Talk:Existence

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The state that follows creation and precedes death.

Talk:Existence/Archive 1

1 new intro
2 First sentence
3 nominalism and realism
4 Descartes, again
5 Existential generalization
6 Meinong and existence
7 Semantics of existence
8 Trying for rewrite of "Semantics" section
9 New lead
10 Extending section of Semantics of Existence

[edit] new intro

I've made another attempt at an introduction which is readable, which covers the main points in the article, and which I hope answers the main objections to the old introduction. Rick Norwood 14:22, 20 August 2007 (UTC)

I've added some references, and (forgive me) weeded out 'epistemological' claims about existence, which are easily confused with issues about existence itself. With existence itself, we are concerned about what it is, how we define it, whether we can define it, problems that philosophers have had with the very concept itself. Cartesian questions like whether we can be certain of the existence of certain things, should not be in this article. edward (buckner) 14:50, 20 August 2007 (UTC)

I'm very glad to have you weigh in on what was getting out of hand. I understand and now agree with your assertion that Descartes' famous dictum has more to do with epistemology than with ontology. Rick Norwood 15:11, 20 August 2007 (UTC)

See my note above on 'Pegasus'. My memory of modern logic is getting rusty, but I am right about 'existential generalisation'? Where is it in Wikipedia? edward (buckner) 14:59, 20 August 2007 (UTC)

Looking through articles like Existential quantification and doing a search through WP suggests that there is no treatment of existential generalization anywhere. I can hardly believe it. Perhaps the variant spelling / terminology is the problem. Would anyone else care to check? edward (buckner) 15:14, 20 August 2007 (UTC)

I'll find a citation for your NOT(x=y), now that you've added the necessary qualifying clause. I'm not sure what you mean by "existential generalisation". It sounds like what is now called the scientific method. That is, "Socrates is mortal", "Plato is mortal", "Aristotle is mortal", we know of no exceptions to this pattern, therefore "All men are mortal."

I didn't write the not x=y bit. Existential generalization is the rule that from Pa, infer Ex Px. Google it and find out. edward (buckner) 15:14, 20 August 2007 (UTC)

I am still unclear why you do not consider the question of the existence of things not seen -- gods in particular -- not an important ontological question. As you may remember, I don't believe in such things, but whether or not existence is created seems to me an important ontological question, as does the question of whether or not existence is confined to that which we may, at least in theory, experience. Rick Norwood 15:11, 20 August 2007 (UTC)

The existence of God, or of gods, is part of theology, or is discussed in the Ontological argument article. The existence of black holes, particles &c is part of physics. It's not that such questions are not important, the question is what belongs in the scope of the article. This article is about what it means to say something 'exists', and the difficulties around that. It's not about specific existential questions like, does God exist. edward (buckner) 15:22, 20 August 2007 (UTC)

I can live with that, especially since we finally seem to be making progress. I'm going to remove the not(x=y), if you have no objection.

Ah, that "existential generalization". Godel, for example, demonstrated that there are statements that are true, but which cannot be proven true. I assume that the question you raise is this. Can we, from the statement "3 is odd", deduce the statement "There exists a 3 and it is odd." My guess is, no, we can't. For example, from "Pegasus flies" we cannot deduce the statement, "There exists a Pegasus and it flies." Therefore existential generalization would be a fallacy. Rick Norwood 15:38, 20 August 2007 (UTC)

? Rick I'm not with you. EG is a standard bit of predicate calculus. That is a fact. The point of the paragraph in question is to show that there is a problem with it, applied to ordinary language. edward (buckner) 15:46, 20 August 2007 (UTC)

Specifically, the paragraph is highlighting a problem. 'Pegasus flies' implies 'something (namely Pegasus) flies'. It is this intuition that leads to the EG rule in standard logic (in Free Logic this rule is rejected, for the reasons alluded to in the paragraph). The problem is that 'Pegasus does not fly' implies something (namely Pegasus) does not fly. I.e. whether the sentence is true or false, something is Pegasus. It is merely identifying a difficulty (one which Free Logic supposedly solves). edward (buckner) 15:50, 20 August 2007 (UTC)

This wasn't a part of predicate calculus the last time I taught the subject, but that was some years back. On the other hand, it sounds like one of Frege's ideas that Russell found counterexamples to, so I'm going to have to do some research and get back to you. Rick Norwood 18:22, 20 August 2007 (UTC)

I'm bemused by this. It's one of the first things you learn about natural deduction. My undergraduate primer was Lemmon. Here, for example. It is sometimes called different names (existentialization, particularization) so maybe that's where the confusion lies. edward (buckner) 08:13, 21 August 2007 (UTC)

[edit] First sentence

"Existence is the property of being; that which is in the category of what is."

I've tried to parse this generously, in some way that would give the statement content, but I can't, so I'm afraid I'm going to have to ask for a reference.

To demonstrate my problem, suppose this was an article about cats. Would you begin by saying, "Cat is the property of being a cat; a cat is that which is in the category of cats." I find your definition of existence similarly vacuous. If you can quote a reputable source for it, I'll stand down. Rick Norwood 18:36, 20 August 2007 (UTC)

I agree. The first clause is contentious, because the main dispute in this area is precisely whether existence is a property or not. The second clause is vacuous. Existence is in the category of what exists. edward (buckner) 08:14, 21 August 2007 (UTC)

good luck finding a better opening line. if you find a worse one, i'll revert it. i'm open to a better starting definition. existence is a vacuous notion. it only means is. x is is equivalent to x exists or has the property of existence. if you were to define it in sets, it is the set of things that are or what is. --Buridan 13:33, 21 August 2007 (UTC)

"Being is that which belongs to every conceivable term, to every possible object, of thought-in short to everything that can possibly occur in any proposition, true or false, and to all such propositions themselves... To exist is to have a specific relation to existence-a relation, by the way, which existence itself does not have... For what does not exist must be something, or it would be meaningless to deny its existence ; and hence we need the concept of being, as that which belongs even to the non-existent." — pp. 449-450, Bertrand Russell - The Principles of Mathematics - New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1903, second edition 1937.

Definitions (from external link) Newbyguesses - Talk 12:58, 21 August 2007 (UTC)

That was not in support of the current first sentence, it is weak, by all means upgrade it. I meant it as food for thought, and from a mathematical viewpoint, but it would be best to read the whole paragraph by following the link on the articlepage. Newbyguesses - Talk 13:07, 21 August 2007 (UTC)

Since we are using existence in the common sense of the word, and since it is difficult to define, I think it is best to locate the study by the area in which it occurs and its name within that area. The whole rest of the article discusses the problem of what existence is -- we can hardly hope to answer that question. Rick Norwood 13:54, 21 August 2007 (UTC)

[edit] nominalism and realism

Dbuckner wrote "nominalist = medieval nominalist." My understanding of the medieval sense of the words is that "realists", following Plato, taught that abstractions really existed, while "nominalists" taught that abstractions were only names, with no real existence. Is this really how the words are still used in modern philosophy? Rick Norwood 12:46, 22 August 2007 (UTC)

Generally yes. But in any case, if you try reading past that sentence, you will find that the section is about 'medieval nominalism'. Either way, whoever put in the bit I removed wasn't thinking too hard. edward (buckner) 21:06, 22 August 2007 (UTC)

There is this sentence — Thus Ockham argued that "Socrates has wisdom", which apparently asserts the existence of a reference for "wisdom", can be rewritten as "Socrates is wise", which contains only the referring phrase "Socrates". — Some linking text could then follow on Problem of universals#Medieval nominalism, but there seems enough for now on Ockham and his clever razor. Nominalism, as a school, retains substantial connection to its roots, is my understanding. (There is this recent thread at the humanities reference Desk - [1] ) - Newbyguesses - Talk 13:08, 22 August 2007 (UTC)

If you want to link to an article that is rubbish, fine. It has a splendid sentence 'A position subsequently identified as conceptualism was formulated by Pierre Abelard'. There are two fundamental errors in that sentence. edward (buckner) 21:08, 22 August 2007 (UTC)

Thanks edward. That phrase - The nominalist approach to the question (not to be confused with the scholastic usage of "nominalist") is to argue that ... - had been there for some time. I opened a thread at the Humanities reference Desk on ==Ockham and Existence== yesterday on this, by the time I got it figured out, the "confusing' sentence was already gone! Thanks also for the information on that other article - I must look closely at that sort of thing, it seems one just cannot believe everything one reads, these days. Newbyguesses - Talk 23:10, 22 August 2007 (UTC)

I think I was the one who put in the "confusing sentence". Thanks for setting me right and removing it. Rick Norwood 13:19, 23 August 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Descartes, again

I am not sure - if Descartes believes that he exists, then that is ontology; or else, Descartes believes that he exists, and that is epistomology. If this is too confusing, a replacement could be found for Descartes in the leadsect. I think it best to keep a sentence there, rather than just delete Descartes, if there are any suggestions? Is this needed, Edward, otherwise, we can leave well enough alone with the leadsect. for now, it seems to be working alright. I believe I noticed some recent discussion here concerning Descarte's suitability, though I do think it works OK for now, Newbyguesses - Talk 02:21, 23 August 2007 (UTC)

My own formulation of Descartes' famous dictum is that the universal set is not equal to the empty set. But that would be original research. Rick Norwood 13:21, 23 August 2007 (UTC)

From nothing, nothing could have proceeded. Therefore, from nothing, everything must have proceeded. (Being too unlearned and uninformed to be capable of Original, Reseasch, I , must have read this somewhere?) Newbyguesses - Talk 07:56, 28 August 2007 (UTC)

Sounds familiar to me. I'm also fond of the Gahan Wilson cartoon of people bowing down to an empty alter, "Is Nothing Sacred?" Rick Norwood 17:14, 28 August 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Existential generalization

I'm still trying to understand what is going on with existential generalization. I find it in books from the 1950s and earlier, e.g. Suppes, "Introduction to Logic", but not in books 1970 or later, e.g. Hamilton, "Logic for Mathematicians" or the "Encyclopedic Dictionary of Mathematics". The online sources I looked at are either from philosophy or else from class notes.

The problem with existential generalization (the problem we are having here is a special case) is with statements that are vacuously true. For example, "If an even prime is bigger than two then it is green." is a vacuously true statement. We would not, however, assert that there exists a green even prime bigger than two. I think we get around this by paying closer attention to the scope of the quantifier. In the statement "There exists x, if x is an even prime bigger than two then x is green." the scope of the quantifier must be everything that follows. Therefore 42 is an example of such an x, since the statement "If 42 is an even prime bigger than 2 then 42 is green." is a true statement, as is any statement with a false hypothesis.

How does this apply to our Pegasus? "Pegasus flies." is equivalent to, "If there is a Pegasus, then it flies." We apply existential generalization to get "There exists x, if x is a Pegasus then x flies." Keeping in mind that the scope of the quantifier must be the entire rest of the sentence, Lassie is an example of such an x, since the statement "If Lassie is a Pegasus, then Lassie flies." is a true statement.

Why the phrase "existential generalization" does not appear in the later books I looked at still puzzles me. Maybe it has gone out of style, or maybe I just looked in the wrong books.

Rick Norwood 14:04, 23 August 2007 (UTC)

I'm not sure you understand EG. EG is only from singular terms. Your example "If an even prime is bigger than two then it is green." is a universally quantified sentence.

(x) [ [even(x) & prime(x) & x > 2] -> green(x) ]

Now, as it happens, we can existentially generalise on the number 2, to give

(E y) (x) [ [even(x) & prime(x) & x > y] -> green(x) ]

i.e. there is some number (namely 2) such that &c. But your translation

"There exists x, if x is an even prime bigger than two then x is green."

is not correct.

>>How does this apply to our Pegasus?

Let p be Pegasus. Then EG allows us to infer from 'flies(p)' that 'Ex flies(x)'. Does that help? edward (buckner) 11:18, 27 August 2007 (UTC)

The trouble I have with that example is, what are we to do with the statement "Pegasus flies faster than the speed of light." We certainly cannot conclude there exists x that flies faster than the speed of light.

Here is what Suppes says. "Existential Generalization (EG). The assertion that a condition is satisfied by a named individual implies the assertian that this condition is satisfied by some individual."

As an example, he writes "Ma" and on the next line, he uses EG to deduce from Ma the following: (There exists x) Mx.

Here is how Hamilton, twenty years later, handles the same situation. (There exists x)A is an abbreviation for ~((for all x)(~A)), where A is any well formed formula. Since implications are well formed formulas, Hamilton deals with the Pegasus as outlined above.

I'm not sure what happened in the twenty years between Suppes and Hamilton, but I suspect that the concept of Existential Generalization was replaced by the idea of free and bound variables and the scope of a quantifier. Since Hamilton, another thirty years have passed, and if I ever teach Mathematical Logic again, I'll probably have to learn the subject all over again, with new notation.

The more I look into this, the less I think it has anything to do with the question of the existence of imaginary objects. Rick Norwood 19:13, 28 August 2007 (UTC)

Nothing you say here suggests mathematical logic has changed in any way. E.g. it is standard that Ex Fx is equivalent to ~ (x) ~Fx. But let's go back to the Pegasus problem, as stated in the article. The problem is that P(a) is either true or false. Thus P(a) v ~P(a). If Pa is true, then EG allows us to infer Ex Px. But if ~Pa is true, EG allows us to infer Ex ~Px. Thus, either way, we can infer the existence of some x that is either P or not P. Thus, whether or not 'Pegasus flies' is true or false, we can still infer the existence of something (i.e. Pegasus). Which seems absurd. That is the problem identified in the article. edward (buckner) 12:55, 29 August 2007 (UTC)

This may be relevant, if Pegasus does or does not exist. In classical logic, inconsistent premises always make an argument valid; that is, inconsistent premises imply any conclusion at all. This is known as the paradox of entailment. (Another article needs work?) Newbyguesses - Talk 13:24, 29 August 2007 (UTC)

The mathematical idea of existence has nothing to do with the real world idea of existence. For practical reasons, axiom systems are usually based on the real word, but as far as the mathematics goes, you could just as well have Axiom One: Every quirtle is a glottle; Axiom Two there exists at least one glottle that is not a quirtle. This assertion of the existence of a glottle has nothing to do with existence in the sense that it is discussed in the article.

It seems clear to me that, as Aristotle so patiently explained, we say things in the real world exist. We also say that abstractions, such as "goodness", have a kind of existence, but a different kind of existence from existence in the real world. If there were no minds, there would be no abstractions. A similar and perfectly elementary consideration applies to fictional characters. They exist in people's minds, or on the printed page, but not in the world. It is a secondary kind of existence, what Tolkien called "subcreation". Rick Norwood 21:17, 29 August 2007 (UTC)

That may be so, but how does this point to any problem with the 'Pegasus' article we were discussing? You were indicating there was some sort of problem with that paragraph.edward (buckner) 15:08, 30 August 2007 (UTC)

My understanding of the paragraph is this: what the paragraph calls "existence in the wide sense" is what Meinong called "Existenz" and what the paragraph calls "existence in the narrow sense" is what Meinong called "Bestand". ("Sense" or "scope" -- I suggest changing the title to "sense" since "scope" has quite a different technical meaning.) The paragraph then goes on to say that assertions of existence in the wide sense are typically of the form "N is P". I assume an example would be "Socrates is mortal". But "Pegasus is a myth" has that same form, "N is P", yet Meinong would not even allow Pegasus to Bestand, but would put Pegasus in the class of "impossible objects".

The article goes on to say that existence in the narrow sense is typically of the form "N exists". An example would be "a triangle exists", or (if you allow me to mix languages) "a triangle Bestand". But we could also say, "Socrates exists", which has the same form, but the meaning "Socrates Existenz".

I would like to try a rewrite to clear up this difficulty. Have you any objection? Rick Norwood 18:02, 30 August 2007 (UTC)

OK it turns out we are talking about different paragraphs. You are now talking about the one called 'wide and narrow scope'. I am sure it never used to have that title in the original version. Obviously it should be 'sense'. ARe you are absoutely certain about what Meinong says here, i.e. do you have a reference? edward (buckner) 07:34, 31 August 2007 (UTC)

I added a section heading, and used the word "scope", incorrectly. Sorry, my bad. Newbyguesses - Talk 07:53, 31 August 2007 (UTC)

To save myself a trip over to the library, I trusted what Wikipedia has to say about Meinong. If that's wrong, then we have a lot of work ahead of us, but it sounds authoritative to me. Rick Norwood 12:56, 31 August 2007 (UTC)

You referred to Wikipedia? Disbelief. Anyway I took a quick look at the article, as well as refer to a primary-ish source (my copy of 'On Assumptions'). The article leaves much to be desired: there are things that seem plain wrong, plus other things that aren't properly cited. For example, when Meinong talks about 'subsistence' and so forth he is not talking about things like Pegasus, but usually what we now call 'propositions'. It was his disciple Ernst Mally who came up with the stuff about objects. Also, surely Meinong would allow that Pegasus subsists, since a flying horse is not logically impossible, whereas a 'square circle' is. edward (buckner) 13:07, 31 August 2007 (UTC)

PS I note that the Wikipedia article on Mally makes no reference to his connection with National Socialism. edward (buckner) 13:10, 31 August 2007 (UTC)

The section being discussed here rather does lack - reference-wise. There are only five ~~references~~ citations for the article as a whole, I think they are all for quotes. The ones for this section should be very easy to track down. Good luck. Newbyguesses - Talk 14:03, 31 August 2007 (UTC)

Knowing how way leads on to way... . What you are saying is that after we finish rewriting this article, one of us needs to rewrite the article on Meinong. I have only one thing to say about that. It ain't me, babe.

In any case, I think we agree that there are problems with the paragraph in question (in this article). Do you want to attempt a rewrite, or shall I? Rick Norwood 12:40, 1 September 2007 (UTC)

Good work, Newbyguesses. Rick Norwood 12:49, 1 September 2007 (UTC)

I will keep trying to track down references where they are needed, and others are working here on sections that need work, good. Whole sections lacking references is not the best, though the lead shouldnt need any. The article is presentable, surely, and can be made better with but a little work. After that? Newbyguesses - Talk 23:42, 2 September 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Meinong and existence

I was going to try to work on this article, but it started taking on a life of its own, and it seemed best to me to just follow its progress. I do follow the existential generalization issue presented by dbuckner, and that seems correct to me. However, in terms of basic categories of existences, it seemed there were undistinquishe domains that needed to be in the article. I think what I was envisioning are the distinctions of Meinong: specifically a) existence (this is understandable to me as "actual existence) b) subsistence (I understand this as "existences of the mind". The category Being-given I don't understand at all. Maybe Meinong was considered a quack, but those seem to be pretty solid assumptions he's made there. Richiar 05:16, 6 September 2007 (UTC)

As I understand it, the third form of existence discussed by Meinong was the sense in which logical contradictions, such as "square circles" exist. That is, things that can be asserted to exist which cannot exist even as mental constructs, also called oxymorons. I also think Meinong's distinction resolves the "Pegasus flies" problem. Rick Norwood 17:13, 6 September 2007 (UTC)

It seems the "square circles" would be an imaginary existence of the mind, like the chesire cat in Alice in Wonderland. (Actually, Alice too). A real existence as an imaginary mental image. The dream of the scientist KeKulé who dreamed a mental image of benzene being circular, and then actually discovered that benzene was circular. That would be a correspondence of an existing mental image to an actual reality. So that might lend support to two domains of "existing". (Inner, outer, to quote Ken Wilbur, or, subjective and objective: I don't know who argues for or against that). I'm wondering if the "Giving-being" isn't the distinction of being-for-itself vs. being-in-itself?? Richiar 05:13, 7 September 2007 (UTC)

The phrases "being-for-itself" and "being-in-itself" don't communicate anything to me. I have no problem, however, if the article uses two categories, physical being and ideas. Round benzine would be a physical being whose discovery was aided by an idea. (Of course, benzine is really hexagonal and non-planar, but that's neither here nor there.) Most discoveries begin as ideas. There was a time when "Man on the moon" was only an idea.

I think Meinong's third category is things that exist as verbal constructions but which do not even exist as ideas. That is, if I understand him, he would claim we can have an idea of a Cheshire cat, but we cannot even have an idea of a square circle or a red that is green. Rick Norwood 12:39, 7 September 2007 (UTC)

I don't think Meinong would have said that non-existent objects exist in the mind. They are just as mind-independent as real chairs, tables &c. It's just that they don't exist. You might all find this section of this article helpful. edward (buckner) 15:05, 7 September 2007 (UTC)

I am unable to understand this. Consider Pegasus. If no mind had ever thought of a Pegasus, it would not have existence in any sense. Pegasus has existence only to the extent that it exists as a mental concept. It has no existence outside the human mind.

On the other hand, I thought of a problem with my own and, to the extent that I understand them, Meinong's categories. There are only finitely many human minds, each of which has only finitely many thoughts in its lifetime. But there are infinitely many natural numbers. Therefore, there is some natural number nobody has ever thought of. And yet, a mathematician would say that natural number exists.

I'll follow up your links, and see if they help. Rick Norwood 18:00, 7 September 2007 (UTC)

You seem to be arguing that the word 'Pegasus' refers to our mental concept of Pegasus. There is a standard argument against this, given by Mill, Frege, Quine and others. The argument is that it is the expression 'Our mental concept of Pegasus' that refers to our mental concept of Pegasus. I.e. we already have a term for the concept. But the word 'Pegasus' refers to Pegasus. Unless you also want to claim that the mental concept of Pegasus = Pegasus. But Pegasus is a horse, not a concept. edward (buckner) 07:04, 8 September 2007 (UTC)

I read your link with great interest, and I have a number of ideas on the subject, but in order for them to avoid the No Original Research restriction in Wikipedia, I have to publish them in a refereed journal first. Can you recommond a good journal that publishes papers in this area? Rick Norwood 19:28, 7 September 2007 (UTC)

Any philosophy journal would accept a good, well-researched article on this subject. edward (buckner) 07:04, 8 September 2007 (UTC)

The article discusses Aristotle's Categories previous to the Meinong material. Two points that then occur to me, that might have bearing on this,

A mathematician might say that the concept of the set of all natural numbers is conceivable, and therefore exists. That is not the same as saying "2" exists, though 2 is a natural number, nor does it assert that any particular member of the set exists, only that some member of the set exists, for the purposes of mathematics.

A table "exists" - we say it is made of a substance, wood. A thought "exists" - we say it exists within a mind, (though that is a disputable point); however, just because a table is "made" of wood, its existence is no more or less "real" than the existence of even the most ephemeral of thoughts.

These points are of course arguable, are argued. I recall a library book on Philosophy of mathematics, not a specialist text, but useful perhaps, which I may be able to re-locate, though there may not be much there on Categories as such.

Newbyguesses - Talk 23:17, 7 September 2007 (UTC)

It is Saturday, and I am at home, without my reference books in easy reach, but I am pretty sure that any mathematician would agree that if S is a set and x is an element of S, then if S exists it follows that x exists. I think this is an axiom of set theory in ... um... Halmos's Naive Set Theory ...???... . But I'm trusting my memory. Rick Norwood 13:08, 8 September 2007 (UTC)

I am continuing to follow this discussion and find it quite interesting. Thanks edward for the reference to nonexistence. I am continuing to read it. As I ponder these issues, it seems there may be some confustion as a result of inadequate conceptualization for the discussion, or what one might call "domains of distinction". I will present below possible distinctions for this discussion. (I do not believe that they can be put in the article, as I know of no general discussion of these distinctions in secondary or primary sources that could be used for the Wikipedia article. But for the purpose of maybe helping with the discussion, I am presenting them):

Consider the two statements:

a) Pegasus flies

b) Pegasus has flies

These two statements could bring forth the following categories:

Mind existences:

image of horse

image of pegasus

word "pegasus"

belief "pegasus"

story of "pegasus"

image of flies

Pegasus "is"

horse "is"

fly "is"

flying "is"

(This is a clarification of the above: there is a discussion of language and the relationship to "is" in "An Introduction to Metaphysics" and "On the Way to Language", both by M. Heidegger). Richiar 04:27, 28 September 2007 (UTC)

Actual existences:

book about pegasus

horses

flies

birds

airplanes

Actual Actions:

flying (eg. airplanes, flies, birds)

conversation about pegasus

Richiar 18:15, 8 September 2007 (UTC)

As I look at these categories, it might be more properly stated that mind existences are actual also: but intangible, thus one could say actual mind existences that are intangible, and actual existences that are tangible. Then there could be the category of "nonexistence", which is the current topic of debate. Richiar 16:58, 10 September 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Semantics of existence

The fifth paragraph of this section has an interesting idea, but the paragraph is grammatically very difficult to understand, and I'm not sure what its saying, if anything. Maybe a rewrite might help (keep content but less complex sentence structure). Richiar 01:43, 16 September 2007 (UTC)

That fifth paragraph has been the subject of a lot of controversy with no consensus. I'm going to be bold and try a rewrite. Rick Norwood 13:18, 16 September 2007 (UTC)

Rick, you have added the sentence " On the other hand, the statement "A bridge crosses the Styx at Limbo," has the same form, but does not imply existence." This is POV statement – certainly some philosophers would claim that that "A bridge crosses the Styx at Limbo," does not assert the existence of such a bridge, but the dominant view is that it does assert existence (for example, the statement seems synonymous with "at least one bridge crosses the Styx at Limbo", which is a number statement, thus asserts existence (the statement "zero bridges cross the Styx at Limbo" would be taken to be a denial of existence).

This reminds me of a few things that would be needed to be added at this point. But the sentence you have added needs to be qualified, or referenced, nonetheless. edward (buckner) 10:10, 17 September 2007 (UTC)

I'll give it a shot, but you may want to work on this paragraph as well. Rick Norwood 13:22, 17 September 2007 (UTC)

I don't know about how others feel, but I think this article has vastly improved in a meaningful direction since Edward requested assistance back in July. Nice work. Maybe improvements can be made, but I like how its going so far. Rick,Your work on the paragraph seems a good improvement. Thanks. Richiar 21:14, 18 September 2007 (UTC)

It seems to me, by contrast, that it's getting steadily worse. Can anyone explain what the section 'Semantics of existence' is about? It seems now like a set of random unconnected observations, most unreferenced, some of them rather dubious. Sorry to be critical. I'd help, but I find the subject too difficult at the moment. edward (buckner) 08:28, 21 September 2007 (UTC)

My understanding of the paragraph is that the word "existence" is used in at least three ways. First, it is used to mean "exists in the real, physical world", as in the sentence, "I believe in the existence of elephants but not in the existence of unicorns." Second, it is used by mathematicians in a highly technical sense, as the scope of a particular quantifier with particular properties given by axioms and definitions, as in the sentence, "The existence of five and only five Platonic solids has been proven within the axioms and definitions of Euclidean geometry." Finally, it is used in the sense in which fictional objects exist within the worldview of human beings. Thus "The existence of Sherlock Holmes is thanks to the writing of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle." Rick Norwood 17:45, 21 September 2007 (UTC)

Thanks Rick. But 1. is that what the paragraph is saying? Shouldn't it be amended to say that? and 2. Suppose it is claimed that 'fictional objects exist within the worldview of human beings'. Then I might reply: are there such things as fictional objects? I.e. (and spelling the problem out) I can validly ask whether fictional objects exist. Do you now see there is a problem with what you are saying here? If it is correct to say that there is a sense of the word 'exist', according to which fictional characters exist, then the question whether there are such things as fictional characters, i.e. do they exist, makes no sense (it would be like asking whether bachelors are unmarried). Do you see the problem now? edward (buckner) 13:12, 22 September 2007 (UTC)

Thanks edward. Your comments seem appropriately candid, and a critical perspective will help the article. If you can direct us to the version that seemed more appropriate we can look to see where it maybe currently fails, when you have time.Richiar 22:13, 21 September 2007 (UTC)

Thanks Richiar. The problem is that there are certain fundamental and very difficult questions about the topic of existence (see my reply to Rick above). If this article is to be any good, it should be illuminating people about those problems. But it isn't working, because even the people who are involved in writing the article itself are having the same problems. This is probably one of the most difficult subjects to write about coherently, which is why I despair. Thanks for you kind support, however. edward (buckner) 13:12, 22 September 2007 (UTC)

I am trying to understand your point, and I have certainly had the experience of thinking I understood something, a mathematical concept for example, and then discovering that there was a subtle point I was missing. Is that the case here? I'm willing to talk about it.

Language is an imperfect tool for the transfer of ideas. Communication is possible only to the extent that people use words in the same way. I gather we understand "existence" in the same way in the first two cases, the scientific and mathematical, and that it is only in the case of "fictional existence" that we have difficulty.

My understanding is that the problem arises in an attempt to apply a mathematical rule, "If A has property P, then A exists," to statements outside the field of mathematics. But outside of mathematics, people use words losely, not precisely. Mathematical rules do not apply to ordinary language. As Yuri Manin points out, to a mathematician "She got married and got pregnant," means the same thing as "She got pregnant and got married," because the "and" operator is commutative. In common language, however, the meanings are very different.

Most people would agree that "Sherlock Holmes is a detective," is a true statement. Applying the rule "If A has property P, then A exists" we arrive at the statement "Sherlock Holmes exists." You seem to believe that there is a profound problem with this. In my view, it is a simple case of using the word "exist" in two different ways, a common enough problem with words in ordinary language. Yes, of course Sherlock Holmes exists, I've read the stories. No, of course Sherlock Holmes does not exist, he's a fictional character. Since I think most people would agree that both of those statements are true, it necessarily follows that the meaning of the word "exists" isn't the same in statement one as it is in statement two.

What we need is a textbook or scholarly article on the subject which will guide us in writing the paragraph. Rick Norwood 14:59, 23 September 2007 (UTC)

Here is a link to Michael Dummett which might address the problem with communication as well as classification that you are addressing. [2] I found it under the article on Reality. I follow what you are saying in your communication above.Richiar 01:06, 24 September 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Trying for rewrite of "Semantics" section

I'm going to try my own rewrite of the Semantics section, but rather than put it on the main page, I'll put it in the discussion section for comments. I will rewrite it as suggestions are made.

There are some common ways of understanding the meaning of the world "existence". First, it is used to mean existences of the real, physical world, such as in the sentence, "I believe that elephants are real". Secondly, there is the meaning of existences as "objective principles of truth" beyond the subjective experience: eg., "the existence of five and only five platonic solids has been proven by Euclidian geometry". Finally, there is the meaning of existences as fictional subjective mental processes: eg., "I believe elephants are real but not Unicorns"; "Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character created by Sir Arther Conan Doyle, and existes in books, movies, and the imagination". There have been centuries of debate and research investigating these ideas.

Several schools of philosophy have addressed these issues. (Elaborate on: Frege; Dummett; Bretano; Wittgenstein; B. Russell; Nominalist approach; Categories (Plato, medieval concepts; Ockham.)

Richiar 00:04, 23 September 2007 (UTC)

This sounds fine to me, but I'm going to attempt a rewrite for style.

There are some common ways of understanding the meaning of the world "existence". First, it is used to mean existence in the real, physical world, as in the sentence, "Elephants exist." Second, there is the meaning of existence as "objective principles of truth" beyond the subjective experience, for example, "The existence of five and only five platonic solids has been proven by Euclidian geometry." Finally, there is the meaning of existence which includes mythical or fictional mental constructs, for example, "Unicorns exist in myth but not in reality," or "Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character created by Sir Arther Conan Doyle, who existes in books, movies, and the imagination." There have been centuries of debate and research investigating these ideas.

Rick Norwood 15:06, 23 September 2007 (UTC)

OK. I got it. I will take it a little further. Richiar 01:08, 24 September 2007 (UTC)

>>I have certainly had the experience of thinking I understood something, a mathematical concept for example, and then discovering that there was a subtle point I was missing. Is that the case here?

Well, sort of, but see below.

>>Most people would agree that "Sherlock Holmes is a detective," is a true statement. Applying the rule "If A has property P, then A exists" we arrive at the statement "Sherlock Holmes exists." You seem to believe that there is a profound problem with this.

Yes, there is a profound problem. The view you are referring to is that existence is not 'univocal' and it was debated extensively in the middle ages, as well as now. As for scholarly articles, the best online by far is Barry Miller's article 'Existence' in the SEP. Also, to understand better what is wrong with the view you put forward, see the chapter 'Glimpses beyond' in Quine's Methods of Logic. This is all giving me a better idea of how the article could be developed to be more accessible. Thanks for the help. edward (buckner) 18:38, 24 September 2007 (UTC)

I hate to say it, but to me the Barry Miller article seems to be making a mountain out of a molehill. Early philosophers seem to have been very naive about the nature of language. They seem to have assumed that the correspondence between language and the universe was much stronger than it actually is, and that the laws that work for precise language, such as the language of mathematics and science, can be applied to ordinary language, where in fact counterexamples abound. If I understand what "univocal" means, then it seems to me that the non "univocal" nature of the word "existence" is the answer to all of these problems. The other answers, especially the "many worlds" answer, seem to me silly, much like Robert Morley and his friends pretending that Sherlock Holmes is real. In fact, every word has as many meanings as there are people who "know" that word, and the astonishing thing is not breakdowns in communication and in the laws of logic, but rather how often communication is possible and how often the laws of logic work. Rick Norwood 20:24, 24 September 2007 (UTC)

You know best, Rick. edward (buckner) 08:33, 25 September 2007 (UTC)

Aside from the issue that Millers article might appear to be making assumptions (mountain out of mole hill, naive view of relationship between language and world, assuming precision that is not the case), this seems to be to be a digression and it seems to me the Miller article is notable and reasonably comprehensive in an introductory way, to be practically a helpful source that could be used constructively in writing a wiki article about the topic "existence". If the views you're expressing can be found in notable sources, then they could be added as a counterview to the views of the existence article by Miller. I don't have the same sense of the article that you seem to: the issues seem cogent to me. If these issues have been debated for centuries and are still current and presented in SEP, all the more reason to consider the Miller article as an appropriate reference. The issues of the Ancients relationship with language and world might be a topic for another article, maybe a sub topic under history of philosophy of language, if there are any notable sources for that. Richiar 02:52, 25 September 2007 (UTC)

Rick. You may well be right (and thus Russell, and Quine, and Frege, and also medieval philosophers like Ockham, Buridan, Boethius of Dacia and many others are possibly wrong) in defending the 'two sense' view of 'exists'. However, this being Wikipedia, we have deal with NPOV. What is required is (a) to provide suitably-referenced sources for the one-sense view (I found a good quote from Russell the other night) (b) explain the view in a simple way that doesn't confuse the reader, and gives him or her a good sense of why the one-sense view has been taken seriously by many philosophers.

>>I hate to say it, but to me the Barry Miller article seems to be making a mountain out of a molehill. Early philosophers seem to have been very naive about the nature of language.

As I said, the art of getting this right is to explain the issue in a way that makes the mountain real, and plainly visible to the average reader. This is what I have been struggling with. On the comment about 'early philosophers', do you include Frege, Russell and Quine? For they defend the one-sense view. Indeed, the entire predicate calculus is built on the one-sense view. edward (buckner) 07:56, 26 September 2007 (UTC)

Of course, what I'm afraid of is that I don't know best. I can say things here on the talk page that I would never put into the article unless I found a published source. On the other hand, I have a lot of published source material on my book shelf about the predicate calculus, and I know that it was never intended to be applied to ordinary language. In fact, textbooks often warn against attempting this (Manin is noteworthy). The predicate calculus should only be applied to well formed formulas, at least from a mathematician's viewpoint. What the philosophical viewpoint on this I don't know, but surely the subject has been discussed.

At least we seem to be close to agreement on the first paragraph. I'm looking forward to Richiar's extension of that. Rick Norwood 13:40, 26 September 2007 (UTC)

Inspite of the vissicitudes and undulations this seems to be a constructive dialogue (I hope), and I am getting ready to continue with the above as soon as get a little more review done. Richiar 21:21, 26 September 2007 (UTC)

[edit] New lead

There are many problems with the current opening. Philosophers from the analytic tradition who study existence would get very upset if you called their branch of philosophy 'ontology'. The paragraph goes on to talk about the questions that arise about existence, but the list given here is of mostly epistemological questions (e.g. does there exist an external reality ...). Ontology is more closely connected with the problem of Essence, which is a separate article. Sorry to be negative (that's what I'm best at). I have some positive ideas but this is a very difficult to present at a non-specialist level in a clear way.

Here's what the opening paragraph should be, in my view.

Existence is what is asserted by the verb 'exist' (derived from the Latin word 'existere', meaning to appear or emerge or stand out). The word 'exist' is grammatically a predicate. Some philosophers have argued that it is logically a predicate, and predicates something called 'existence' of the subject. Thus 'four-leaved clover exists' predicates exists of the subject four-leafed clover. Cognates for this predicate are 'is real', 'has being', 'is found in reality', 'is in the real world' and so on.
Other philosophers have denied that existence is logically a predicate, and claim that existence is really asserted by the etymologically distinct verb 'is', and that all statements containing the predicate 'exists' can be reduced to statements that do not use this predicate. For example, 'Four-leaved clover exists' can be analysed into the equivalent statement 'some clover is four-leaved', where the verb 'is' connects the subject 'some clover' with the predicate 'four-leaved'.
The philosophical question about whether 'exists' is a predicate or not is an old one, and has been discussed and argued over by philosophers from Aristotle, through Avicenna, Aquinas, Scotus, Hume, Kant and many others. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Dbuckner (talk • contribs) 11:09, 27 September 2007 (UTC)

I noticed your suggestions: your thoughts seem cogent. I'll have to look at the intro and reflect on it. Give me a day or two. Richiar 04:37, 28 September 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Extending section of Semantics of Existence

I have been working a couple of days on taking some ideas from the Miller article, trying to simplify them, and combine them with Ricks paragraph from the section above. There will likely be some editing problems with the sentences, and paragraphs, but I'm putting them here just to include some basic ideas to what we've been working on. Also, I notice some similarities with what Edward has suggested for the introduction, so we'll probably have to reassess this also in light of that. Give it a whirl, Rick.

If the ontology is an issue, then it can be worked over somehow.

The new paragraphs I've been working on are below:

In English the word "exists" and "is" are verbs of being. In discussing existence from the analytic philosophy perspective, therefore, we are concerned with the predicates ‘is’ and ‘exists’.

The issue of the meaning of existence is inextricably intertwined with the idea or word ‘exists’. On the surface one might think that a statement "Tom exists" means the same thing as "Tom is real". This meaning can be called into question however because it is considered from an analytic view as a negation of Tom as imaginary, or Tom as being nonexistent. To extend the arguement, Tom could not be considered as existent in reference to a property or attribue of nonexistence if considered from the point of view of the state of affairs prior to Tom's birth. The idea of existence in reference to nonexistence in this situation is simply meaningless. Thus, a reasonable conclusion is that Tom's existence can't be based based in the idea that it has the same meaning that "Tom is real".

In general (although not exhaustively) analytic philosophers have developed two views of the meaning of "existence". The first (considered to be the Frege-Russell distinction) is that there are four different meanings of ‘is’ — a) the ‘is’ of existence, b) the "is" of identity, c) the "is" of predication, and d) the "is" of generic implication (inclusion), The second view can be expressed by the statement "existence is not a predicate".Richiar 04:27, 28 September 2007 (UTC)

R, consider the following three sentences

(A) Tables exist in the real world (B) Hobbits exist in the world of LOTR (C) Platonic solids exist in the world of geometry.

Note the word 'exist' occurs in each of these. It is plain to me that it is used in exactly the same sense, each time. Of course, it is qualified by 'in the real world' in the first case, by 'in the world of LOTR' in the second, and so on. But that is not an argument that the word 'exist' has a different meaning. Any more than the word 'man' has a different meaning in 'running man' than in 'sitting man'. I.e. the expression 'exists in the real world' has a different meaning to the expression 'exists in the world of LOTR'. But the word 'exists' has exactly the same meaning in both. edward (buckner) 09:55, 28 September 2007 (UTC)

OK. I used the word "meaning" which you are referring to in a nontechnical sense, and perhaps you could suggest a better way to express it. I am noticing there are contexts to the three examples you gave above. Go ahead and suggest a more appropriate word. Richiar 05:15, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

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