credited in the article. It states that Lützow and Mölders developed their tactics based on his principles - this in its self is a loose assumption. Although the element of suprise (the need to see one's enemy first) is covered in the article Dicta Boelcke, Boelcke did not really cover the "how" this was to be achieved in relation to the style of formation. Lützow invented the Finger four as the "how", while Mölders addapted its manoeuvrability with the "tac-turn". Lützow came up with the fundamentals, which I think was the basis for flexibility. Dapi89 (talk) 14:48, 28 January 2008 (UTC)
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- That's what I was getting at. (Unclear, again. I should change my username to Mysterio or something! =D) Knowing Boelcke codified the principles, I was wondering if Lützow et al. just reiterated, or added. Looks like he & Mölders made significant additions.
- Can this be linked in somehow? I'm thinking of a link to something like a "fighter tactics" page (I don't see one) where the developments can be covered in more detail, & where others, like Chennault & Thach can be included. Comment? Trekphiler (talk) —Preceding comment was added at 19:20, 28 January 2008 (UTC)
Yes I think this would make a good article. Perhaps we could branch out a little further to include the Western Campign as well, to include French doctrine. Dapi89 (talk) 21:45, 28 January 2008 (UTC)
- I'm thinking much broader, going WW1 right up to today. I'm just not sufficiently versed to name too many others, tho now, "Boots" Blesse (?) comes to mind. ("Learn to love the vertical.") Trekphiler (talk) 01:40, 29 January 2008 (UTC)
Sure I think this would be great. I'll help. Dapi89 (talk) 11:48, 30 January 2008 (UTC)