Battle of Osan
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
| Battle of Osan | |||||||
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| Part of Korean War | |||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||
 United States |
 North Korea |
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| Commanders | |||||||
| LTC. Charles B. Smith | |||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 540 | 1,100 | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 120 killed, 36 captured |
42 killed, 85 wounded |
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The Battle of Osan was the first engagement between United States and North Korean forces during the Korean War. Vastly outnumbered and ill-equipped, U.S. Task Force Smith of 540 men suffered 180 casualties while inflicting about 120 casualties on the North Korean force and delaying them half a day.
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[edit] Background
Task Force Smith was named for Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith, commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 21st Regiment, 24th Infantry Division. The division had M24 Chaffee light tanks and M3 Half-tracks, but no one thought beforehand of getting hydraulic fluid for the M24s and flying them by cargo plane to give the needed mobility, armor protection or firepower. Another option was to use LSTs and move the M24 light tanks and half-tracks by sea, which was also not considered. Instead, the force was moved by a hodge-podge of wheeled trucks.
The unit comprised 406 officers and men: half of the battalion headquarters company, two understrength rifle companies (B and C), a communications section, a recoilless rifle platoon and two mortar platoons. In addition to its rifles, the task force had two 75 mm recoilless rifles, two 4.2-inch mortars, six 2.36-inch "bazooka" rocket launchers and four 60 mm mortars. Supporting Task Force Smith were 108 men from the 52nd Field Artillery Battalion armed with six 105 mm howitzers. Ammunition for the howitzers consisted only of High Explosive rounds and six armor piercing High Explosive Anti Tank (HEAT) rounds. Each man was issued 120 rounds of ammunition and two days' worth of C-rations. All the equipment was of World War II vintage. All the soldiers were from the Army of Occupation of Japan. Most of the men were 20 years old or less; only one sixth had seen combat.
The men of Task Force Smith left Japan on the morning of 1 July 1950. Major General William Dean, 24th Division commander, ordered Smith to block the main road to Pusan as far north as possible.
On 4 July, Smith's divided command reunited at P'yongt'aek and was joined there by a part of the 52d Field Artillery Battalion. This artillery contingent comprised one-half each of Headquarters and Service Batteries and all of A Battery with 6 105-mm howitzers, 73 vehicles, and 108 men under the command of Lt. Col. Miller O. Perry. It had crossed from Japan on an LST on 2 July, disembarking at Pusan late that night. Two trains the next day carried the unit to Taejon. There General Church ordered Perry to join Smith at P'yongt'aek, and at about 21:00 that night Perry's artillery group entrained and departed northward. Because of the destroyed railroad station at P'yongt'aek, the train stopped at Songhwan-ni, where the artillerymen unloaded and drove on the six miles (10 km) to P'yongt'aek before daylight.
On 4 July, Task Force Smith set up a defensive position covering the road between the cities of Suwon and Osan.
[edit] Battle
Shortly after 07:00 on 5 July, a column of eight North Korean T-34 tanks, part of the 107th Tank Regiment of the 105th Armored Division, approached across the open plain from Suwon. The 105 mm howitzers first opened fire with high explosive rounds which proved ineffective against the reinforced tanks. A single howitzer, deployed in a forward position and armed with the six HEAT rounds, then opened fire, damaging one T-34 and setting another on fire before being destroyed. Once in range, Task Force Smith engaged the tanks with the 75 mm recoilless rifles and 2.36-inch bazookas. 2nd Lieutenant Ollie Connor fired 22 rockets at a range of 15 yards at the rear of the tanks, where their armor is weakest. Neither weapon had any effect. The 2.36-inch rounds could not penetrate the armor of the T-34. Smith later said he believed that the rounds had deteriorated with age.
The 3.5-inch bazooka round would have been effective, but there were none in the unit. In truth, the high-explosive rounds of these two weapons were the reason they had no effect against the North Korean tanks. Only HEAT rounds could defeat the T-34's armor, and they were in very short supply.
After raking the positions with shell and machine gun fire, killing or wounding 20 US soldiers, the North Korean column continued south unmolested.
At about 11:00, three more tanks were sighted advancing from the north. Behind them was a column of trucks, followed by two infantry regiments of the North Korean 4th Division. The column apparently was not in communication with the tanks that had preceded it.
It took about an hour for the head of the column to reach a point about 1,000 yards from the American position, when Smith ordered to open fire. American mortars and machine guns swept the North Korean column causing heavy casualties but did not stop the three tanks. These advanced to within 300 yards and raked the ridge with shell and machine gun fire.
Smith held his position as long as he dared, but casualties mounted rapidly. His men were down to less than 20 rounds of ammunition each, and the North Koreans threatened to cut off the position. The North Korean tanks were to the rear of the American position, and Smith consolidated his force in a circular perimeter on the highest ground east of the road. The North Koreans were using mortar and artillery fire.
About 16:30, Smith ordered a withdrawal. Under heavy fire, the American troops abandoned weapons and equipment in sometimes precipitous flight. Not all of them had received word of the withdrawal, and it was at this point that the Americans suffered most of their casualties. When they reached the battery position Smith was surprised to find it intact with only Perry and one other man wounded. The artillerymen disabled the five remaining howitzers by removing their sights and breechblocks. Then all walked to the outskirts of Osan where they recovered most of their trucks that had been hidden earlier. There was no enemy pursuit.
[edit] Aftermath
In the battle approximately 150 American infantrymen were killed, wounded, or missing. North Korean casualties were approximately 42 dead and 85 wounded; four tanks had been destroyed or immobilized. The North Korean advance was delayed perhaps seven hours.
[edit] References
- Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, eds. America's First Battles, 1776-1965 (1986)
- Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (1960) Office of the Chief of Military History, US Army
